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ABSTRACT 
 
Kevin Mason: Building an Unwanted Nation: The Anglo-American Partnership and 
Austrian Proponents of a Separate Nationhood, 1918-1934 
(Under the direction of Dr. Christopher Browning) 
 
 
 
 This project focuses on American and British economic, diplomatic, and cultural 
ties with Austria, and particularly with internal proponents of Austrian independence. 
Primarily through loans to build up the economy and diplomatic pressure, the United States 
and Great Britain helped to maintain an independent Austrian state and prevent an Anschluss 
or union with Germany from 1918 to 1934. In addition, this study examines the minority of 
Austrians who opposed an Anschluss. The three main groups of Austrians that supported 
independence were the Christian Social Party, monarchists, and some industries and 
industrialists. These Austrian nationalists cooperated with the Americans and British in 
sustaining an unwilling Austrian nation. Ultimately, the global depression weakened 
American and British capacity to practice dollar and pound diplomacy, and the popular 
appeal of Hitler combined with Nazi Germany’s aggression led to the realization of the 
Anschluss. Other works on the Anschluss have not given adequate attention to the years 
1918 to 1934, the critical American and British role in Austrian affairs, and the Anschluss 
opponents. The study of cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in terms of 
nation-building and economic aid has taken on renewed significance in recent years.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
       
 Building an Unwanted Nation examines American and British political, economic, 
financial, diplomatic, and cultural relations with Austria in the time period 1918 to 1934, 
with specific emphasis on the British and American policy to secure Austrian independence. 
This dissertation also investigates those Austrians who supported an independent Austria, 
worked with the Americans and British, and opposed an Anschluss movement that sought a 
union between Austria and Germany in this period. Scholars have addressed the question of 
Austria’s internal situation in the inter-war period, primarily from 1934 to 1938, and have 
focused on the majority of Austrians who supported an Anschluss. However, the significant 
roles of Anglo-American diplomacy and the anti-Anschluss Austrians who along with the 
Americans and British maintained the Austrian state and encouraged the development of 
Austrian national identity into the mid 1930s have been overlooked. My project hopes to fill 
this gap in the historiography. Drawing on aspects of the “new diplomatic history,” it 
explores the interrelationship of diplomacy, economy, domestic politics, nation-building, 
and culture. 
 Austrian independence from 1918 to 1934 was maintained by the combined efforts 
of the United States and Britain, as well as the minority of Austrians who also pushed for 
Austrian sovereignty. The Anglo-American loans for Austrian economic reconstruction and 
diplomatic pressure helped prevent an Anschluss. At the same time, Austrian patriots-- in 
particular the Christian Social Party that led the government, the legitimists (monarchists), 
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and some industries and industrialists-- resisted German nationalism and regional separatist 
movements and instead embraced Austro-nationalism. Without British and American aid, 
the anti-Anschluss forces in Austria would have had much greater difficulty resisting 
Anschluss, and in particular the Christian Social Party would have had far greater difficulty 
in maintaining its pivotal position in Austrian domestic politics. And without a receptive 
anti-Anschluss government, international aid—if received at all—would have been far less 
effective in restoring economic stability and lessening Anschluss pressures. Therefore, these 
dual domestic and foreign forces formed the pillars holding up Austria—a state that survived 
severe economic crises, a horrible global depression, and an attempted Nazi coup in this 
period. 
After World War I, the Allies created independent Polish, Czechoslovak, and 
Yugoslav states, based on the principle of self-determination and in response to the 
perceived national aspirations of these peoples. In contrast, to invert Benedict Anderson’s 
concept of nationalism, Austria was an “unimagined community” upon which the victorious 
Allies imposed statehood.1 Although ethnically the population of Austria was mostly 
German, the Allies forbade Austria from joining Germany after World War I. American and 
British diplomacy combined self-determination and balance of power politics in Europe. 
Britain, the United States, and other Allies did not want to add territory to and thereby 
strengthen a defeated Germany.   
 During the inter-war period the United States and Great Britain were the top two 
creditor nations, and their foreign policies were the most similar and most moderate. Anglo-
American policies were neither as punitive nor as strict in the enforcement of the peace 
                                                 
1Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (Revised Edition, London and New York: Verso, 1991). 
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treaty as those of France and other European countries. Although they wanted to preserve 
Austrian independence, the position of the United States and Britain toward an Anschluss 
prohibition was not absolute. At times they left the door open to a possible Anschluss in the 
future as long as it took place peacefully and with the consent of an international body.   
The Anglo-American friendship has been one of the most enduring relationships. 
The efforts of the British-American alliance in seeking local partners in order to create and 
sustain a nation and political culture as they imagined and desired it have renewed 
significance. Examples of American and British nation-building after September 11, 2001, 
include Afghanistan and Iraq. The Austrian case offers a window onto earlier and at least 
partially similar attempts by the same powers in Austria after World War I.   
The Anschluss movement during the inter-war period was predominately fuelled by 
both nationalism and economic forces. Despite its picturesque Alpine scenery, Austria had 
few natural resources and industries. In fact, Austria had been fully dependent on the other 
parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire for its survival, in particular on agricultural 
products from Hungary and industrial products from Bohemia, a region which was now 
incorporated into the state of Czechoslovakia. During the inter-war period, the Austrians 
questioned the viability of their new country and sought a variety of solutions, ranging from 
economic unions with neighboring states, to a political union with Germany, to a Habsburg 
restoration. Most Austrians wanted to align with either the successor states of Austria-
Hungary or Germany. However, embittered political memories and ethnic tensions in the 
non-German areas of the former Habsburg territories continually blocked the former option.  
  Because it emerged out of a hated and imposed treaty, the new and independent 
Republic of Austria remained unwanted by most Austrians. The inter-war Anschluss 
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movement existed as part of a much larger unresolved German question whose origins went 
back to the early nineteenth century prior to the Kleindeutschland unification of Germany. 
Loyalty to the Habsburgs had given the German Austrians a sense of unity and identity as 
part of the larger Empire. The dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and end of 
the monarchy after World War I intensified the desire for a Grossdeutschland in Austria, 
which had previously only been supported by a minority. From 1918 to1934 the Anschluss 
in Austria was supported by not only Greater Germans but also most socialists and many 
conservatives, making it a majority movement, especially in the years 1918 and 1919. 
In response to the strong Anschluss movement, the United States and Britain 
continually sent money to stimulate the Austrian economy. The infusion of international 
money, much of which came with the condition that Austria remain independent, allowed 
the Austrian economy in the mid and late-1920s to improve from a state of near collapse. 
British and American diplomats reported that the desire for Anschluss had decreased.  
However, in the early and mid- 1930s uncertainty over the fate of Austria resurfaced 
because of the global depression. For example, in 1931 Austria requested a customs union 
with Germany, thus expressing a pro-Anschluss sentiment that the majority of Austrians 
held. Perceiving the customs union as a step towards an actual Anschluss, French opposition 
brought about the collapse of the Austro-German customs union. Consequently, Britain and 
the United States encouraged other options, such as a trade union among the Habsburg 
successor states, which also failed. Moreover, due to the magnitude of the world economic 
crisis, and their own financial problems, the American and British dollar and pound 
diplomacy in Austria lessened but did not end.   
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This key economic relationship was supported by amicable cultural relations. In 
particular American movies and jazz disseminated throughout Austria in the 1920s and early 
and mid- 1930s. There were many exchanges of students and art exhibits between Austria, 
Britain, and the United States. Austrian music concert tours in Britain and the United States 
were especially well-received. These exchanges of people and art strengthened international 
bonds. In particular Americans and Britons had positive perceptions of Austrians during this 
time period, which facilitated their governments’ providing economic support. 
Alongside Anglo-American diplomacy in Austria, this dissertation also looks at the 
Austrian advocates of independence from 1918 to 1934. Regardless of the majority support 
of an Anschluss, there were still those Austrians who partnered with the Americans and 
British in sustaining an unwanted nation. The Austrian anti-Anschluss supporters were 
Austrian nationalists rather than Greater German nationalists. The three main groups of 
Austrian nationalists were a majority faction within the Christian Social Party, the 
monarchists, and some industrialists and industries. The Christian Social Party was anti- 
Anschluss, anti-socialist, anti-Prussian, and anti-Protestant. Meanwhile it supported Austrian 
nationalism and Catholicism and was generally sympathetic to monarchist sentiments. The 
party also had a pro-Anschluss faction within it. Although the Christian Social Party 
represented only a minority of Austrians, it led the government from 1920 to 1934 because it 
formed a coalition with other rightwing parties, especially the Greater German People’s 
Party, with the socialists in opposition. The coalition subordinated the Anschluss issue to 
anti-socialism. The failed Austro-German customs union plan and the rise of Nazism 
brought about a decline in the Greater German People’s Party. In 1932 Engelbert Dollfuss 
formed a new rightwing coalition without the Greater Germans People’s Party, and then in 
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1933 he replaced parliamentary democracy with an authoritarian regime. This regime was an 
oppressive, one-party, anti-socialist, “Austro-fascist,” and anti-Nazi state. Dollfuss’ 
oppression of the socialist party rather than joining forces with it against a common enemy 
impeded the state in its battle against Nazism. Nonetheless, on a scale of relative 
authoritarianism, Dollfuss did not wield as much power as Hitler and Benito Mussolini. 
In addition, the legitimists opposed an Anschluss with Germany because that would 
destroy their number one goal of a Habsburg restoration. The monarchists were the most 
committed of the Austrian nationalists but also the smallest in numbers. In the 1930s, the 
US, Britain, and other major European powers valued their anti-Nazism, even though they 
did not agree with a Habsburg restoration. Finally, the anti-Anschluss industries and 
industrialists primarily feared German competition in the period 1918 to 1934. In general 
Austrian industries and industrialists were split over the Anschluss question. The Austrian 
automobile, chemical, and electric industries in particular were anti-Anschluss. Altogether, 
Austrian proponents of an independent Austria complied with American and British 
policies, negotiated for loans, and helped build the Austrian nation.  
With the help of the US, Britain, and other countries, the Austrian supporters of 
independence were successfully able to maintain Austrian’s independence in the period 
1918 to 1934. However, neither the Austrian nationalists nor the Americans and British were 
fully able to create a separate Austrian identity and nationalism during this period. The US 
and Britain achieved their goal regarding Austria by sending loans to revitalize the country’s 
troubled economy and by applying economic and diplomatic pressure.2 Circumstances 
changed drastically in the 1930s due to the Great Depression and the rise of Nazism. When 
                                                 
2Examples of diplomatic pressure included not sending any more loans, economic 
sanctions, and possible occupation if Austria did not hinder any Anschluss movements. 
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Hitler came to power in Germany, the anti-Anschluss stance of Britain and the United States 
intensified, and they were no longer willing to compromise on a possible Anschluss. Also, 
Austria’s largest pro-Anschluss political party, the socialists, officially abandoned its support 
for an Anschluss, along with most Austrians, because they had wanted a union with a 
democratic Germany. They saw Nazi Germany as anti-socialist and anti-democratic. Since 
neither Britain nor the United States were willing to make a military commitment to Austria, 
the country also turned toward fascist Italy in 1933 as its last remaining hope against Nazi 
Germany, which was aggressively challenging the very existence of Austria. But the 
rapprochement between Mussolini and Hitler ended the last support for an independent 
Austria and opened the way to Anschluss in March 1938.    
 The dissertation is divided into three parts and ten chapters. All three parts describe 
events from the perspective of the Americans and British on the one hand and the Austrian 
nationalist groups on the other. Part I “Contested Beginnings” discusses the period from 
1918 to 1919, which was marked by economic stagnation and a strong Anschluss movement 
that reached its zenith. Part II “Emerging Independence” discusses the 1920s, a period that 
witnessed economic improvement with international aid and a decreased Anschluss 
movement by 1923. Part III “Increasing Crisis” discusses the period from 1930 to 1934, 
which was marred by the global depression, a heightened Anschluss movement, and the rise 
of Nazism.   
 
I. Historiography 
 
 The unique situation of Austria during the inter-war period does not fit well into 
current historiography on nationalism and new diplomatic history. Most books on general 
diplomacy during the Peace Settlement and its aftermath do not cover Austria prior to 1934 
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or the American and British involvement in nation-building.3 There are many books on the 
decline and fall of the Habsburg Empire on the one hand and the Anschluss of 1938 on the 
other, but only a few books discuss Austria in the early inter-war period. Most books 
concerned with the 1938 annexation of Austria start in the 1930s, and there is a definite gap, 
especially in English-language scholarship, of books that cover the 1920s. Moreover, both 
the German and Anglo-American scholarship have neglected the quintessential diplomatic 
role that Britain and America played in maintaining Austrian independence from 1918 to 
1934. My dissertation will help fill in that gap.   
 A body of secondary materials focuses on the Anschluss in the 1930s.4 Specific to 
this project are those that deal with Austrian popular sentiment. Currently, there are no 
works on the Anschluss and new diplomatic history. One book that does cover the early 
Austrian Anschluss movement is Alfred Low‘s The Anschluss Movement 1918-1919. Yet, 
Low does not focus on the main motives of the Anschluss movement. In addition, Low deals 
with the Austrian internal situation and not the American and British mission in Austria. In 
another book, The Anschluss Movement, 1931-1938, Low maintains that the main reason the 
Austrian Republic ended in March 1938 was because of Nazi Germany’s military invasion 
                                                 
3Examples are:  Manfred F. Boemeke, Elisabeth Glaser, and Gerald Feldman, eds., The 
Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Gordon Martel, ed., "The Origins of the Second World War" Reconsidered: 
The A.J.P. Taylor Debate after Twenty-Five Years (London: Routledge, 1999); William 
Kehler, “A Reevaluation of the Versailles Peace," Relevance: The Quarterly Journal of the 
Great War Society, Vol. V, No. 2 (Summer 1996); Kehler, ed., The Legacy of the Great 
War: Peacemaking, 1919 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).  
 
4Examples of books dealing with Austria in the 1930s and the Anschluss are: Jürgen Gehl, 
Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss 1931-38 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); 
Kurt von Schuschnigg, The Brutal Takeover: The Austrian ex-Chancellor’s Account of the 
Anschluss of Austria by Hitler (New York: Atheneum, 1971). 
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and forced annexation, not the will of the Austrian people. When Europe and the US failed 
to support Austria in the late 1930s, the superior Nazi army conquered Austria. Low asserts 
that, unlike in 1918-1919, two-thirds of the Austrian population, including himself, had not 
wanted a union with Nazi Germany in 1938. Low had fled his native Austria in 1938. Low’s 
two books on the Anschluss do not cover the 1920s. This dissertation disagrees with Low’s 
argument that only a minority of Austrians desired an Anschluss with Nazi Germany.5 
Recent scholarship on popular opinion and the Anschluss also tends to reject the notion that 
Austria should be considered the first victim of Nazism and argues that most Austrians 
wanted an Anschluss in 1938.6 Some historians, like Evan Burr Bukey in Hitler’s Austria: 
Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945, even contend that the Austrians became 
good Nazis.7   
                                                 
5
 Alfred Low, The Anschluss Movement 1918-1919 (Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, 1974) and The Anschluss Movement, 1931-1938 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985). 
 
6Other works on popular opinion: In Österreichische Geschichtswissenschaft und Anschluß, 
1918-1930 (Vienna: Geyer-Edition,1974), Herbert Dachs asserts that most Austrian history 
professors at universities throughout the inter-war period were extremely rightist, pro-
Anschluss, and to some degree anti-democratic. These universities then influenced students, 
intellectuals, and secondary teachers, who in turn influenced the youth. In a chapter titled 
“Aufteilungs- und Einmarschpläne um Österreich 1918-1934” in Festschrift für Franz Loidl 
(Vienna, 1975), L. Jedlicka says that most of the Austrian political parties favored 
Anschluss, and the Austrians rejected the notion of a Kleinstaat (small state). In addition, 
Michael Gehler has a more recent study on Austrian universities in Thomas Albrich, Klaus 
Eisterer, and Rolf Steininger, eds. Tirol und der Anschluss: Voraussetzungen, 
Entwicklungen, Rahmenbedingungen 1918-1938 (Innsbruck: Haymon-Verlag, 1988). 
Gehler’s essay “Die Studenten der Universität Innsbruck und die Anschlußbewegung 1918-
1938" asserts that in general the Tyrolean universities, professors, students, and fraternities 
were very rightist and pro-Anschluss. This is in agreement with Herbert Dach’s argument 
regarding universities and students.    
 
7An invaluable book dealing with popular opinion is Evan Burr Bukey’s Hitler’s Austria: 
Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000). Disputing Low, Bukey argues that not only did the majority of 
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In addition, books dealing with the Austrian inter-war economy are relevant to this 
project, such as Tirol und der Anschluss and Ungleiche Partner?8 Francis Ludwig Carsten 
focuses on Austria’s domestic situation, namely its political and economic handicaps.9 These 
works on popular sentiment and the economy do not deny the massive appeal for the 
Anschluss in the inter-war period. However, none of the books specifically discusses the 
Austrian question from the perspective of British and American foreign policy in the time 
period 1918 to 1934.  
Moreover, most books on Austria during the inter-war and the Anschluss focus on 
the Anschluss supporters and not its opponents. For example, Carsten’s book on the First 
                                                                                                                                                      
Austrians support the Anschluss in 1938, but they continued to support Hitler, the war, and 
the persecution of the Jews until the very end. Bukey maintains that the overwhelming 
power of German nationalism accounts for Austrian receptivity of the 1938 Anschluss, not 
economic factors. While Bukey focuses on Austrian popular sentiment from 1938 to 1945, 
my dissertation looks at the early Anschluss movement and employs American, British, and 
Austrian documents that support Bukey’s arguments regarding most Austrians’ desire for 
union in 1938, because the underlying Anschluss desire existed long before Hitler. 
 
8Michael Gehler, ed., Ungleiche Partner? Österreich und Deutschland in ihrer 
gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung. Historische Analysen und Vergleiche aus dem 19. Und 20. 
Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996); In Tirol und der Anschluss Kuprian and 
others examine the Anschluss movement in Tyrol and its economic motives. In Ungleiche 
Partner? many historians, such as Rolf Steininger and Franz Mathis, also discuss the 
connection between the Anschluss and the economy. For example, Steininger focuses on the 
1931 customs union between Austria and Germany. He is concerned with who initiated the 
customs union and what were the specific intentions, plans, and policies that both Austria 
and Germany pursued. 
 
9
 Francis Ludwig (F. L.) Carsten, The First Austrian Republic 1918-1938 (Brookfield, 
Vermont: Gower Publishing Company, 1986). Regarding sources, both Carsten and this 
dissertation use the unpublished British Foreign Office documents. However, while Carsten 
uses the older published British Documents on Foreign Policy that appeared in the 1960s 
and 1970s, this dissertation uses the British Documents on Foreign Affairs which is a newer 
and expanded series. In addition, Carten mainly discusses the Austrian internal situation, 
while this work emphasizes American and British foreign, economic, financial, and cultural 
ties with Austria. Also, he does not use American and Austrian documents, newspapers, and 
foreign archives.  
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Republic does not emphasize key anti-Anschluss groups.10 Thus, there is no book in the 
English or German language that collectively investigates the three main Anschluss 
opponents, the Christian Social Party, the legitimists, and the anti-Anschluss industries and 
industrialists and how they cooperated with the Americans and British in the time period 
from 1918 to 1934. 
There is another gap in Anglo-American diplomacy with Austria.11 The studies of 
Emily Rosenberg, Frank Costigliola, and Michael Dockrill are very broad and do not focus 
on Austria.12 How did Britain and the United States together with their Austrian partners 
sustain Austrian independence from 1918 to 1934 despite the strong Anschluss movement? 
This dissertation examines this unaddressed issue in the historiography. 
Furthermore, this project employs “new diplomatic history,” which places diplomatic 
issues in a wider socio-cultural-political context, including the context of nationalism and 
national identities. An example of diplomatic history that reveals the relationship between 
                                                 
10
 Carsten’s book discusses the Christian Social Party, but he does not use the Christian 
Social Party archives or the only recently published documents on the Christian Social Party 
meetings. He has little on monarchists, and the anti-Anschluss industries and industrialists 
are not mentioned. 
 
11Examples of general books on diplomacy are: Stephen Schuker, American "Reparations" 
to Germany, 1919-33: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1988);  Marc Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: 
France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980); Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981); John W. Dower, War Without Mercy  
(New York : Pantheon Books, 1986). 
 
12Michael Dockrill and J. Douglas Goold, Peace without Promise – Britain and the Peace 
Conference 1919-1923 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981); Frank Costigliola, Awkward 
Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1984); Emily Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the 
World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003). 
 
 12 
diplomacy and the socio-cultural system is Paul Kennedy’s The Rise of the Anglo-German 
Antagonism, 1867-1914. Kennedy not only examines traditional diplomacy between 
Germany and Britain, such as the colonial and naval rivalries, but also gives a more 
comprehensive comparison of the two nations, stressing competing and complimentary 
political cultures, the media, popular opinion, social structures, economic ties, dynastic 
links, and religious, cultural, and ethnic connections.13 Using these same methods, my 
project places the Anschluss in the context of nationalism, identity, economy, popular 
sentiment, and socio-cultural aspects.  
Many historians attempt to explain nationalism, the creation of a nation-state, and 
identity. Some historians contend that a nation-state is based on a common ethnicity and 
culture, while other historians, like Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, maintain that a 
nation is a constructed entity. Traditional theories primarily based on European examples 
maintain that national groups attained national identity by the creation of nation-states. The 
prior creation of a nation-state subsequently led to a shared feeling of belonging and 
identity.  
             However, Hobsbawm, who viewed a nation as a modern, political, social, and 
cultural construction, asserts the opposite. Hobsbawm contends that previous definitions of 
nationalism are inaccurate and states several arguments concerning nationalism. According 
to Hobsbawm, “nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and 
nationalisms but the other way round.” He also contends that nations are primarily 
constructed by the elites, but must still be examined through the eyes of the common people. 
                                                 
13Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1867-1914 (London:  Allen & 
Unwin, 1980, 1996).  
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Hobsbawm asserts that national awareness can spread irregularly to different regions of a 
nation. Hobsbawm also discusses how economic nationalism, mass schooling, printing, 
language, race, culture, media, and sports (Olympic Games, soccer games, and so forth) 
contributed to nationalism. Examples of national economies, where the states controlled 
commerce and financial policies, included Alexander Hamilton’s US Federal Bank and 
Friedrich List’s Zollverein. Hobsbawm argues that languages cannot develop without 
printing and schooling.14  
Anderson is a second example of “constructed” nationalism with a particular 
emphasis on cultural transmission through print. Anderson defines a nation as an imagined 
political community that is limited and sovereign. A nation is “imagined” because even 
though a person in a particular nation will not interact with all the other people that form that 
nation, there is still an image of a shared community. Anderson contends that a nation is 
imagined “limited” because it has boundaries. According to Anderson, a nation is perceived 
as “sovereign,” because this idea developed during a time of Enlightenment, revolution, 
secularization, and declining absolutism, in which each nation desired freedom. A nation is 
                                                 
14
 Hobsbawm defines “nationalism” as “primarily a principle which holds that the political 
and national unit should be congruent.” As a Marxist, he focused on class and mass politics 
in shaping nations. Industrialists sometimes used nationalism to undermine the working 
class solidarity. Also, Hobsbawm uses Miroslav Hroch’s division of nationalism into three 
periods. First, nineteenth-century Europe, “was purely cultural, literary and folkloric, and 
had no particular political or even national implications. . .” In the second period there is the 
appearance of radical nationalists. While most of Hroch's book focuses on the second period, 
Hobsbawm concentrates on the third period, where nationalist programs acquire mass 
support. Using a Marxist approach, Hroch argues that the emergence of a nation is a social 
process marked by the transition from a feudal society to a capitalist one and a struggle 
between the old feudal ruling class and the common people. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 9-12; Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in 
Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among 
Smaller European Nations translated by Ben Fowkes. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985).  
 14 
imagined as a “community” because it is based on a sense of “comradeship.” In examining 
the cultural roots of nationalism, Anderson argues that print capitalism brought about 
nationalism and also led to the spread of nationalism.15  
On the other hand, Breuilly asserts that nationalism is a product of politics whereby 
the structure of the state pursues its own interests. Unlike Anderson, Breuilly places 
nationalism in political context. Breuilly defines nationalism as “a form of politics that 
arises in close association with the development of the modern state.” He contends that in 
order to understand nationalism one must place it in terms of “obtaining and using state 
power.”16 Key to his argument is that a national movement can either be opposed to or 
controlled by the state. National opposition to the state can either seek to break away 
(separation nationalism),17 reform the state from within (reform nationalism),18 or unite with 
other states (unification nationalism). The first real national movements were cases of either 
separation or unification. In the case of Germany, Breuilly argues that the elites, not the 
masses, drove the national movement for unification. In Germany liberal nationalist elites 
were isolated and divided, but allied themselves with a large existing state to achieve their 
goals. Meanwhile, historian Peter Alter looks at nineteenth century European nationalism 
from a social history perspective and asserts that nationalism at this time embraced not only 
                                                 
15Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6-7. 
 
16John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1982), xii. 
 
17According to Breuilly, national separation movements took place in the Ottoman Empire 
and Habsburg Empire. Breuilly contends that the extent of ethnic diversity in Austria-
Hungary was so great that the only way for the various ethnic groups to achieve state power 
was through separation not reform. He also discusses separation movements within France 
(Basque), Britain (Scotland), Canada (Quebec), and Spain (Basque).     
 
18
 An example of reform nationalism is Japan in the 19th century, when it changed from a 
feudal society to a modernized, industrialized, and militarized nation.  
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national unity, but also liberation from oppressors, especially from the multi-ethnic Empires 
of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.19 
 The issues of nationalism, identity, and the creation of a nation-state has been 
particularly problematic and complicated for Germans, and are part of the debates over the 
German question and Sonderweg thesis. The Sonderweg thesis argues that politically, 
intellectually, economically, and culturally Germany followed a path different from the rest 
of western Europe. According to the negative aspects of this thesis, German political culture 
was highly anti-liberal, autocratic, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, and radically anti-Semitic, 
and thus Germany took the “special path” to Hitler and the Holocaust rather than to stable 
and peaceful democracy.20 The German question deals with the grossdeutsch, kleindeutsch, 
Mitteleuropa (Central Europe) controversies. What kind of a state should Germany be and 
what should be its borders? The many Slavic, Italian, Hungarian, and other minorities within 
the Habsburg Empire up until World War I, who had national aspirations of their own, 
                                                 
19Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Arnold, 1989).  
 
20
 The more positive attributes of the Sonderweg thesis are that up to World War I Germany 
had the best school and university systems in the world and was seen as a land of “poets and 
thinkers.” But given the rise of Nazism, some historians have focused on the negative side. 
German intellectuals embraced nationalism but rejected liberalism and democracy after the 
French Revolution and Napoleonic era, because they viewed these ideas as foreign (French). 
While France and Britain had long since existed as European nation-states, until the late 19th 
Century Germany existed more as a Kulturnation (an entity of common German culture), 
rather than a Staatsnation (nation-state). Politically Germany had no successful middle class 
revolution and no monarch lost his head. The failure of the 1848 democratic revolution 
paved the way for unification under Bismarck by “Blood and Iron” in 1870-1871. 
Economically, Germany had switched from being a mostly agrarian country to one of the 
world’s industrial superpowers in the late 19th Century, which led to various crises in 
modernization. Also, the German economy, like the political structure, was heavily 
controlled by the old elites (the Junkers) and powerful industrialists. Culturally, Germany 
was also seen as anti-liberal and nationalistic. 
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complicated the matter.21 Many German nationalists were not satisfied with the creation of a 
Kleindeutschland in 1870-1871, and particularly after the break up of Austria-Hungary they 
pushed for a union of Germany and Austria. Oscar Jaszi, Peter Alter, and Arthur May deal 
with the German question and dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy.22    
 This dissertation suggests that the Austrian case is unusual in that it contradicts the 
standard scenarios of nation-state development. Before World War I, the identity of the 
German Austrians was based on loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty that collapsed in 1918, 
causing an enormous identity crisis among German Austrians. After World War I, the 
Americans, British, and other Allies created an independent Austrian state, with which most 
Austrians were not connected by any sense of national identity. Specific works on 
nationalism and identity in Austria are Stanley Suval’s The Anschluss Question in the 
Weimar Era: A Study of Nationalism in Germany and Austria, 1918-1932 and Günter 
Bischof’s and Anton Pelinka’s collection of articles on Austrian Historical Memory & 
National Identity.23  Suval argues that although people and parties in both Austria and 
Germany advocated a union, the desire for union was stronger in Austria where it was a life 
or death matter. He maintains that class, religion, and regionalism fragmented the Anschluss 
movement and prevented it from occurring between 1918 and 1938. Austrian Historical 
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 The 1867 Ausgleich, Compromise, created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, but 
failed to give other minorities more sovereignty. 
 
22Peter Alter, The German Question and Europe: A History (London: Arnold, 2000); Oscar 
Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1929); Arthur May, The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 
(Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966). 
 
23Stanley Suval, The Anschluss Question in the Weimar Era: A Study of Nationalism in 
Germany and Austria, 1918-1932 (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974); 
Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, eds. Austrian Historical Memory & National Identity 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997).  
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Memory & National Identity primarily focuses on Austrian identity after World War II, 
where Austrians saw themselves as victims of German aggression. Once again neither of 
these books discusses the Anschluss in terms of Anglo-American diplomacy and the anti-
Anschluss Austrians who worked with the Americans and British.   
 
II. Sources 
 
 This project primarily relies on foreign affairs documents of the United States, Great 
Britain, Austria, and Germany, newspapers, and party files of the Christian Social Party.  
These sources shed light on the American and British polices maintaining an independent 
Austrian from 1918 to 1934 as well as those Austrians who were against an Anschluss and 
cooperated with the Americans and British. This work also relies on letters, memoirs, and 
the personal papers of key Austrian Anschluss opponents.        
 The policies of the three main Austrian supporters of a separate nation (the Christian 
Social Party, monarchists, and the anti-Anschluss industries and industrialists) were 
investigated. These three Austrian groups welcomed international aid to sustain Austrian 
independence and the development of Austrian national awareness. The dissertation 
analyzes the Christian Social Party’s polices regarding opposition to the Anschluss and the 
party’s relation to the United States and Great Britain through the Christian Social Party 
archives found in the Politische Akademie der ÖVP (österreichische Volkspartei) located in 
Vienna. Other sources on the Christian Social Party include the recently published complete 
transcript of the Christian Social Party meetings, Dieses Österreich Retten: Protokolle der 
Christlichsozialen Parteitage der Ersten Republik, edited by Robert Kriechbaumer, and the 
Christian Social Party newspaper the Reichspost. 
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 This dissertation examines the anti-Anschluss monarchist policies through 
monarchist newspapers such as the Österreichische Nachrichten: Organ der Monarchisten 
Österreichs (Vienna) and the Staatswehr (Vienna). This work describes the industrialist 
policies against an Anschluss and their relation to American and Britain using archives of 
the Vienna Chamber of Economics, Industry, and Businesses, Wiener Wirtschaftskammer 
Archiv, and the papers of Robert Ehrhart, an Austrian opponent of a union with Germany 
who was the Vice President of the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie (main 
Austrian industrial association), and the letters of Ludwig Urban, the anti-Anschluss 
President of the Hauptverband der Industrie. The Ehrhart papers and the Urban letters are 
located at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Archiv at the University of Vienna. 
 Moreover, this dissertation investigates American and British diplomacy toward 
Austria, using American and British foreign policy documents, from the United States 
Department of State documents in the National Archives II in Maryland and the Foreign 
Office archives of the British National Archives in Richmond, London. This work also uses 
Austrian documents relating to Austrian foreign affairs with the United States and Great 
Britain which are housed in the NPA (Neues Politisches Archiv) Austwärtige 
Angelengenheiten, 1918-1934 of the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik in 
Vienna. 
 Published primary sources include American, British, and Austrian foreign affairs 
documents and newspapers, such as the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS 
collection), the only recently published Austrian foreign affairs documents, Außenpolitische 
Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918-1938 (ADÖ),24 and the British Documents on 
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 Currently volumes 1-7 from 1918 to 1926 have been published. 
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Foreign Affairs. These sources cover the years 1918-1934 and have been invaluable to my 
research. I have examined various newspapers, such as the Times [London], Manchester 
Guardian, New York Times, Chicago Daily Tribune, and Washington Post for their coverage 
of American and British foreign policy.  Finally, other newspapers used throughout the work 
are the Wiener Zeitung (Vienna) and the Neue Freie Presse (Vienna). 
 The American, British, Austrian, and German foreign affairs documents and archives 
contain a wealth of information because each country had diplomats stationed around the 
world, who were required to submit regular reports on the economic and political situation, 
the media, domestic affairs, status of minorities, and so forth in their country of assignment. 
Regarding their assigned country, the diplomats were often familiar with the language and 
culture and very much in tune with the current political and social situations. They met and 
corresponded with important leaders, politicians, and everyday people. The diplomats gave 
first-hand accounts on the situation in Austria, drawing on such sources as local newspapers, 
election results, party speeches and campaigns, government letters and statements, and 
conversing directly with the Austrian people and their leaders. These reports helped shape 
British and American foreign policy toward Austria. American and British diplomats both 
gave strong recommendations for policy matters to their respective home countries and 
implemented the foreign policies of their home countries. Certainly there existed some bias 
among the opinions of individual diplomats, but this dissertation shows the general 
perspective of the most important diplomats. Furthermore, not only do these foreign affairs 
documents contain reports of the diplomats sent back to their respective countries, but these 
foreign affairs documents also have communications sent from the governments to the 
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diplomats. The foreign affairs documents show how the diplomatic reports were received 
and acted on in London and Washington, DC.25 
  
III. Early Nationalist Forces, Germany, and the German Austrians 
 The possibility of including Austria in a greater Germany did not originate after 
World War I, for dreams of a Grossdeutschland had already appeared in the nineteenth 
century. While some countries, like Italy and Germany, emerged unified out of the era of 
nationalism, multi-ethnic states, like Austria, were undermined by national sentiment. 
Austria had once been the leader of the German states but had declined by the mid and late 
nineteenth century. Despite political separation after the 1866 Austro-Prussian war and the 
later German unification, the historical and ethnic ties between the German Austrians and 
the Germans in Germany remained significant factors in Austro-German diplomacy up to 
World War I. The national aspirations of the many ethnic groups within the Habsburg 
Empire contributed to its Zusammenbruch (collapse) into many autonomous states after 
World War I. 26   
For centuries the Habsburg monarchy had controlled the imperial title to the Holy 
Roman Empire and German Nation. However, Napoleon’s dissolution of the Holy Roman 
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 In comparison to the American FRUS documents, the British documents are a bit more 
thorough on the European theater, and their subject matter is better organized and 
catalogued. Nevertheless, both countries took a very active role in Austrian affairs, and both 
the American and British documents offer an extensive and accurate depiction of conditions 
and popular sentiment in Austria during the inter-war period. 
 
26The Habsburg Empire contained eleven main ethnic groups. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., 
Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1991), 4. 
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Empire in 1806 severely weakened Emperor Franz II’s27 command of the German states, 
which became evident when the French Emperor controlled much of Germany through his 
newly-created Confederation of the Rhine.28  The European statesmen of the Congress of 
Vienna partially restored Austrian influence in Germany when it replaced Napoleon’s 
Confederation with a German Confederation under Austrian presidency in 1815. However, 
the German Confederation, which consisted of thirty-eight German states, did not fulfill the 
aspirations of German nationalists who wanted a united Germany.   
 In 1848 German intellectuals at the Frankfurter Parliament pondered over a united, 
democratic Germany, and what its borders should be. The delegates at the Frankfurter 
Parliament discussed various forms of a united Germany. Some championed a 
Grossdeutschland, a united Germany that included the hereditary Habsburg lands of Upper 
and Lower Austria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Styria, Carinthia, Bohemia, Moravia, Carniolia, and 
the port city of Trieste. But it would not include Austrian lands that had never been part of 
the Holy Roman Empire proper. Austria was adamantly against this plan because it meant 
giving up its enormous Italian, Polish, and Hungarian holdings. Emperor Franz Joseph’s 
stance as an avid conservative suppressing revolutionary forces that threatened him did not 
make him appealing to German liberals who favored a Grossdeutschland either.  A more 
liberal Prussian-led Kleindeutschland without Austria was a second option. A third option 
was a trialism approach, in which power would be shared between Austria, Prussia, and the 
so-called ”Third Germany.” Extreme German nationalists called for a merger of the entire 
Austrian Empire, Prussia, and the other German lands into a German-dominated 
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 Holy Roman Emperor Franz II was also known as Franz I of Austria. 
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 Dietmar Hann, Die Stellung der Christlichsozialen Partei zum Anschluβ an das Deutsche 
Reich 1918-1934 (Vienna, 1978), 3. 
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Mitteleuropa. Two problems with the grand Mitteleuropa idea were that it would include 
many non-Germans, and other Great Powers would probably not accept it. None of these 
visions became a reality in 1848, and ”Germany” remained bitterly divided. 
 As nationalism continued to spread across Central Europe, the other ethnic groups 
severely tested Vienna’s hegemony. During the 1848 ”Springtime of Nations” in the Czech 
lands, František Palacký opted for a moderate challenge to imperial power while others 
wanted total Czech independence immediately. Imperial troops were sent into Bohemia to 
stop the armed uprisings. Ardent nationalists preached the idea of Pan-Slavism as a 
challenge to the Germanic peoples. However, Palacký, who still believed in the necessity of 
the Empire, favored Austro-Slavism rather than Pan-Slavism, where only the Slavs in the 
Austrian Empire worked together for more rights and autonomy. The Czechs under Palacký 
boycotted the Frankfurter Parliament in 1848 and held a Slavic conference in Prague. A far 
more serious challenge to imperial authority came from the Hungarians, who unlike the 
Czechs had had their own independent kingdom centuries earlier, including a constitution, 
the Golden Bull, written in 1212. Hungary actually waged a war of independence in 1848-
1849, officially declaring itself free from Austria in the April Laws of 1849. Only through 
the intervention of Russia’s Czar Nicholas I, who wanted to maintain the balance of power 
in Europe according to the 1815 Congress System, was the Hungarian revolt smashed and 
Habsburg control upheld. Similar to the Germans, many Italians desired a unified Italy, 
which before 1860 was nothing more than a geographical expression. In 1848 Austria 
smashed Italian revolutionaries in northern Italy. However, in 1859 Austria was not so 
fortunate. Defeated by Italian and French troops, it lost influence over Italian affairs and had 
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to cede the rich province of Lombardy, which included the city of Milan, to the newly 
unified Italian state that emerged.   
 Austria’s rivalry with Prussia over the political framework of ”Germany,” 
particularly competing economic unions such as the Prussian led Erfurt Union and the 
Austro-Bavarian bloc, the inclusion of non-German Habsburg lands into a greater Germany, 
and the Schleswig-Holstein issue, continued to escalate. The ”humiliation of Olmütz” in 
1850, when Prussia backed down and Austria reaffirmed its presidency over the German 
Confederation, was only a minor setback for Prussia. The Punctuation of Olmütz was 
achieved with the help of Czar Nicholas I who had sent a navy ship near Schleswig-Holstein 
to thwart Prussia.  Afterwards, Prussia still remained economically stronger than Austria 
through the Zollverein, an economic trade union created in 1834 between Prussia and other 
German states that excluded Austria. Austria remained militarily stronger, but that was only 
due to its vast non-German territories, and by this time it was becoming quite clear that 
many of the non-Germans within the Empire no longer wanted to be a part it, showed no 
loyalty to the Habsburgs, and definitely did not see themselves as ”Austrians.” Therefore, 
Olmütz did not end the rivalry over German hegemony. A military showdown was still 
imminent. 
 The loss of Lombardy was unfavorable for Austria, but much worse were the 
ongoing demands of other ethnic groups within the Empire. The Hungarians in particular 
called for a renewal of the March laws of 1848 and Hungarian autonomy. Realizing that 
these domestic problems would weaken Austria’s ability to thwart Prussian power among 
the German states in an impending war, Austria allowed Hungarian leaders under Ferenc 
Deák to begin negotiations in 1862. The unification of Italy had shown Austria how 
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explosive the nationalism issue had become; yet Austria, unlike Prussia, could not exploit 
nationalism to unify the German states under its command because this would detract from 
its multinational Empire. Also, the German nationalists who evolved out of the German 
liberals of 1848 did not like the conservative and absolutist Habsburg Empire under the 
oppressive Bach system that had been imposed primarily to stem Hungarian separatism 
following the 1848 revolution.29   
 The seven week Austro-Prussian war broke out over the administration of 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1866. Austria’s disastrous defeat at Königgratz in Bohemia sealed its 
fate. However, Bismarck did not impose harsh peace terms.  Austria’s only territorial loss 
was that of Venetia ceded to Italy.  More significant was the dissolution of the German 
Confederation, which was replaced by a North German Confederation under Prussian 
leadership, and Austria’s removal from German affairs. Because the Hungarians had 
impaired the Austrian war effort against Prussia, Austria had no choice but to accept some 
of the Hungarian demands for the sake of the Empire. Thus, Austrian defeat in 1866 brought 
about the Ausgleich, or compromise, of 1867, in which a Dual Monarchy was established in 
response to Hungarian pressure for more autonomy. The Austrian Empire now officially 
became Austria-Hungary. Vienna and Budapest now had their own parliaments that 
governed their separate halves of the Empire, but foreign policy, finance, military, and the 
Habsburg monarchy remained common to both.   
 In 1870-1871, after defeating France, Prussia chose to solve the German unification 
question on its own and formed the German Empire without Austria, which had always been 
a key German state until then. Still, Otto von Bismarck favored close ties with his fellow 
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Germanic empire.  He did not seek to create one all encompassing German nation-state 
because that would have weakened Prussian leadership, and he considered Austria-Hungary 
vital to the European balance of power.  Moreover, the inclusion of Austria would have 
greatly increased the number of Catholics in the mostly Protestant Prussian-led German 
Empire.  Bismarck, in particular, had a dislike of South Germans.   
 Nevertheless, the ongoing ideas of a Grossdeutschland and Mitteleuropa remained 
present and ever so complex. They contributed to the post-1848 stalemate that dominated 
Austrian internal politics. By the late nineteenth century and lasting until the early 20th 
century, Austrians were divided among three main political camps, the Christian Social 
conservatives, socialists, and the nationalists. Both the socialists and nationalists were 
grossdeutsch sympathizers. The National Party founded by Georg Ritter von Schönerer, a 
forerunner to Hitler and even mentioned in Mein Kampf, advocated radical nationalism and 
was extremely anti-Semitic, anti-Slavic, anti-Habsburg, anti-Catholic, and anti-Austrian.  
Schönerer dreamed of a greater Germany and the day when German troops would march 
into Austria. By the early 20th century the National Party had lost most of its members.30   
 In Germany, Social Democratic leader Wilhelm Liebknecht declared in a speech in 
1900 that Germany was seeking expansion in overseas colonies while forgetting Austria.  
Greater Germans wanted to incorporate Austria into a greater Germany. Yet, other radical 
German nationalists sensed that only including the German lands and relinquishing the rest 
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of the Habsburg Empire meant giving up a Mitteleuropa under German hegemony. These 
radicals realized that the coveted Mitteleuropa was not possible at the moment and, 
therefore, considered the immediate existence of two German Empires the next closest 
thing. Merging the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire with that of Imperial Germany would 
have led to increased internal ethnic conflicts. The non-German nationalities, like the 
Hungarians who had only recently become co-partners of the Habsburg Empire, would not 
tolerate being part of huge Empire with 60 million more Germans. Moreover, the other 
Great Powers would not have responded favorably to a German-controlled Central Europe 
extending from the North Sea to the Adriatic and Rhineland to the Balkans.  Moderate 
German nationalists might have been satisfied with a Grossdeutschland, but radicals 
believed that the German Austrians served the German Volk best by remaining part of a 
Empire that stretched across Central Europe and maintaining their dominance (or jointly 
sharing authority with Hungarians after 1867) over the Slavic people.31  In 1870-1871 
Prussia had opted for the Kleindeutsch solution-- faster, easier, and more acceptable to its 
neighbors--by eliminating its Austrian rival from a united German Empire. Only through a 
major war with several or all of the Great Powers could a German Mitteleuropa have been 
achieved. 
 Although having lost to Prussia in 1866, Austria-Hungary remained closely allied to 
Germany up to the Great War. Both countries participated in various military alliances, such 
as the Three Emperors’ League (1873), Austro-German Dual Alliance (1879-1918), 
Alliance of the Three Emperors (1881-1887), and Triple Alliance (1882-1915).  Each 
country also supported the other’s foreign policy, as evident in the 1878 Congress of Berlin. 
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Primarily through the help of Germany, Austria-Hungary gained the right to occupy and 
administer Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, Austria-Hungary was the only country to 
support Germany at the Algeciras Conference in 1906 during the first Morocco crisis, and in 
the 1908 Bosnian crisis Germany supported Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Austrian domestic and foreign policies up to World War I were driven by 
traditional Austrian sentiment and above all the need to maintain the Empire and quell 
nationalist aspirations. The maintenance of a close relationship with Germany, as well as 
Austria’s creation of the state of Albania and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—both 
meant to thwart Serbian expansion—were deemed necessary for survival.   
One reason Germany purposely kept Austria-Hungary virtually intact after the 
Austro-Prussian war was because it served as a bridge connecting the German Empire to the 
Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. For radical German nationalists this held open the 
possibility of a Mitteleuropa.  Some even dreamed of an even vaster Ostraum, where 
Germany stretched well into Russia.32 The radicals realized that, if not yet, perhaps one day 
in the near future Germany would be strong enough to risk a major war to fulfill these 
visions.  
 
IV. World War I and Dismemberment 
 The Anschluss movement was neither an isolated event in 1938 nor unique to Nazi 
foreign policy, but part of a much larger unresolved German question whose origins went 
back to the nineteenth century and which reappeared with a vengeance in the inter-war 
period, following the destruction of the two Germanic Empires. Although prior to 1914 the 
                                                 
32 Low, The Anschluss Movement 1918-1919, 26. 
 
 28 
Habsburg Empire had been the second largest country in the Europe in area excluding 
colonies and the third largest country population-wise with about fifty million people,33  
militarily Austria-Hungary was less than impressive. Once World War I began, whether 
Austria was fighting in Serbia, in Galicia against Russian troops, or on the Italian front, it 
became evident that Germany was the dominant member of the Central Powers and the only 
force standing between Austria-Hungary and military collapse. The military shortcomings of 
the Habsburg Empire during World War I were caused by the same problems that had 
hampered it since the French and Napoleonic wars, namely the ethnic divisions and the ultra 
conservatism of the army, which did not respond fast enough to technical changes.34 
 Internal problems had engrossed the Empire as well. A Czech ”Mafia” encouraged 
desertion, sabotage, and disruption. Some Czech soldiers even fought on the Russian side.  
Hungary did not start rationing until the last two years of the war in order to protect its own 
home front, which hurt the entire country in the long run. The Habsburg Empire would have 
collapsed in 1916 but for German support. With defeat imminent, the unraveling began.35  
On October 6, 1918, the Slovenians, Serbians, and Croats declared themselves independent 
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and part of a sovereign nation. On October 7, the Poles announced their independence in 
Warsaw. On October 28, the Czechs in Prague asserted their national sovereignty.  
On October 30, 1918, a leading group of German Austrians met in the Reichsrat to 
discuss the impending dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and agreed on the basic 
foundations of a new German Austrian State.36 Accepting Woodrow Wilson’s principle of 
self-determination, the leaders of German Austria thought that their state would include the 
German populations of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia. With most of the German 
speaking hereditary Habsburg lands kept intact, Austria would have had an estimated 
population of about ten million. On November 11, 1918, Emperor Charles, who had 
succeeded Franz Joseph who had died in 1916, announced the end of old regime. One day 
later the Austrian Provisional Assembly proclaimed an Austrian Republic that was part of 
Germany. Most Austrians also wanted a union with Germany after World War I. The Allies, 
however, wanted an independent Austria.  
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PART I: CONTESTED BEGINNINGS 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
AMERICAN AND BRITISH DIPLOMACY, 1918-1919 
 
 
I. Introduction                     
  On September 11, 1919, the Times [London] described the signing of the peace 
treaty with Austria at the chateau in St. Germain-en-Laye, which took place on the previous 
day, as  ”pale” and ”uninteresting” in comparison to the earlier one at Versailles between the 
Allies and Germany. The heat was unbearable and seating arrangements insufficient. The 
Times correspondent stated that the inside decoration of the chateau was unimpressive and 
monotonous. He even recalled that the Allied delegates had to squeeze their way through to 
get to the table and sign. The head of the Austrian Delegation, Dr. Karl Renner, who signed 
for Austria, seemed unmoved by ”the dismemberment of what was once the proudest 
Empire in Europe.”37       
Following World War I and the peace settlement, the new, independent Austria 
hardly resembled the proud Habsburg Empire, whose leading city had been the music capital 
of the world, or the same Empire that had withstood the attack of the Turks and after many 
conflicts with Napoleon had been victorious from 1813 to 1815. Under the Treaty of St. 
Germain, the victorious Allies dismembered Austria-Hungary, creating the new and 
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independent states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, while ceding other 
parts of the former empire to Poland, Italy, and Romania. The population of the new 
Austrian state was mostly German. Nevertheless, the Allies prohibited the union of Austria 
and Germany. Questions that this chapter answers are: what were the Allies’ policies, 
particularly the British and American, in response to the creation of the First Austrian 
Republic and Austrian Anschluss movement during this time. 
Despite a strong Anschluss movement in Austria in 1918 and 1919, Allied policies 
prevailed. Ignoring the will of the Austrians, the Allies decided the fate of Austria, which 
was to remain independent. However, Britain and the United States were the most moderate 
of the Allies, and they left open the possibility of a future Anschluss through international 
consent. The Americans and British also participated in allocating food, supplies, and loans 
to a shattered Austria from 1918 to 1919. In addition, both the United States and Britain 
favored a Danube Confederation, a free customs union among the Habsburg successor 
states, as a preferred alternative to the Anschluss. 
 
II. Historiography 
In the 1930s Charles Beard had criticized American entry into World War I . Beard 
saw economic reasons, in particular the interests of industry, in motivating the United 
States’ intervention in the Great War. Even when facing the threat of fascism and 
totalitarianism in the mid- and late 1930s, Beard favored American isolationism and 
criticized Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy.38 Meanwhile, also in the 1930s, Charles 
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Seymour and Newton Baker upheld traditional views. They maintained that the United 
States primarily entered World War I because of Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare 
and not because of pro-Allied or financial interests. Ultimately, in their view, the United 
States entered the war to preserve peace and democracy.39 Thus, already in the 1930s there 
was a debate concerning American entry into World War I between materialistic and idealist 
motives. 
In the 1960s, Arno Mayer focused on various nations’ World War I war aims from 
1917 to 1918. Mayer argued that each state’s domestic and foreign policies were determined 
by the internal struggle for power between the forces on the right and the left. The right 
championed expansionist goals and polices that continued the “Old Diplomacy” and status 
quo. On the other hand, the left supported non-annexation of territories and “New 
Diplomacy.” The program of the “New Diplomacy” included open diplomacy (instead of 
secret treaties), freedom of trade (instead of restrictive trade barriers), no forcible 
annexations without plebiscites, the self-determination of people, an armaments reduction, 
the greater democratization of governments, and an international body that could mediate 
disputes (such as the League of Nations). Mayer defined these objectives as “liberal” and 
“progressive,” and President Woodrow Wilson embodied “New Diplomacy” and 
international progressivism. Wilson promoted “the war to end all wars” through American 
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involvement in World War I, and once an Allied victory was secured, his Fourteen Points 
became an extension of his liberal war aims.40  
Wilson’s antagonist in promoting a new world order was Lenin. Mayer contended 
that Wilson and Lenin both symbolized “New Diplomacy,” but to a different extent. 
Wilson’s “New World” and Lenin’s socialist “New Society” had things in common. Both 
Wilson and Lenin portrayed a new era and championed open diplomacy, self-determination, 
and the creation of an international body, whether it be the League of Nations or a form of 
international socialism/communism. Nevertheless, Mayer also asserts that there were huge 
differences between Wilson and Lenin. Lenin, being more radically left, advocated the 
elimination of big industry and heavy state control. Mayer concludes that ultimately some 
would “turn to Wilson, others to Lenin.”41     
There have been many recent books reexamining the Treaty of Versailles and other 
World War I peace treaties.42  But particularly useful for its breadth of coverage and variety 
of interpretation is The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, which contains 
twenty-six scholarly and thought-provoking essays on the treaty.43 In one essay “The 
Minorities Question at the Paris Peace Conference: The Polish Minority Treaty, June 28, 
1919," Carole Fink examines the post-World War I treaties in terms of how the European 
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nations sought to protect the rights of minorities.44 Given the impossibility of creating 
ethnically homogenous states in East Central Europe, various multi-ethnic countries, such as 
Poland, were obligated to respect the cultural and linguistic rights of their minorities. The 
League of Nations was to ensure the enforcement of these minority treaties.  
Several historians challenge the harsh verdict of Versailles. William Keylor contends 
that Versailles was fair and Germany was not economically destroyed by the reparations, 
which were ultimately paid by American investors rather than German taxpayers.45 Gerhard 
Weinberg maintains that Versailles actually strengthened Germany’s position in Europe 
relative to the prewar period rather than weakening it.46 At the other end of the spectrum, 
Jim Powell maintains a sweeping accusatory approach. He calls Woodrow Wilson the 
“worst president in American history” and blames Wilson’s foreign policies, in particular 
entering the Great War, for causing the rise of Hitler and Stalin, World War II, and the death 
of tens millions.47 With their focus on Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Eastern Europe in 
general, these books on the peace settlement have little to say about Austria in particular. 
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Recent scholarship has left a gap in terms of American and British diplomacy with Austria 
in 1918 and 1919. 
 
III. A. C. Coolidge 
 Most studies focus on great leaders, especially Wilson,48 but to understand American 
policy toward Austria, it is important to study the role of a more obscure member of 
Wilson’s entourage. Harvard Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge was a member of the 
American Peace Commission in Europe from 1918 to 1919.49 Born on March 6, 1866 in 
Boston, he was the third of five sons and came from a prominent family that had lived in 
Boston for generations. His father John Randolph Coolidge had spent a few years in a 
military school in Dresden, Saxony, in his youth, and perhaps because of this his children 
were well disciplined and educated. All his sons attended Harvard and two were 
professors.50 A. C. Coolidge graduated from Harvard with highest honors in 1887. He was 
fluent in German and French and got his PhD from the University of Freiburg in Germany at 
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a time when many American graduate students went to either Germany or France for 
advanced degrees. While studying in Germany, he extensively traveled throughout Europe. 
Turning down an offer to work at the American embassy in Vienna, he returned to the 
United States and taught history at Harvard in 1893. He helped modernize Harvard based on 
the German model of universities.51 He became first director of the Harvard University 
Libraries from 1910 to 1928. He was also an expert on diplomacy, and at Harvard he trained 
many Americans for foreign service careers in the State Department.  
In 1918 A. C. Coolidge was appointed by the American Peace Commission as 
director of the Special Commission of Study in Austria. Through his position, he 
encountered many notables, like Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, Lord James Balfour, 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Edouard Benes. A. C. Coolidge was well aware of the dangers 
of attempting to redraw European borders along national lines because the different 
ethnicities were inextricably mixed together in so many regions. He hoped that the peace 
treaties would protect the rights of ethnic minorities. He and his team of scholars sent many 
reports from Vienna to Wilson in Paris expressing these concerns.  
Some of Coolidge’s reports influenced the drawing of Austria’s borders, while other 
reports were not followed by the Allies. Although he had positive perceptions of Germans 
because he had studied there, his biographer Robert Byrnes characterized his reports as 
“accurate and objective.”52 Overall, his reports expressed sympathy for the self-
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determination of the Germans and German Austrians. Official American policy, however, 
did not advocate an Anschluss at this time. Coolidge’s pro-Austrian sentiment was rare in 
the American team, with the exception of a few others who had studied or lived in a 
German-speaking country. 
After the Paris Peace Conferences, A. C. Coolidge worked for the American Relief 
Administration in Russia from 1921 to 1922. From 1922 to 1928 he worked for the Council 
of Foreign Relations and edited the Foreign Affairs journal.53 He died on January 14, 1928, 
in Boston where he had been raised. His greatest legacy concerning Austria was his effect—
however less than he had hoped—upon the decisions of Wilson and the Allies concerning 
that country’s borders. 
 
IV. Allied Political Policies and Austria’s Neighbors  
 The Allies made sweeping territorial changes in Central Europe after World War I. 
Unable to satisfy all the different ethnic groups’ desires for sovereignty, they created multi-
ethic states, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
left more than one-third of the Habsburg Empire’s ten million ethnic Germans scattered 
around East Central Europe governed by different countries, thereby creating many potential 
conflicts. The First Republic of Austria was left with about six and a half million ethnic 
Germans. The Austrians were upset over the unequal application of the Allied principle of 
self-determination, which they saw as biased against German speakers. With minor 
exceptions, Austrians felt that they had lost all territories that had even the smallest Slavic or 
Italian minorities, regardless of the wishes of the German population.  
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 Austria’s bad relations with its neighbors in East Central Europe in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I thwarted the Allied attempts of creating a Danube Confederation 
and fuelled the Austrian Anschluss supporters. Territorial disputes hampered an Austrian 
post-war reconciliation with Czechoslovakia in particular. Of major concern to Austria were 
the Germans living in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia, later known collectively as 
the Sudeten Germans.54 In a letter to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in January 1919, 
A. C. Coolidge wrote that Germans in these border regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and 
Austrian Silesia vehemently protested against being incorporated into a “Czech-Slovak 
state.” Coolidge said that by putting the Sudeten Germans in that state against their will and 
ignoring their pleas, the Allies would create an Austria Irredenta and destroy any hope of 
friendship between Czechoslovakia and its German neighbors; thereby, endangering any 
chance of a lasting peace in Europe.55 In his reports he stated that the Sudetenland should be 
separated from Bohemia and Moravia. However, neither Wilson nor the other Allies were 
persuaded.56 
 The Allies gave the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia because without the 
mountainous Sudetenland regions, Czechoslovakia would have had no militarily defensible 
border and thus been very vulnerable to an attack from Germany. In addition, the Allies 
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contended that the German Sudetenland, which contained core industrial areas,57 was and 
always had been economically tied to the rest of Bohemia and Moravia, not Germany or 
Austria. Hence, the Allies found it easier to include the entire historical provinces of 
Bohemia and Moravia within the borders of Czechoslovakia. The post-war borders left 
about three and a half million Germans in newly created Czechoslovakia.58 The Sudeten 
Germans, who had formerly been citizens of Austria-Hungary, suddenly became a minority 
group within Czechoslovakia. Ironically, Czechoslovakia claimed historical boundaries with 
Germany and Austria, where it was to their benefit, but ethnic borders with Hungary. 
 If the Austrians and Sudeten Germans resented the borders of the new 
Czechoslovakia, the Czechs in turn still nursed resentments concerning their past treatment 
under domination from Vienna. When Austria was suffering from a severe coal shortage 
after World War I, Czechoslovakia refused to give Austria any of its coal, although 
Austrians had previously owned many of the coal mines there. Also, the Czechs refused to 
allow transports of German coal to Austria to pass through Czechoslovakia. The reason for 
this according to American Food Administration Representative Dr. Alonzo Taylor was 
anti-German and anti-Austrian sentiment.59 Professor Coolidge regarded the distribution of 
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coal as vital in alleviating the unemployment and heating problems in Austria.60 The 
American assessment of the situation was shared by British observers as well. According to 
the British High Commissioner Mr. Francis Lindley, who was stationed in Vienna, the 
Czechs were "so determined to maintain their newly won supremacy over the German-
speaking population, and so jealous of Vienna, that they regarded the ruin of the latter as a 
positive advantage to themselves."61 In response to Czechoslovakia cutting off the supply of 
coal to Austria and the supply of wood to Hungary in the winter of 1919, British diplomat 
Sir George Clerk62 wrote in his report that because of the ”selfish and callous policy pursued 
by these newly created States” the Great powers would have to take it upon themselves to 
”provide remedies out of their own resources” to prevent further chaos in Europe.63 Clearly, 
this degree of Czech hostility toward Austria did not bode well for the prospects of creating 
a Danube Confederation. 
   Austria’s relationships with its other neighbors were no better. After World War I, 
hostilities erupted between Austria and the new country of Yugoslavia over contested border 
regions. Yugoslavia was awarded the southern parts of the Austrian province of Carinthia, 
all of Carniola, and a huge portion of Styria. Although these provinces had been a part of 
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Austria for centuries, they were inhabited by Slovenians. Both Austria and Yugoslavia 
claimed the Klagenfurt-Villach basin, whose 150,000 inhabitants were mostly German with 
some Slavic minorities. In a letter to Professor Coolidge, Austrian Foreign Minister Otto 
Bauer stated that the Carinthian government wanted American soldiers in the area. The 
Carinthian population said it trusted “only in the United States” to maintain security and 
provide for the peaceful transfer of the territory to whichever party the Allied commission 
decided.64 Yugoslavia sent troops to occupy Klagenfurt, and local skirmishes over the 
disputed territory broke out in 1919.65 The United States of course did not send American 
troops to Carinthia, but it did send A. C. Coolidge to investigate the situation and make 
recommendations. 
 Hungary, Austria’s partner in the Dual Monarchy and fellow loser whose kingdom 
was also territorially dismantled in the aftermath of World War I, ought to have been 
Austria’s best possible friend. Like Austria, the peace settlement had left Hungary with few 
natural resources, no real industrial regions, and no access to the sea. The peace settlement 
reduced Hungary’s land area by two-thirds and population by three-fifths. The geographical 
area of Transylvania and that part of the Banat66 that Romania acquired from Hungary was 
larger than what remained of the new state of Hungary itself. Yet, in 1919 disputes over a 
                                                 
64 Staatssekretär für Äußeres Bauer an Professor Coolidge. Vienna, 9 February 1919.  
Außenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich (ADÖ), 1918-1938. 12 vols. (Vienna: 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993-2004), 2:436.   
 
65Staatssekretär für Äußeres Bauer an Professor Coolidge. Vienna, 18 February 1919. ADÖ 
1918-1938. 2:457. 
 
66
 After World War I the territory known as the Banat was divided between three countries. 
The eastern and largest part went to Romania. The western part went to Yugoslavia (modern 
day Serbia), and the northern and smallest part went to Hungary.  
 42 
small German populated part of western Hungary, known as Burgenland,67 kept any lasting 
friendship from developing. Unlike Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, countries 
which seized Hungarian territory outright, Austria had asked for a plebiscite. Nevertheless, 
the matter damaged relations between the former partner nations. A bitter Hungary blocked 
its grain supply to Austria, which led to a food shortage in the mostly mountainous country.  
Relations between the two deteriorated even more, when in order to force Hungary into 
accepting the peace terms, the Allies obligated Austria to enforce a blockade against 
Hungary if the Allies deemed it necessary.68    
 Austria’s relationship with Italy was also strained after the war. The Italians rejected 
a Danube Confederation because a strong economic union might eventually lead to another 
political union somewhat similar to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Italy, which had received 
the Austrian territories of South Tyrol, Trieste, and the Istrian peninsula as promised to it in 
the secret Treaty of London, wanted to prevent the revival of a strong Austria at all costs.69 
At this time, the Italian government considered an Austrian union with Germany ”less 
undesirable” than a Danube Confederation or Habsburg restoration.70  
          As with the Sudetenland, Carinthia, and Burgenland, an equally acrimonious conflict 
broke out between Austria and Italy over South Tyrol. Despite an alliance with Austria-
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Hungary prior to World War I, Italy had initially remained neutral and then entered the war 
on the victorious Allies' side, hoping to satisfy its expansionist desires at Austria-Hungary's 
expense. The area around Trent (Trento) was mostly Italian, but the other parts of South 
Tyrol were unquestionably inhabited by a majority of German-speakers.  
 According to A. C. Coolidge, historically Tyrol had been one of Austria’s most loyal 
provinces, and the people of Tyrol associated themselves with Andreas Hofer.71 A. C. 
Coolidge had said even though South Tyrol was small and not economically significant, it 
was important to Germans because of its “beauty and its romance.” As in the case of the 
Sudetenland, he suggested this territory be given to Austria on the basis of self-
determination.72 Additionally, a representative from the small Ladin speaking area of Tyrol 
claimed that most of the Ladin speaking people could also speak German, got along very 
well with them, and had no desire to be detached from Austria. Even though Ladin is Latin-
based, it is a distinct language and not a dialect of Italian. Therefore, linguistic affinity did 
not justify the area being annexed by Italy. A. C. Coolidge concluded that the Ladin people 
preferred Austrian rule over Italian. He also argued that the Ladin region was mostly barren 
and like the rest of Tyrol had been economically connected to and dependent on Austria, not 
Italy.73  
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 However, at the end of World War I the Italian army occupied Tyrol all the way to 
the Brenner Pass, ignoring clear ethnic boundaries. Italy based its claim on the fact that in 
the past the territory of South Tyrol had given the Habsburg Empire an unfair advantage 
when attacking Italy. Thus, a more militarily defensible border along the Alps was 
strategically necessary for Italy to protect itself. In the peace treaty with Austria, the other 
Allies agreed with Italy and gave it South Tyrol.  
 Like Coolidge, the British Sir Francis Oppenheimer74 was also sympathetic to the 
German Tyroleans. Sir Francis Oppenheimer said that the entire area of South Tyrol was 
ceded to Italy despite the population’s wishes, splitting apart "an old independent race of 
free German peasants" whose history went back more than a thousand years. South Tyrol, 
along with its German population of 250,000, was incorporated into Italy as the province of 
Trentino-Alto Adige. Sir Francis Oppenheimer asserted that now with the Empire gone and 
Tyrol divided, the inhabitants of the Austrian part of Tyrol were bitter and no longer felt any 
connection to the dying Vienna government. Losing its two important districts of Bozen and 
Meran to Italy, Tyrol was reduced to a minute “speck” in the Alps.75 Also, within Austria 
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eastern Tyrol was separated from the northern Tyrol (even though the two parts are 
considered one province in Austria).76 
 Although A. C. Coolidge’s suggestions for South Tyrol and the Sudetenland were 
not accepted, his reports successfully influenced Wilson and the other Allies, in particular 
Britain, in giving Austria two other disputed areas. In his reports to Wilson in early May 
1919, and in a meeting with the Commissioners Plenipotentiary on May 26, Professor 
Coolidge had said that the Burgenland should be given to Austria. Consequently, the United 
States, Britain, and other Allies agreed to let Austria have the disputed territory of western 
Hungary, the so called ”Kitchen Garden of Vienna.”77 In the Treaty of St. Germain, the 
Allies allocated Burgenland to Austria primarily because it was mostly settled by Germans 
and was part of the Danube valley, which meant it contained fertile agricultural areas that 
could supply Austria, particularly Vienna, with some much needed grain since the rest of 
Austria was mostly mountainous. Burgenland, which had belonged to the Hungarian half of 
the Dual Monarchy, added Hungarian and Croatian minorities to Austria.   
 Professor Coolidge had also greatly influenced the outcome of the Klagenfurt-
Villach basin dispute between Austria and Yugoslavia that had started in January 1919.78 
Following Wilson’s principal of self-determination, Coolidge and Major General Sherman 
Miles who headed American study missions had agreed on the borders of Austria and 
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Yugoslavia (today Slovenia). At the Paris Peace Conference the Allies used the 
recommendations of Coolidge and Major General Miles and sanctioned a plebiscite in the 
Klagenfurt-Villach region.  It was held on October 20, 1920, and three-fifths of the voters 
favored joining Austria. Klagenfurt became the capital city of the southern Austrian 
province of Carinthia.79 Karl Renner thanked A. C. Coolidge in 1920. Many decades later, 
on September 4, 1995, the then Governor of Carinthia, Christof Zernatto, led an official 
delegation to the United States to mark the 75th anniversary of the October 1920, Carinthian 
plebiscite. The Carinthian delegation in particularly honored the three men who were critical 
in that decision—Wilson, Coolidge, and Major General Miles—and placed wreaths on their 
graves.80  
 Archibald. C. Coolidge became an advocate of the Austrian point of view and 
offered insightful arguments on its behalf, some of which were followed. Yet, faced with 
mixed population areas that defied easy partition as well as demands for more defensible 
frontiers, the Allies could not satisfy every ethnic groups’ wishes. Consequently, the Allies 
sometimes used inconsistent policies in re-drawing Europe. In Czechoslovakia, they kept the 
historic political provinces of Bohemia and Moravia together, favoring defensible but 
ignoring ethnic borders. In Yugoslavia they based borders on ethnicity, not historic 
provinces. And in Tyrol they followed neither ethnic nor historic political borders but 
favored militarily defensible borders. The Allies gave Poland access to the Baltic Sea, but 
they did not give Austria access to the Adriatic. The Allies used plebiscites in the 
                                                 
79Yugoslavia would try again to get Klagenfurt after World War II, this time with backing 
from the Soviet Union, but the Allies ultimately kept Austria’s borders the same after World 
War II for better or worse. 
 
80Commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the Referendum on the Unity of the State of 
Carinthia/Austria.  http://www.austria.org/press/prel0914.htm.  (January 2007). 
 47 
Burgenland and Carinthia, but they refused to allow plebiscites in South Tyrol and the 
Sudetenland. Although the United States and Britain intervened on Austria’s behalf in its 
borders with Yugoslavia and Hungary, the Habsburg successor states’ hostility towards 
Austria did not change. The massive conflicts between Austria and its neighbors shattered 
the Allies’ ability to create a Danube Confederation in 1918 and 1919, and thereby 
strengthened the Austrian Anschluss movement.  
 
V. The British and American Agenda in Austria 
 
  Besides the partial Allied accommodation to Austrian desires concerning the 
drawing of new borders, some of the Allies—particularly Britain and the US—were not 
unsympathetic to the domestic consequences facing the new state, particularly the twin 
perils of Bolshevik threat on the one hand and Anschluss fervor and its potential strategic 
consequences on the other. The British and Americans realized that they were dealing with a 
major crisis in Austria and wanted to prevent an Anschluss. The British diplomat Sir Francis 
Oppenheimer advised that Austria was ”surrounded by enemies [and] can only survive by 
leaning on Germany or the Allies.” Oppenheimer wrote that fusion between Austria and 
Germany was inevitable if the Allies did not immediately help Austria and modify the 
reparation clauses concerning Austria.81 Another British diplomat Sir George Clerk likewise 
described the desperate condition of Austria, as well as Hungary, and argued that any 
immediate demand for reparations from Austria and Hungary should be abandoned. Clerk 
asserted that:  
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. . . if we are not to be responsible for a catastrophe almost as great, and in its 
ultimate consequences possibly even greater, than the war itself, so far from exacting 
reparation, we have to find funds to keep Austria and Hungary alive. I should be the 
last to deny that this can be exaggerated. There is a feeling of helplessness in both 
countries which leads them to expect everything to be done and to feel incapable of 
doing anything for themselves. But their financial situation and their losses through 
the war are such that unless they get some measure of immediate help they will 
inevitably collapse into utter ruin and despair.82           
 
 Similar to Sir Francis Oppenheimer and Sir George Clerk, the Allied Commission on 
the Relief of German Austria concluded that the Allies had immediately to help Austria in 
order to prevent the possible turn to Bolshevism, a merger with Germany, and the further 
spread of disorder in Europe.83 The danger of Bolshevism was likewise very real at this 
time, especially in light of the Bela Kun seizure of power in neighboring Hungary,84 and the 
attempt to create a socialist republic in Bavaria.85  
 Besides a threat of Bolshevism that lingered because of Austria’s poor economic 
condition in 1918 and 1919, Britain and the United States were additionally worried about a 
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resurgent Germany moving into East Central Europe.86 Both the Treaty of Versailles with 
Germany (Article 80) and the Treaty of St. Germain87 (Article 88) with Austria, signed in 
September 1919, strictly prohibited any union unless the League of Nations was to decide 
otherwise. Germany was forced to recognize Austria’s independence. Regarding the reasons 
for the Anschluss prohibition, the Allies agreed that union of Austria and Germany would be 
a threat to their national security and feared a strong, revived Germany that would no doubt 
seek revenge. An Anschluss might trigger a sequence of falling dominoes, with disastrous 
consequences.  It was feared that an enlarged Germany would use Austria as a launching 
pad for its continued expansion east. Germany’s Drang nach Osten would then be a menace 
to recently established Czechoslovakia and Poland. Then all German minorities in South 
Tyrol, the Sudetenland, Danzig, and other areas would also desire to join Germany, which 
would lead to the dismantling of the entire peace settlement.  The culmination of this 
doomsday scenario would be a strong, powerful, and unified Germany that would dominate 
Europe. The Allies had just fought a long and hard war against Germany, and their intention 
after World War I was to weaken Germany, not strengthen it with additional territory and a 
larger and more homogenous population. The inclusion of Austria in Germany would have 
more than offset Germany’s losses in Alsace-Lorraine and the Polish corridor.88 After 
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Mussolini came to power, another reason for preventing a merger between Austria and 
Germany was that it would set up a German-Italian block that would divide Europe in half, 
separating the Allies, especially France, from their friends in the east. 
 Despite the Allies’ agreement that an Austrian union with Germany was dangerous 
and not in their best interests, their foreign policies regarding a possible union between 
Austria and Germany were not always uniform. According to the British Foreign Office, of 
the ”Big Four” (Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Vittorio 
Orlando who had represented the victorious Allies at the Paris Peace Conferences), 
Clemenceau had been the harshest concerning punishing Germany. He also pushed the most 
for the prohibition of any Anschluss. France in its resolute Anschluss prohibition went as far 
as threatening Germany and Austria with occupation. France also threatened higher 
reparations, loss of loans, and even the loss of additional territories. Concerning this ultimate 
sanction, France threatened that Germany would lose additional territories in the Rhineland 
or Eastern Germany, and Austria would not receive the disputed territories of Burgenland 
and Carinthia. Meanwhile, of all the Allies, the United States under Wilson and Britain 
under Lloyd George were the most moderate in their policies toward Austria (and 
Germany).89 
 Britain and the United States wanted Austria to remain independent, but their 
Anschluss opposition was not absolute. Britain and the United States could foresee a 
possible Anschluss in the future with international consent. A British document stated that 
Great Britain believed that the union ”must come sooner or later,” but it should not be 
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allowed without approval of the League of Nations. Concerning American foreign policy, 
the United States Secretary of State said ”anything which would keep Germany and Austria 
apart was worthy of encouragement,” but the United States was not willing to directly 
oppose Austria’s right to self-determination nor obligate itself to militarily intervene in the 
event that Austria and Germany would join in the future.90 Overall, the American and 
British policy represented a compromise between Wilson’s principle of self-determination 
and the balance of power. 
 In his reports in 1918 and 1919 A. C. Coolidge had said that Austria could not 
survive as an independent nation, and anticipating French refusal to allow union with 
Germany, he advocated a Danube Confederation that would heal the economic wounds of 
Central Europe.91 The Danube Confederation plan of 1918 and 1919 was politically and 
financially desirable to Britain and the United States because it would lead to an 
economically stable East Central Europe, re-open trade in the Danube region, bolster 
Hungary, and prevent a union between Austria and Germany. Britain joined France and 
other European countries in negotiating with the governments in Prague, Budapest, Vienna, 
and other successor states but made no progress. The United States welcomed a Danube 
Confederation, but because it did not want to directly intervene, it did not attempt to 
implement it.92   
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VI. American and British Aid 
 In November 1918 Austrians desperately asked the British and Americans to send 
food, as well as other necessary supplies, and to re-open old trade routes in the Danube 
region.93 With Austria unable to help itself and receiving little sympathy from 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, who were blocking supplies to Austria,94 Great 
Britain and the United States sent food, fuel, and other basic necessities in 1918 and 1919. 
Britain and the United States led an international effort to send thousands of tons of cereal 
grains and millions of dollars in loans to Austria.95  
 Britain began sending food stuffs to Austria in January 1919.96 In June 1919 Sir 
Francis Oppenheimer recommended that the Allies allocate 45,000,000 dollars in loans to 
Austria for food and raw materials, using Austrian salt mines, state owned forests, and gold 
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and silver currency as foreign security guarantees. There were talks on being more lenient 
on Austria specifically to lessen the chances of a close Austro-German bond forming.97 
 The principle source of American food and other necessities to Austria in 1918 and 
1919 was the American Relief Administration, ARA, which Herbert Hoover with President 
Wilson’s approval had established and directed. The main purposes of American food relief 
were to prevent famine and disease and to plant the seeds for democracy. Hoover had said 
“if European civilization is to live, they must be fed.”98 Thus, the food relief program had 
both humanitarian and political motives. 
Hoover had begun the American Relief Committee in August 1914, in order to aid 
American citizens trapped in Europe at the beginning of World War I. Later Hoover 
organized the Belgium Relief Commission (October 1914 to August 1919) that provided 
$1.5 billion in aid to war-torn Belgium and France. The American government raised 
another $1 billion dollars for the War Finance Corporation (WFC). The American Relief 
Committee, the Belgium Relief Commission, and the United States Food Administration 
were predecessors of the ARA. In December 1918 Hoover’s ARA allocated food, clothing, 
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and other essentials to countries in Central and Eastern Europe—even former enemies. The 
countries included Germany, Austria, Poland, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In addition, organizations like the 
Children’s Relief Bureau (March 1919 to March 1921) and the American Relief 
Administration European Children’s Fund (summer 1919 to December 1922) fed 12-15 
million children.99 
 The American led food relief program that distributed food to a total of twenty-eight 
nations and 375 million people in 1918 and 1919 was a colossal undertaking that had never 
been done before on this scale.100 From November 1918 to November 1919, the total 
amount of food sent to Europe was 27 million tons, of which about 5 million tons were 
grains, peas, vegetable oil, beans, flour, cocoa, milk, sugar, and rice. The United States sent 
more than 16 of the 27 million tons of food, while Great Britain, other Allies, and neutral 
nations provided the remaining 11 million tons.101  
From June 1917 to June 1919 the ARA purchased food in the amount of $7 
billion.102 The total cost of the food from November 1918 to November 1919 alone was $6 
billion, of which the Americans paid $3.3 billion. The American money for the ARA came 
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from the United States government which allocated $2.4 billion in credit, charities which 
raised $325 million, and private American organizations which paid the rest, like US Grain 
Corporation that provided $25.1 million. Other Allied and neutral governments also paid a 
part of the $6 billion total figure. In 1918 and 1919 Great Britain furnished $100 million, 
while France and Italy furnished $30 million each.103 
In 1942, Hoover wrote that problems that the ARA had encountered during and after 
the Great War were finding enough ships, keeping the flow of aid constant, unloading, 
distribution, and storage. Many of the American staff had a 112 hour work-week. Hoover 
had concluded that many of these same problems would occur again during American relief 
organizations after World War II.104 
Specifically regarding Austria, Hoover appointed Lieutenant Colonel William 
Bowdoin Causey105 and Captain T. C. C. Gregory to head the American mission in Austria 
on December 23, 1918.106 One of Causey’s immediate jobs was to find out the best way to 
transport food from Trieste to Vienna. According to Hoover’s memoirs, 170,000 tons of 
food were stuck in Trieste, and Causey was to use his expertise in railroads to get the trains 
running again.107 
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From December 1, 1918 to August 31, 1919 Austria received a total of 508,344 tons 
of food, clothing, and other necessities from the United States and other countries, which 
were worth $108,057,702. In comparison Germany had received the most food stuffs, which 
totaled 1,041,356 tons and were valued at $256,149,040. The Allies sent Belgium the second 
highest amount of foodstuffs. Austria received the third largest number of tons, but the net 
worth was valued fourth after Poland. The grand total of American and Allied food 
shipments to Europe during this period was 3,955,110 tons valued at $968,338,222.108 In 
addition, Lieutenant Colonel Anton Julius Carlson had stated in August 1919 that the 
Children’s Relief Program had been “most successful in German Austria” because the 
Austrian government had cooperated the most with the Allies.109 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Many reports from foreign observers in 1918 and 1919 on Austrian popular 
sentiment concluded Austria would seek solace with Germany. Coolidge’s reports were 
especially sympathetic to the plight of Austria.110 He contended that Vienna’s future 
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”certainly looks most discouraging from every point of view.” Regarding the Allies’ 
rejection of a an Anschluss, Coolidge stated: ”This decision is open to grave criticism. If the 
world, under the League of Nations, is to be governed according to the principles of a new 
freedom, what could be a more crass violation of it than to forbid two portions of the same 
nationality from forming a union that is desired by both, especially when one of them bids 
fair to go to ruin without it?”111 British diplomat Mr. A. Akers-Douglas likewise asked: 
”Why, if the Allies laid so much stress on the right of self-determination, did they not permit 
Austrians to exercise this right, as they undoubtedly would have done in 1918-19, by joining 
the German Empire?” Akers-Douglas said that for ”purely political reasons” the Allies 
maintained “a State in which few, if any, Austrians believed.”112 Reporting on the 
immediate aftermath of the Great War, British diplomat Sir Walford Selby113 noted that: 
Austria emerged from the war broken and dispirited. The problem of the country, as 
of the population, was one of existence. Austrians generally felt that the country 
could not live alone, and to them the most natural solution seemed to lie in close 
                                                                                                                                                      
110
 Also, the FRUS documents mention a plebiscite in 1919, which before it was  
stopped by the Allies indicated that about 95% of the Austrians wanted a union with  
Germany (Memorandum by the Councillor of Embassy in Germany (Gilbert):   
Austrian Development– Information and Opinion. Berlin, 28 March 1938. FRUS:  
1938. (Washington, DC, 1955), 1:467). However, there is no other documentation of  
this plebiscite, bringing its accuracy into question. 
 
111Coolidge, "The New Austria," 477, 481. 
 
112Memorandum by Mr. Akers-Douglas on the Present Position of Austria. (Received by the 
Foreign Office, 28 February 1925.) BDFA: Europe, 1919-1939. 2:106. Although written in 
1925 it discussed the years 1918 and 1919. 
 
113Sir Walford Selby (1881-1965) began his diplomatic career in 1904. He worked in Berlin, 
London, Cairo, and the Hague. He was British ambassador to Austria 1933-1937, and he 
was anti-Anschluss. Catalogue of the papers of Sir Walford Selby. 
http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/modern/selby/selby.html  (February 
2007). 
 58 
[connection] of Anschluss with Germany. This solution, however, was refused by the 
Great Powers.114  
 
 Although Great Britain, the United States, and other Allies ultimately agreed on an 
independent Austria in the time period 1918 to 1919, their policies were not always clear or 
well defined. Fearing a revived Habsburg Empire or Danube Confederation, Italy had 
considered the idea of allowing a union between Austria and Germany, whereas France 
adamantly opposed such a union. The United States and Britain were essentially forbidding 
an Anschluss, but their actions, which were a compromise between Wilson’s principle of 
self-determination and the reality of needing to weaken the German juggernaut, sometimes 
gave the impression that an Anschluss might be possible sometime in the future with 
international consent. At the end it was Allied policy that was decisive in keeping Austria 
independent and not Austrian or German popular sentiment. 
 Simultaneous with their opposition to Anschluss, the United States and Britain also 
sent massive aid to Austria. In 1918 and 1919 Britain and the United States intervened to 
bolster Austria’s broken economy by sending food, supplies, and money, whereas Austria’s 
immediate neighbors simply blocked trade and worsened conditions in Austria. In particular, 
Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration, ARA, helped feed Europe, which 
included Austria, from 1918 to 1919. The ARA, initiated by Hoover but approved by 
Wilson, represented a positive American policy to feed, clothe, and economically revitalize 
Austria and the rest of Europe. Following A. C. Coolidge’s recommendations, President 
Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George helped Austria acquire disputed territories in 
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Carinthia and the Burgenland. Both the United States and Britain had also desired a Danube 
Confederation.    
 Regardless of American and British aid policy in Austria, there still were many 
Austrians in 1918 and 1919 who were upset at what they perceived as Allied hypocrisy. 
They contended that Americans, British, and other Allies had proclaimed the principle of the 
self-determination of peoples, and they had asked for no less in 1918 and 1919. The many 
pro-Anschluss Austrians asked themselves whether the Allies really believed that the 
Italians, Romanians, and Poles could form sovereign nations, but they the German Austrians 
had no right to join Germany. Many Austrians believed that the Allies seemed to dismiss 
their grievances, as well as the grievances of the South Tyroleans, Sudeten Germans, and 
other German minorities. Most Austrians never fostered feelings of deep loyalty toward their 
new republic immediately after the Great War. Although most Austrians and Germans 
favored a union, their governments could not act on it. The Allies, especially France, 
threatened retaliation. If there was ever a moment in history where a union would have been 
welcomed by the majority of people on both sides but did not happen, this was it.  Only the 
Allies prevented–or delayed–a merger from occurring in 1918 and 1919.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER II 
AUSTRIAN CHOICES, 1918-1919: INDEPENDENCE OR ANSCHLUSS? 
 
 
I. Introduction                     
 German Austria had been fully dependent on the other parts of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire for its needs. The new Austria, having inherited the poorest regions of the late 
Empire with few industries and raw materials and lacking a sea port, was so economically 
and politically weak that most Austrians thought it was incapable of standing on its own in 
the period 1918 to 1919. With astronomically high unemployment and its livelihood in 
ruins, the fate of Austria after World War I hung by a narrow thread.115 Questions that this 
chapter answers are: What were the problems of the First Republic of Austria, and what 
motivated the desire for alternatives in the period 1918 to 1919?   
Most Austrians believed that an independent Austria was not viable. Some hoped for 
a trade confederation or monarchist revival. Others even turned towards Bolshevism as a 
possible answer. But more than anything the horrendous economic conditions served as a 
catalyst for the immediate postwar Anschluss movement. The Anschluss movement during 
the inter-war period was at its zenith in 1918 and 1919, when socialists, nationalists, many 
conservatives, and ultimately most Austrians favored a union with Germany. The Anschluss 
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desire was manifest in the political agenda of the main parties and Austrian leaders, election 
results, and reports from foreign diplomats.  
   
II. Historiography  
Most books on the Anschluss movement in Austria focus on the 1930s.116 One 
exception is Alfred Low’s book that traces the long background of the Anschluss, which was 
a revived grossdeutsch longing. Low correctly contends that the immediate post-war 
Anschluss movement in 1918 and 1919 was supported by a majority of Austrians.117 This 
chapter agrees with Low that there was already broad support and a strong push for an 
Anschluss in 1918 and 1919. 
           In addition, there are many German language books on Austria that cover the period 
from 1918 to 1919. The tragedy of post-war Austria according to Viktor Bibl’s Die Tragödie 
Österreichs (Vienna, 1941) was the loss of South Tyrol and the Sudetenland, as well as the 
Anschluss prohibition. This book written during the Nazi period supported the Anschluss and 
Nazism. Hellmut Andics’ Der Staat den keiner wollte. Österreich 1918-1938 (Vienna, 1962) 
argues that hatred of the Treaty of St. Germain hampered Austria. Friedrich Heer’s Der 
Kampf um die Österreichische Identität (Vienna, 1981) contends that Austria suffered from 
an identity crisis after World War I.    
Neither Low nor any of the German language books on Austria during this time 
period mention clear motives for the Anschluss movement in Austria from 1918 to 1919. 
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Low’s book and the other German language works do not place emphasis on the economic 
turmoil, which in addition to other factors, like the ethnic and national issues, identity crisis, 
long-time historical ties, lack of patriotic ideology, and socialist brotherhood before 1933 
fuelled the Anschluss fervor. Also, this chapter uses additional sources, including the 
Christian Social Party archives (Parteiarchiv), the records of the Christian Social Party 
meetings (Parteitage), and A. C. Coolidge’s essay “The New Austria.” Moreover, it 
investigates the reports of foreign observers found in the Foreign Relations of the United 
States and the British Documents on Foreign Affairs as informative about internal Austrian 
affairs.  
 
III. Economic Viability of Austria 
The Austrian people were already starving due to the Allied blockade initiated 
during the Great War. Even though an armistice ending the war had been concluded on 
November 11, 1918, the Austrian economy continued to be crippled by severe fuel and food 
shortages, because the blockade remained in effect until Germany signed the Treaty of 
Versailles on June 28, 1919. The hundreds of thousands of returning soldiers added to 
Austria’s problems.  
 Landlocked and reduced to a third-rate power, the new Austria could not even feed 
or support its own population. Most of the Austrian Republic was mountainous with 
relatively poor and unproductive land. Before World War I, Hungary had supplied the 
German speaking regions with grain, and Galicia, which was ceded to Poland, had supplied 
 63 
potatoes, beans, peas, and eggs.118 Now, without access to the Hungarian agricultural basin 
and other regions of the Habsburg Empire to obtain foodstuffs, the entire population of 
Austria was at the brink of starvation. Reporting on the conditions in Austria, Harvard 
Professor and member of the American Peace Commissioner, A. C. Coolidge, wrote that 
”meatless days were soon followed by meatless weeks.”  The food crisis was more 
devastating to the lower classes than any other group, because the wealthy had connections 
and even resorted to smuggling from Hungary. Though the Americans were supplying food 
through the Allied Food Administration headed by Herbert Hoover, A. C. Coolidge 
contended it was not enough.119   
 Also adding to the economic dislocation was the fact that Austria had lost Bohemia, 
which had been the Empire's most important industrial district. Bohemia, incorporated into 
Czechoslovakia, had been the source of 90% of the coal, 80% of the iron and steel, 90% of 
the cotton, the entire wool and ceramics trade, and 95% of the sugar industry in Austria-
Hungary.120 Industrially, Austria had no Ruhr Valley or Skoda Works, but was left with 
small undeveloped industrial areas in Styria and around Vienna. Due to a shortage of coal, 
Austria had restrictions on lighting, manufacturing, and transportation. Factories came to a 
standstill, and in the face of freezing winter temperatures, there was not enough coal for 
heating. To conserve heating, restaurants and theatres had to close early. The First Republic 
of Austria, now a country slightly smaller than the state of Maine, was in a state of turmoil, 
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and the extremely high unemployment rate was conducive to a rise in support for 
Bolshevism.121 Unemployment in the city of Vienna in 1918 and 1919 was between 90,000 
to 120,000 in a city of one and a half million.122 With the lack of coal and transport, high 
unemployment, rampant disorder, and threat of Bolshevism, British economist Sir William 
H. Beveridge123 concluded that Austria was in ”a state of general economic paralysis,” and 
the Allies must immediately intervene.124 
  On top of these vital shortages, Austria was in deep financial trouble. The Austrian 
economy was saddled with debt because of the disastrous war. Having no significant sources 
of food and coal of its own, Austria even lacked the cash and credit needed to import these 
necessities from its neighbors.125 The Austrian government had printed a large quantity of 
paper money in order to temporarily relieve its troubled condition, which led to high 
inflation.126 Vienna’s importance, lying in the heart of the Habsburg Empire as a center of 
transport, finance, and commerce, was gone. 
    Another problem that worsened the dire economic situation in Austria concerned 
responsibility for the war, reparations, and the assets and liabilities of the late Empire. A. C. 
                                                 
121Sir William H. Beveridge, Interim Report. 17 January 1919. 9:344-353. 
 
122Coolidge, "The New Austria," 473. 
 
123
 Sir William Henry Beveridge (1879-1963) was a British economist, an advocate for 
social improvement, and member of the Labour Party. During the Great War he was 
secretary for the ministry of food.  
 
124Sir William H. Beveridge, Interim Report. 17 January 1919.  9:349. 
 
125Mr. Lindley to Earl Curzon, 4 November 1919, Document 196. BDFA: The Paris  
Peace Conference of 1919.  9:396-397. 
 
126Minutes of the Daily Meetings of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, 26 May 1919.  
FRUS: 11:187. The meetings of the commissioners plenipotentiary were held daily in Paris 
throughout the peace talks of 1919.    
 65 
Coolidge stated that the Austrians and Hungarians were left with the liabilities that the 
Czechs, Poles, and Yugoslavs did not feel any responsibility to share, like the debt that was 
jointly accumulated by all regions and the question of war guilt, for which the other ethnic 
groups blamed the German speaking Austrians. Prior to the war, Austria-Hungary had even 
invested a large amount of its money into Bohemia. According to Coolidge, in 1918 the 
other ethnic groups maintained that they were innocent victims of Austria. Coolidge said the 
other ethnic groups considered themselves  "enslaved nationalities, and that their guilty 
masters could not shed responsibilities in this easy way by merely changing their own 
name."127     
 On September 3, 1919, the Times [London] reported that the Austrian delegates 
claimed that German Austria should not be held accountable for the actions of the entire 
Habsburg Empire. The Allies, however, rejected the Austrians’ pleas and maintained that the 
majority of Austrians had vigorously supported the Great War from start to finish. The 
Times stated that the people of Austria and Hungary, by initiating the conflict in Serbia, bore 
the ”responsibility for the calamities which have befallen Europe in the last five years.” 
Vienna, together with Berlin, had plotted ”against public law and the liberties of Europe” 
and now had to assume the ”full measure of responsibility for the crime which had brought 
such misery on the world.”128    
 Thus, according to Coolidge, of the new states emerging from the wreckage of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, the greatly reduced and impoverished Austria was made to carry 
the major burden of responsibility of World War I, including the payment of reparations. On 
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the other hand, when it came to any assets of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, like works of 
art and leftover weapons arsenals, everyone suddenly claimed equal share as former 
members of the Empire. With both Austria and Hungary landlocked, Admiral Nicholas 
Horthy had no choice but to hand over the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian fleet to the 
Yugoslavs. The Czechs wanted back everything from Vienna that they felt they had lost 
since the Thirty Years War. Italy claimed many of the paintings in the Vienna art 
museums.129 By being held responsible for the war and forced to pay reparations, not only 
was the Austrian economic recovery impeded, but also any postwar reconciliation with its 
neighbors, even though cooperative solutions to the vast economic problems they all faced 
would have benefited all parties. 
 
IV. Political Problems and Possible Solutions 
 Despite the Allied policies that sought to establish Austrian independence, in 1918 
and 1919 most Austrians saw an independent Austria as unviable, mainly because of the 
deplorable state of the Austrian economy. Austrians considered three options: a revived 
Habsburg Empire, an Austrian Anschluss with Germany, or an independent Austria as part 
of a greater trade confederation.130 Support for these policies broke down along political 
lines. 
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 The first option was a revived monarchy. After World War I, there were 
traditionalists and monarchists who had no love for the Republic and desired a return to the 
old days of the Empire. A complete imperial revival had little hope, though, for the Empire 
had already collapsed from within, and each former subject ethnic group was now claiming 
the right of self-determination and sovereignty. Still, attempts to revive the monarchy on a 
more limited national scale did occur, particularly in neighboring Hungary.  
 The second option was a union with Germany. Many Austrians, particularly the 
socialists, the Greater German People’s Party, and the communists, despised Austria’s 
independence and longed for this alternative. The Austrian socialists, who formed one of the 
largest parties, supported a merger with Germany because that would unite them with their 
socialist brothers who formed the plurality party in Germany. The Austrian communists 
likewise supported an Anschluss, but unlike the socialists they remained a fringe group. The 
Greater German People’s Party, another minority group, were ultra-nationalist and wanted a 
union of all the German speaking lands.     
 In addition, many Christian Socials wanted Austria to become part of a proposed 
trade association, and this third alternative was referred to as the Danube Confederation in 
1918 and 1919. As proposed, the Danube Confederation would have been an economic 
partnership among all the former parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, encompassing 
Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, other Balkan states, and maybe 
even Poland. Politically each of the members would have remained independent, but Vienna 
would have maintained its importance in this confederation as the leading city of commerce. 
In November 1918 the Christian Social Reichspost avoided the Anschluss excitement 
of other Austrian newspapers and instead advocated a Danube Confederation. In doing so, it 
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realistically anticipated the issue of Entente response, a foreign policy factor that would 
increasingly shape Christian Social politics. According to the Reichspost, “we are afraid of 
the threats of the Entente.”131 At the fourth Christian Social Party meeting in Vienna on 
December 15, 1918, the official party platform in 1918 also avoided the Anschluss issue 
directly and instead called for strong economic ties with the neighboring states.132    
 The Danube Confederation was also favored by those Austrians who harbored strong 
resentment towards Prussia, a resentment that reflected more than a century of deep-seated 
rivalries that had culminated in Prussian victory over Austria in 1866.133 A union with just 
south Germany looked appealing to those Austrians who were anti-Prussian. But union with 
all of Germany meant domination of a predominately Catholic country by both Prussian 
Protestantism and Prussian socialism. Moreover, Vienna with its beauty and culture would 
become just another regional town under the authority of Berlin.  
 Although the Danube Confederation plan sounded advantageous to many, it was 
soon abandoned, despite support from the Christian Social Party and those Austrians who 
especially hated Prussia. The creation of a Danube Confederation depended on the 
cooperation of all the former regions of Austria-Hungary. However, after the dissolution of 
Austria-Hungary, each newly independent nation wanted to go its own way. Because of 
border disputes, ethnic tensions, and past grievances, relations between Austria and the 
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surrounding countries were severely strained and the Danube Confederation proposal was 
doomed.134 
 To be viable, the Danube Confederation needed the support of Czechoslovakia in 
particular, since Bohemia had been Austria-Hungary’s most important industrial region.  
However, Czechoslovakia wanted nothing to do with Austria. Finally, getting their 
independence after the Great War, the Czechs had absolutely no desire to join a union with 
Austria, even if it was just an economic one and each of the members would maintain its 
political sovereignty. Having inherited the main industrial regions of the late Habsburg 
Empire as well as the Slovak inhabited areas of northern Hungary (modern day Slovakia) 
that were rich in raw materials, Czechoslovakia was economically the strongest of the 
successor states and saw no advantage in the Danube Confederation. The Czechs possessed 
the two prestigious cities of Prague and Pressburg (Bratislava) and had no need for Vienna 
as an administrative and financial center. Furthermore, over-estimating the potential of a 
great land route from Constantinople to the North Sea, the Czechs hoped Prague would soon 
surpass Vienna as the leading city of Central Europe.135  
  The peace settlement left the situation in Austria so dismal that some of the most 
loyal German Habsburg provinces no longer desired to remain under Viennese rule 
following World War I, and there were many separatist movements. In February 1919 the 
Tyrolean Landtag wrote a letter to Wilson stating that the German and Ladin populations of 
South Tyrol wished to remain together with the rest of Tyrol, and that they would “under no 
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condition whatsoever” accept the partition of Tyrol.136  In May 1919 the Tyrolean Landtag 
declared itself an independent state,137 which neither the Austrian government nor Allies 
recognized.  
 Also on May 11, 1919, eighty percent of the population of Vorarlberg, a small 
western Austrian province, voted in favor of becoming a canton of Switzerland, which the 
Allies promptly forbid.138 Certainly, not all the Swiss were supportive of adding Vorarlberg 
as another canton. The other ethnic groups in Switzerland feared a strengthening of German 
influence with the addition of Vorarlberg, and the Swiss German Protestants feared an 
expansion of Catholicism. However, at least some Swiss were upset that the Allies made the 
decision to forbid such a development without even once consulting them.139 Deprived of 
the prospect of becoming part of Switzerland, Vorarlberg then cast its lot with Germany 
over the crumbling Viennese government, which many Vorarlbergers now perceived as 
coming under the control of socialists and turning ”Red.” On December 16, 1919, the 
Salzburg Landtag, which was controlled by the Christian Social Party, unanimously voted 
for an economic union with Bavaria, which once again the Allies promptly prohibited.140    
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 Politically in shambles, devoid of key resources, and with its new boundaries and 
provinces like Tyrol, Carinthia, and Styria severely mutilated, the new Austria had little 
cause for hope in 1918 and 1919. There was no chance for the Danube Confederation. 
Austria was cut off from the rest of Europe by the deep animosity toward it among its 
neighbors. Austria’s upcoming harvest was inadequate to feed its population. Old channels 
of food and fuel were broken. Thus, the new republic was on the verge of both bankruptcy 
and starvation.  
 By the spring of 1919 most Austrians, even many within the Christian Social Party, 
had given up on the proposed Danube Confederation.141 The other two largest Austrian 
parties, the socialist party and the Greater German People’s Party, had never been supportive 
of the Danube Confederation in the first place. Although attempts at creating a Danube 
Confederation would reoccur throughout the inter-war period, they continued to fail for the 
same reasons.  
 The Danube Confederation plan fell through due to the lack of interest and 
cooperation from Austria’s neighbors, who having received their independence did not want 
to be part of an economic federation that mirrored the hated Habsburg Empire. With few 
agricultural and industrial areas, no access to the sea, and a mostly mountainous terrain, 
Austria was the poorest of the successor states. Whereas Austria was completely dependent 
on its neighbors, the other states did not necessarily need Austria.  Most of the successor 
states enforced tariffs and trade barriers against Austria in 1918 and 1919. Especially 
Czechoslovakia considered Austria a rival and source of competition.  Moreover, in 1920-
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1921 Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania formed their own economic and military 
alliance, the Little Entente, under French influence. Besides blocking German and Bolshevik 
expansion, the Little Entente was formed to maintain the territorial gains of the successor 
states against Austria and Hungary. Created for political and strategic reasons, the Little 
Entente blocked the creation of a Danube Confederation and hindered possible economic 
stabilization in Eastern Europe.  
 
V. The Christian Socials from Fall 1918 to February 1919 
The Christian Social Party was divided on the Anschluss question in 1918 and 1919, 
and it had many Anschluss supporters within its ranks.142 The Reichspost asserted that 
during these two years Jodok Fink143 and Josef Stöckler led the anti-monarchist and pro-
Anschluss Christian Social movement in the Austrian provinces of Vorarlberg, Lower 
Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, Tyrol, and Carinthia, gaining the support of many Austrian 
farmers. Fink, like many Christian Socials, contended that the time of the monarchy was 
over.144 In contrast, those Christian Socials who had monarchist leanings, like Heinrich 
Mataja and Kurt von Schuschnigg, were anti-Anschluss. Thus, the party was sharply divided 
in opinion following the defeat and collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
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  The German-speaking members of the Austrian parliament,145 who had been 
elected in 1911 before the outbreak of World War I, formed the Provisional National 
Assembly or Provisorische Nationalversammlung on October 21, 1918. It consisted of 
seventy-two Christian Social Party members, forty-two socialists, and one-hundred and two 
members who belonged to smaller parties, such as the German nationalist parties.146 The 
Provisional National Assembly chose three presidents, one from each of the three largest 
parties, in October 1918. Christian Social Johann N. Hauser became one president. Franz 
Dinghofer147 of the Greater German People’s Party and Karl Seitz148 of the socialist party 
were the other two presidents.149 
The socialists, not the Christian Socials, had played the predominant role in bringing 
about the downfall of the monarchy and creating the First Austrian Republic. Socialists 
welcomed the immediate revolutionary period in Austria, while Christian Socials had been 
comfortable in the Habsburg Empire. Also, the defeat and collapse after World War I 
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created some resentment towards those associated with the “old regime,” and therefore 
many Austrians “turned naturally to the socialists.”150 Consequently, the socialists led the 
Austrian provisional government, which was formed on October 30, 1918.151 Dr. Karl 
Renner, a moderate socialist, became the first Austrian Chancellor, and he headed the 
Austrian peace delegation.152 Otto Bauer, a left wing Jewish socialist, succeeded Viktor 
Adler who died on November 11, as foreign minister. Fellow socialist Julius Deutsch 
established the Austrian republican army, and Karl Seitz was the first Austrian federal 
president. From November 1918 to June 1920 the socialist party formed a coalition with the 
Christian Social Party. The Christian Socials initially agreed to compromise with the 
socialists in order to prevent an even more radical left-wing government—an Austrian 
Soviet regime—from coming to power.153  
The Austrian Provisional National Assembly also issued two shocking declarations 
on November 12, 1918, one day after the armistice between the Allies and Germany. With 
the exception of three delegates (Wilhelm Miklas,154 Karl Prisching, and Athanasius 
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Guggenberg), the Christian Socials voted for the first declaration that proclaimed Austria to 
be a Republic. Except for Dr. Anton Jerzabek, most Christian Socials also voted for the 
second declaration stating that Austria (including Bohemia and Moravia) was a part of 
Germany.155 Therefore, immediately at the end of World War I, the Christian Social Party’s 
official position on the Anschluss and the First Republic was similar to that of other parties.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to the socialists, the Christian Socials were not unanimous 
on either the Anschluss or the republican issue, regardless of their overall support of the two 
November declarations. The Neue Freie Presse maintained that the Christian Social delegate 
in Vienna, Franz Spalowsky, spoke out in favour of a monarchy in 1918,156 at a time when 
the divisions within the Christian Social Party were so severe that they threatened to tear the 
party into two factions, with a monarchist party in Vienna and a republican party in the 
provinces.157 In order to prevent such a rupture, Ignaz Seipel stated on November 27, 1918, 
that the party needed to defer crucial decisions until a functioning democratic process was in 
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place.158 Seipel was one of the main Christian Social Party leaders at this time, and he was 
anti-Anschluss. 
There was also a strong pro-Anschluss faction within the Christian Social Party in the 
immediate aftermath of World War I. According to the Reichspost, the Christian Social-
controlled Landtag or provincial assembly in Carinthia demanded a national referendum on 
the Anschluss issue, while the Christian Social Party faction in the provincial assembly in 
Upper Austria stated the necessity of the Anschluss for the Austrian economy. Regardless of 
differences between the provinces and city, the Christian Social Party in Vienna, too, 
fostered a German nationalist ideology. In February 1919, the Christian Social mayor of 
Vienna, Dr. Richard Weiskirchner,159 agreed with the Lower Austrian Farmers’ League that 
“the Anschluss was the fulfilment of the national ideal,” and he stated the “the Anschluss 
was the dream of the German youth for the last twenty years and the party should not stand 
against the Anschluss.” Although in 1918 and 1919, the Christian Social Party in Vienna had 
strong monarchist sympathies, Weiskircher represented an exception. However, Weiskircher 
questioned the timing of an Anschluss and said an Anschluss did not necessarily have to 
occur immediately.160 Like Weiskircher, Christian Social Dr. Gottfried Hugelmann also 
offered a partial compromise to the Anschluss. Hugelmann called for a Zusammenschluss 
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(partnership rather than an annexation) of Austria and Germany in the newspaper he edited, 
Deutschen Volksblattes.161 A Zusammenschluss meant that Austria would join Germany as 
one state with Vienna as its capital, and as partners, Austria would not be subordinate to 
Germany. An opposing view was that each of the separate Austrian provinces would join 
Germany and Vienna would no longer have any authority over the provinces.  
Clearly Seipel was aware of the enormous popularity of the Anschluss movement 
and predicted if a national referendum were to be held, the vast majority of Austrians, 
perhaps even ninety-five percent, would vote for the Anschluss movement in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I.162 In February 1919, Seipel warned against an Anschluss because 
of the uncertain situation and spectre of revolution in Germany. He argued that, “if there is 
danger that the German people established a Republic based on terror, or a dictatorship of 
one party or class, then nothing should drive us into a union with Germany.”163   
In addition to fear about the domestic situation in Germany, Allied pressure also 
certainly had a strong affect on the Christian Social Party politics. To prevent the Anschluss 
of Austria and Germany from occurring immediately after the Great War, the Allies could 
threaten Austria and Germany with an even harsher Peace Treaty, involving increased 
military occupation, cancellation of loans, higher reparations, and above all further loss of 
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territory. On October 1918, the Austrian Christian Social Reichspost had expressed the fear 
of losing other territories if an Anschluss took place: 
what would the German Reich have if the union of the German Austrian Republic 
and the German Reich came at the price of the left-bank of the Rhine? We are 
responsible to the German people for not making things harder through thoughtless 
propaganda based on mere feelings and by adding unsolvable problems.164  
 
Thus, the Reichspost reflected many Christian Socials’ caution and reservations toward 
union with Germany, especially due to the Allied policies. Besides Seipel, Mataja, 
Schuschnigg, Michael Mayr, Rudolf Gschladt, and Dr. Anton Jerzabek represented 
Anschluss opponents. Overall, from the fall of 1918 to February 1919 the Christian Social 
Party was evenly divided on the Anschluss. 
 
VI. The Anschluss Movement in 1918-1919 
 With even the Christian Social Party split on the Anschluss issue, especially 
following the demise of any expectations for either the Danube Confederation plan or a 
Habsburg revival, most Austrians strongly favored an Anschluss with Germany in 1918 and 
1919. Certainly many Anschluss supporters at this time were avid pro-German nationalists, 
while many others were simply ready to support any solution that offered relief to Austria’s 
beleaguered economic situation. 
 The pro-German nationalists were influenced by the historic and ethnic ties between 
Austria and Germany and asked rhetorically why not join with Germany?  They both had so 
much in common, even a recent devastating defeat by the Allies. More so, as A.C. Coolidge 
stated: ”for a period of ten centuries, Austria had been an integral portion of Germany, and 
                                                 
164Reichspost, 31 October 1918. 
 79 
had for generations furnished the German nation its Emperors.”165 Vienna had been a 
leading German and European city long before the emergence of Berlin. Only recently, since 
1866, had Austria and Germany really become separate, and many “pan-German” Austrians 
never reconciled themselves to that separation. 
 In fact in Franz Joseph of Austria and his Empire, Anatol Murad contends that even 
after Austria’s defeat by Prussia in 1866, Emperor Franz Joseph never gave up his desire to 
become German Emperor, like so many of his ancestors before him.166 One of the reasons 
that Franz Joseph agreed to the Ausgleich of 1867 with Hungary was because he had hoped 
that this would more closely bind the Hungarians to the Empire and pave the way for 
revenge against Prussia. Likewise, in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Franz Joseph even 
considered helping Napoleon III defeat Prussia in order to regain Austrian dominance 
among the German states. However, the creation of the Dual Monarchy strengthened the 
Hungarians who did not share Franz Joseph’s desires to reassert dominance among the 
German states or add German-speaking territories to the Empire because that would 
undermine their own new found authority. The Ausgleich further pushed Habsburg 
diplomacy away from the German states and eastward towards the Balkans where Austria 
increasingly came into conflict with Russia. 
 According to the Austrian pro-Anschluss perspective, an Austria excluded from 
German affairs had turned its energy towards maintaining its Central European Empire, 
which, ultimately, had given it heartache. The rebellious ethnic groups had posed to Austria 
one insoluble problem after another. Now, the territories Austria had once dominated had 
                                                 
165Coolidge, "The New Austria," 468. 
 
166Anatol Murad, Franz Joseph of Austria and his Empire (New York, 1968).   
 80 
fragmented, and the various nationalities had departed, each their own way to Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Italy. Coolidge gave his own pro-Anschluss opinion when he 
stated: 
What was more natural and proper than that the Germans of Austria should rejoin 
their brothers in their old fatherland? The separation from it had been accidental and 
a short duration. The reunion would not mean a triumph of North Germany over 
South. On the contrary, it would be a reinforcement of the Southern element which 
might thereby well regain the preponderance it had exercised at an earlier age. In the 
same way, it would not mean a success for Protestantism, but rather the 
strengthening of the Catholic element in Germany.167 
 
 The Austrian government was in shambles, and Austria badly needed Germany’s 
strength, support, and security. The German mark would once again provide Austria with a 
much needed stable currency; coal from Germany would keep Austria’s factories going.  
Under an Anschluss, Berlin would no doubt overshadow Vienna. But as Coolidge stated, 
”Vienna, with her splendid position on the Danube, would be the second capital of the 
German State, a centre of enterprise and industry, and would draw under her influence the 
South German regions which had always had more affinity with her than Berlin.”168   
 The strong desire of most Austrians for an Anschluss with Germany was shown by 
the February elections and the policies carried out by the Austrian government, such as the 
secret Anschluss negotiations between Austria and Germany. And even though Austria had 
changed its name from German Austria (Deutsch-Österreich) to the Austrian Republic 
(Österreichische Republik) in early 1919 due to Allied pressure, some Austrian leaders and 
newspapers continued to use the term “German Austria.” Indeed, until 1922 the Austrian 
                                                 
167Coolidge, "The New Austria," 468. 
 
168Coolidge, "The New Austria," 468. 
 81 
postage stamps continued to say “German Austria.” After 1922 that became simply 
“Austria,” and only after 1945 did the stamps say “Republic of Austria.”169  
 The Anschluss question, which concerned the future of the Austrian Republic and 
was considered a life or death issue, was by far the most important political issue during the 
post-World War I elections. The three largest Austrian parties, the Christian Social Party, 
the socialist party, and the Greater German People’s Party, had all sympathized with the 
Anschluss, though to varying degrees. The greatest support for an Anschluss came from the 
socialists and Greater German People’s Party. 
 In the elections of February 16, 1919, which were the first elections of the Austrian 
Republic, the Christian Socials won in the provinces, but the socialists triumphed in Vienna. 
Vienna comprised one-third of the total population of Austria. Anti-socialists dubbed it “Red 
Vienna.” The Austrians had elected seventy-three socialists, sixty-nine Christian Socials, 
and twenty-five Greater German People’s Party members to the Constituent National 
Assembly (Konstituierende Nationalversammlung),170 which replaced the Provisional 
National Assembly and was the first elected legislative body of the First Republic of 
Austria.171 The pro-Anschluss socialists did not gain a majority, but they did gain a decisive 
plurality. Moreover, the two largest pro-Anschluss parties, the socialists and German 
nationalists, together received a total of 60% of the votes in Austria.172 The Austrian demand 
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for an Anschluss in 1918 and 1919 was higher than in any other time period because it had 
support from both the socialist and nationalist parties, even though they were on opposite 
ends of the political spectrum. Moreover, there was the sizable group within the Christian 
Social Party that advocated a political union with Germany as well.173 This alignment of 
political forces did not reoccur in the 1930s because the Austrian socialists wanted a union 
with a democratic Germany and opposed a union with a totalitarian, anti-socialist, Nazi 
Germany.  
 Another important factor was that the socialists maintained control over Austrian 
domestic and foreign policy after the February 1919 elections. Renner remained Chancellor 
and Bauer remained foreign minister until June 1920.174 Both Bauer and Renner were pro-
Anschluss and attempted to push Austrian diplomacy in that direction. The socialist 
Arbeiter-Zeitung had supported the union since November 1918, as did the Viennese Neue 
Freie Presse and the Wiener Mittag.175 Speaking at the Länderkonferenz176 on February 1, 
1919, Renner stated that Austria could not stand alone and had to seek an Anschluss with 
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Germany. Through the Anschluss, Vienna would be Germany’s gateway to the east and 
regain its commercial importance.177   
  In addition, in early February 1919 Bauer headed an Austrian delegation to the 
Constituent Assembly in Weimar to obtain favorable terms for Austria’s incorporation into 
Germany. Negotiations between Austria and Germany concerning the Anschluss then 
continued in Berlin from February 27 to March 3.178 On March 2 Bauer and German Foreign 
Secretary Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau signed a secret Anschluss, or 
Zusammenschluss, agreement, despite Allied warnings against a union. Under the 
agreement, Austria would get representation in the Reichstag, and it could keep close ties to 
the Vatican. Germany would assume part of Austria’s debt and absorb many of the Austrian 
civil servants into its workforce. The Anschluss agreement, which was not made public for 
fear of Allied retaliation, was to be certified by a state treaty and approved by the 
parliaments of both countries.179 Then on March 12, 1919, the Austrian Constituent National 
Assembly renewed the declaration of the previous November, stating that Austria was a part 
of the German Republic. The Constituent National Assembly stated its main foreign policy 
goal was to bring about a union as fast as possible.180 Joint Austro-German Commissions 
were also established to pave the way for union. A financial commission met in Vienna in 
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April to discuss the troubled Austrian economy and a possible monetary union with 
Germany. A transportation committee looked at such things as a possible Rhine-Main-
Danube canal and standardization of the trains, and the Austrian Minister of War met with a 
German general and talked about a common army.181  
 Nevertheless, both Germany and Austria agreed to postpone any final decisions 
regarding the Anschluss until after the peace settlement. The secret Anschluss agreement 
remained a “program for future negotiations.”182 However, Allied pressure and the eventual 
Anschluss prohibition in the peace treaties ended any hopes of an Austro-German union in 
1919. On May 16, 1919, Austrians carried out protests and demonstrations in Braunau am 
Inn, Graz, and other cities against the anticipated peace terms and the Anschluss prohibition, 
even before Germany officially signed the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919.183  
 
VII. The Peace Settlement  
 Although Renner officially signed the Treaty of St. Germain on September 11, 1919, 
Austrian newspapers had already condemned the treaty’s peace terms in June. The 
newspapers predicted a dismal future for the new Austrian state. The Neue Freie Presse 
called the Treaty of St. Germain ”unacceptable,” and the Arbeiter-Zeitung said, ”They have 
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taken everything from us;”  ”No peace but death for German Austria.”184 The conservative, 
Christian Social Reichspost also came out against the Peace Treaty.185 At the Peace 
Conference Austria had made a case for the self-determination of the German Austrians, 
German South Tyroleans, and Sudeten Germans.   
 The Neue Freie Presse contended that in response to the Allies’ infringement on 
Austria’s right to self-determination, in June 1919 Renner asserted German Austria was a 
country that was ”left over,” ”a mountainous country which cannot live and cannot die.”186 
Bauer likewise made the poor economic status and small size of Austria the main point in 
his attempts to convince the Allies of the necessity of an Anschluss.187 In July 1919 Bauer 
resigned from office due to antagonism from France and the Habsburg successor states over 
his pro-Anschluss position and disappointment that his main foreign policy vision was not 
being achieved. Yet Bauer still maintained that an Anschluss was foreseeable in the near 
future.188  
 Most Christian Socials also opposed the peace terms. The Treaty of St. Germain, 
signed on September 10, 1919, both took away South Tyrol and through Article 88 forbade a 
union between Austria and Germany. When Austria was not only denied union with 
Germany but also stripped of key territories to the south, such as South Tyrol and Trieste, 
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some Christian Socials became embittered. In protest Austrian Christian Social delegates 
from Styria and Carinthia left the conference hall before the treaty had been signed.189 The 
Neue Freie Presse asserted that in response to the official Allied prohibition of the 
Anschluss in the Treaty of St. Germain, the Christian Social President Johann Hauser of the 
Constituent National Assembly issued a protest note in September 1919 that condemned the 
prohibition. Hauser hoped that in the future, after war animosities had subsided, Austria 
would receive the same right to self-determination as given to other nationalities.190 Because 
of the Allies’ anti-Anschluss policies, on October 21, 1919, Austria officially withdrew the 
Anschluss declaration of November 12, 1918.191 
Then at the fifth Christian Social Party conference on November 15 and 16, 1919, N. 
N. Zuck of the Christian Social Party announced that Austria should seek an Anschluss and 
demand the return of lost German territories.192 Nevertheless, the Christian Socials Dr. 
Heinrich Mataja and Rudolf Gschladt raised objections to the pro-Anschluss declaration. 
Mataja argued that he did not want a union with a “Bolshevik Republic.”193 During the early 
months of the Republic, the anti-Anschluss Christian Socials combated a strong Anschluss 
movement within their own party and among the Austrian populace.  
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VIII. Germany and the Anschluss: 
 A conceivable Anschluss obviously had to have the cooperation of Germany.  There 
was a strong Anschluss movement in Germany as well, where Kurt Eisner of the 
Independent Socialists (USPD) had already called for a democratic and socialist Bavarian 
Republic and the eventual creation of a ”United States of Germany including Austria” at a 
workers’, peasants’, and soldiers’ council in Munich on November 8, 1918.194 And in 
February 1919 Chancellor Friedrich Ebert (SPD) proclaimed, ”They [the German Austrians] 
belong to us, and we belong to them.”195  
 Similar to the Austrian case, the Allies intervened in Germany to forbid an 
Anschluss. On September 3, 1919, the Times reported that the Allies had given Germany an 
ultimatum to immediately remove Article 61 from its new constitution. Article 61 of the 
German constitution considered Austria part of the German Empire and discussed the 
provisions for allowing Austrian representation in the Reichstag. The Allies maintained that 
this was an outright violation of the peace treaty signed with Germany. Article 80 of that 
treaty explicitly stated that ”Germany acknowledges and will strictly respect the 
independence of Austria” within its new boundaries set forth by the Allies. The Allies gave 
Germany fifteen days to withdraw Article 61 from its constitution or else suffer Allied 
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military intervention and the expansion of its occupation in the Rhineland. Germany 
removed Article 61, but the desire for union with Austria certainly did not end.196 
 Most German parties, such as the Centre Party, socialist party, and national parties, 
favored a union because they believed the annexation of Austria would fulfill the 
grossdeutch vision and speed up Germany’s return to power. The German press was 
likewise pro-Anschluss.197 On January 17, 1919, the German press had collectively asked the 
German government to execute the November 12 Anschluss Resolution of the Austrian 
National Assembly and incorporate Austria into Germany.198 But at this time Germany was 
not in a position to oppose the Allies over the Anschluss.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
 Isolation and resentment from hostile neighbors added to the First Republic of 
Austria's many handicaps and increased Austria's desire for union with Germany. Defeated, 
humiliated, starving, and economically and politically broken, Austria had no one else to 
turn to but Germany. Because a fair and democratic national referendum on the Anschluss 
was never conducted at this time, the exact degree of Austrian popular sentiment toward 
union is unknown. Nonetheless, the prospect of joining the Fatherland looked extremely 
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appealing for Austria, as the November declaration, the pro-Anschluss sympathies of the 
main political parties, the February 1919 election results, the pro-Anschluss polices pursued 
by Austrian leaders (like the secret Anschluss negotiations), the Anschluss demonstrations 
carried out in many Austrian cities, and reports from foreign diplomats showed.  
 Supported by parties and groups on the left, right, and center of the political 
spectrum, the Anschluss movement in 1918 and 1919 was stronger than in any other time 
period. Austrian socialists appealed to the working classes and ardently embraced a union 
with Germany because the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) was the preeminent 
political party of the Weimar Republic. Austrian socialists wanted to join with their socialist 
comrades in Germany to solve Austria’s economic and political chaos and create a socialist 
experiment. The socialists had even pointed to grossdeutsch support in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels.199 The Austrian socialist paper Arbeiter Zeitung likewise favored a union 
with Germany.200 The Greater German People’s Party fervently supported an Anschluss, as 
well. The Christian Social Party also had a sizeable pro-Anschluss faction within it.  
 The miserable economic conditions of the First Republic—triggered by the sudden 
collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the peace treaty terms—German nationalism, the 
Austrian identity crisis, the long-time historical ties between Germany and Austria, and the 
socialist brotherhood motivated the Anschluss movement in 1918 and 1919. The fact that the 
majority of the inhabitants of Vorarlberg had first wanted to separate from the shattered 
Austrian state and become a part of Switzerland, not Germany; the fact that Salzburg had 
first wanted a customs union (not Anschluss) with Bavaria, and the initial popularity of the 
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Danube Confederation plan before it collapsed, indicated the significance of the economic 
factor. While neither the Anschluss opponents within the Christian Social Party nor the 
Allies could change emotional feelings about the Treaty of St Germain, the sense of historic 
ties to Germany, and the lack of any indigenous Austrian national tradition, they could seek 
to improve the economy. This was in effect the only card they had to play, and time would 
thus tell to what extent diffusing the economic crisis would also diffuse Anschluss 
sentiment. Ultimately, supported by socialists, nationalists, and many conservatives, the 
Anschluss movement ascended in 1918 and 1919.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PART II: EMERGING INDEPENDENCE 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SUPPORT, 1920-1929 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
(Karl Seitz to Hoover, March 1920) 
. . . In that terrible time you were foremost among a few to draw the attention of an 
adverse world to our need. It is your humanity, and to your matchless energy that we 
owe the well-timed intervention of the United States and Western Powers which so 
far averted a catastrophe from our country. . .  That’s why your name has become a 
household word in our country. Allow me to be the interpreter of the grateful 
feelings of our people, and to assure you that you will live for ever in our memory, 
and that we look upon you as the messenger of a new epoch, when in place of the 
petty hostilities the civilised nations will be knit together by bond of lasting 
friendship. . . .201    
  
         
 This chapter focuses on British and American political, economic, financial, and 
cultural relations with Austria from 1920 to 1929, and in particular on how the United States 
and Great Britain sought to hinder the Anschluss movement and maintain an independent 
Austria. After World War I, a series of Republican presidents succeeded Woodrow Wilson. 
The Republicans and many Americans in general opposed the Treaty of Versailles, in 
particular the League of Nations, because it represented a commitment to internationalism 
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and possibly another war.202 Wilson’s foremost opponent was Republican Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge from Massachusetts who was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
Besides opposition to the League of Nations, contempt for Wilson and partisanship 
motivated Lodge. The Republicans needed a political issue on which they could contest the 
Democrats. Wilson suffered a stroke in September 1919 while touring the country and 
giving speeches in support of the League. Because of Republican opposition, as well as 
Wilson’s poor health, the United States did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles and other 
World War I peace treaties, and the United States did not join the League of Nations. 
Although the Republican Party rejected Wilson’s League of Nations, it had nothing 
against diplomatically and financially intervening in the affairs of other countries.203 
Realistically the United States could not completely isolate itself from the rest of the world 
in the 1920s. The Republican presidents Warren G. Harding (1921-1923), Calvin Coolidge 
(1923-1929), and Herbert Hoover204 (1929-1933) continued Wilson’s economic aid to 
Europe. Members of their respective administrations, especially Charles E. Hughes,205 Frank 
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B. Kellogg,206 Henry L. Stimson,207 and Andrew Mellon208 likewise supported their policies, 
as did Senator Lodge.  
Meanwhile in Britain, the Conservative Party dominated following the end of Liberal 
David Lloyd George’s six-year run as prime minister.209 Conservatives Andrew Bonar Law 
and Stanley Baldwin, and then Laborite Ramsay MacDonald followed Lloyd George in 
succession.210 Like their American counterparts, the British prime ministers were 
increasingly reluctant to engage in political and military commitments on the continent in 
the 1920s. For example, Britain made no security guarantee to France and did not join the 
Little Entente in Eastern Europe. Yet, similar to the US, Britain gave financial support to 
many countries, including Austria. Thus, while the US and Britain were ”isolationist” in 
terms of their political and military commitments, they were activist in economic 
dollar/pound diplomacy.  
Although sometimes it only sent unofficial delegates, the United States, along with 
Great Britain, participated in many significant international conferences in the 1920s (such 
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as the Geneva and London Conferences). The main American and British foreign policy 
goals in Europe during the 1920s were preserving world peace, re-building war-torn 
economies, disarming countries, establishing free trade, and preventing the spread of 
Bolshevism. The continued financial aid to Europe, for example the 1924 Dawes Plan that 
allocated loans to Germany, the US support of the Treaty of Locarno in 1925,211 and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact212 in 1928 reflected these common interests.  
Within this wider foreign policy framework, Great Britain and the United States had 
political interests in maintaining Austrian independence because an Anschluss would disturb 
the peace settlement and European balance of power. In 1921 Arthur Frazier, an American 
diplomat in Vienna, told Secretary of State Hughes that it should allow neither the collapse 
of the First Austrian Republic nor its annexation by Germany, both of which could mean the 
destruction of world peace.213 Despite its preference for Austrian independence, the United 
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States did not want to directly intervene in the affairs of Austria in the 1920s. Compared to 
other European nations, like France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia; the United States, followed 
by Great Britain, had the least to fear concerning a Greater Germany. Also, in contrast to 
other powers, both the United States and Great Britain left open the possibility of a union of 
Germany and Austria in the future, if it took place through consent of the League of Nations 
and occurred peacefully.214 Similar to 1918 and 1919, the Americans and British also 
supported a Danube Confederation plan as an alternative to the Anschluss in the 1920s, 
though it was never implemented.215 
The British and Americans tended to discount the power of autonomous pro-German 
nationalist sentiment and firmly believed that the strength of the Anschluss movement was 
primarily influenced by the economic conditions in Austria. They observed that during times 
of economic crisis, the Anschluss fervor peaked.216 The 1920s can be divided into two 
periods; the early 1920s (1920-1922) showed no sign of improvement in the economic and 
political turmoil in Austria that began in the aftermath of World War I, while the period 
from 1923 to 1929 showed some stability and economic recovery.217 Especially in the early 
1920s Austria’s relations with its fellow East Central European neighbors remained strained, 
and the latter continued to block Austrian trade. This hindered economic recovery, as every 
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import not balanced by an export substantially increased Austria’s trade deficit.218 In 1921 
pro-Anschluss referenda took place in three Austrian provinces. In particular, because the 
referenda had not occurred with international consent, Great Britain and the United States 
made it clear they would neither recognize the plebiscites nor accept an Anschluss, but they 
refrained from putting the kinds of immediate pressure on the Austrian government as did 
France and others. Thanks to American and British economic aid, the Austrian economy 
finally improved from near collapse in the mid- and late 1920s, and although the desire for 
Anschluss did not disappear, it nonetheless decreased.219   
In addition to the United States and Great Britain, France, Italy, and smaller 
European countries (Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark) also 
allocated loans to Austria throughout the 1920s in order to stabilize its economy and weaken 
the Anschluss movement.220 But it was the United States and Great Britain that emerged out 
of World War I victoriously as the world’s pre-eminent economic and political powers and 
could therefore exercise the greatest economic clout. The Anglo-American policies of 
rebuilding Europe included re-integrating Austria (and Germany) into a peaceful, prosperous 
Europe. As the economic heavy-weight, the United States allocated the greatest amount of 
money for reconstructing Austria and the rest of Europe, while Great Britain was the second 
largest creditor nation in the 1920s. 
 Because the United States and Great Britain invested tens of millions of dollars into 
Austria, they increasingly had not only a political but also a financial stake in keeping 
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Austria independent during the 1920s. If Austria collapsed or sought a union with Germany, 
the British and Americans faced the possibility of losing their money. US international 
philanthropy as seen in Hoover’s American Relief Administration, ARA, had not stopped 
after Wilson but continued under his successors. In addition, private American investors 
who participated in sending loans included companies, like the United States Grain 
Corporation, and bankers, like J. P. Morgan & Company. The total amount of American 
loans, primarily from private investors, to Austria during the 1920s was about $225 
million.221 Great Britain sent yearly “relief” loans to Austria totaling 101,526,000 pounds 
from 1920 to 1929.222  
Most of the money from the United States came from private American bankers, but 
the American government also contributed. The loans and philanthropy to Austria were 
based on both political and humanitarian motives. In general, most of the international loans 
in the 1920s came with the explicit condition that Austria refrain from joining a union with 
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Stationary Office, London, by Kraus Reprint LTD, Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966.  
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Germany. However, in the 1920s the British and American policy on preserving Austrian 
independence was not backed by warnings to the same degree as France, Italy, and the 
Habsburg successor states, which threatened economic sanctions, military occupation, 
cancellation of loans, and the loss of more territories if Austria did not stay independent.  
 Moreover, this chapter examines cultural ties among the Americans, British, and 
Austrians during the 1920s. Besides money, culture, in particular American music and films, 
spread throughout Austria and the rest of Europe. Most Austrians embraced American 
culture, although some Austrians feared Americanization as much as they did 
“Germanization.” Cultural interactions occurred between Austria, Britain, and the United 
States through various international organizations and the exchange of people and art. These 
cultural interactions facilitated positive political and economic relationships. Ultimately, 
American and British diplomacy and economic aid successfully helped maintain Austrian 
independence throughout the 1920s.   
 
II. Historiography 
 Four historians who have covered the themes of diplomacy, reparations, loans and 
the U.S. relationship to Europe in the 1920s are Frank Costigliola, Stephen Schuker, Emily 
Rosenberg, and Marc Trachtenberg. Trachtenberg is a revisionist historian writing in the 
early eighties who challenges the traditional view of the Allies imposing an impossible 
settlement on Germany. He defends French inter-war policies and claims that France was 
actually the most moderate of the Allies when it came to war reparations against Germany.  
Moreover, Germany could have come to a negotiated settlement with the Allies on 
reparations. After World War I, France’s main goal was to revive its ravaged economy 
 99 
through economic cooperation, not at the expense of Germany. Trachtenberg argues that 
overall Germany “made little effort” to pay post World War I reparations. Trachtenberg also 
argues that Great Britain only moved to a more moderate position by 1920, and because 
France was so dependant on Britain, it could not effectively enforce the treaty stipulations 
on its own.223 This chapter in contrast argues that Britain and the United States, not France, 
were the moderate nations concerning reparations and treaty enforcement. 
Schuker, another revisionist, argues that the United States through its numerous 
loans in effect paid “reparations” to Germany during the inter-war period from 1919 to 
1933. Germany was the biggest debtor nation in the world during the 1920s while the United 
States was the number one creditor. Then when the global depression hit in 1929 and 
Germany began defaulting on its payments from 1931 to 1934, American investors lost huge 
sums of money. Schuker compares the international debt crisis of the 1920s to what 
happened in the 1970s and early 1980s, when a similar sequence of borrowing and 
defaulting occurred. The lessons of the 1920s were not learned because the United States 
continued the same policies of sending loans to third-world countries, especially Latin 
America and Africa. These countries then also defaulted on loans to the United States due to 
a decline in the price of raw materials. Similar to Trachtenberg, Schuker rejects the 
traditional myth of the harsh reparations that the Allied victors imposed on a broken and 
defeated Germany. Schuker argues that Germany was able to pay reparations. In fact, 
Schuker maintains that when one subtracts the money Germany paid for reparations from 
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the money that Germany received in loans primarily from the United States, Germany 
actually received a net plus or positive influx in money. The author’s study also brings to 
light the strong connection between the economy and politics.224 
Costigliola decisively debunks the “isolation myth” of American foreign policy in 
the inter-war period and argues that the period from 1919 to 1933 was a time of American 
diplomatic and financial dominance. Yet the American leaders during the inter-war wielded 
the “American dominion” with caution, restraint, and an absence of military threat. They 
firmly believed that “private enterprise and minimal government intervention could 
safeguard world prosperity.” Costigliola contends that the American leaders, such as Herbert 
Hoover, Charles E. Hughes, Owen Young, and Henry Stimson, believed in American 
predominance, but they also believed in the necessity of setting limitations to national power 
and avoiding foreign entanglements. He states that “ironically, their caution also ensured 
that American predominance would be limited and at times ineffectual, what Reinhold 
Niebuhr in 1930 called ‘awkward’ dominion.”225   
Combining diplomatic, economic, and cultural history, Rosenberg analyzes dollar 
diplomacy from 1900 to 1930, during which period the United States extended private bank 
loans to make foreign governments accept American financial advisors. She establishes the 
great significance of "dollar diplomacy,” the use of international lending and advising in 
early twentieth-century American foreign policy. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and 
William Taft first implemented this policy in countries that American officials considered 
unstable. Dollar diplomacy was initially justified as a progressive means to extend 
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"civilization" and raise standards of living by promoting economic stability. Yet, Rosenberg 
also discusses the bad side of dollar diplomacy, which had already become controversial in 
the late nineteenth century because it represented new imperialism and exploitation.226   
Meanwhile, Michael Dockrill, John Douglas Goold, and Gaynor Johnson have  
written on British diplomacy. Co-authors Michael Dockrill and J. Douglas Goold give no 
specific emphasis on Britain and Austria in the period 1919 to 1923.227 While focusing on 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire, their book devotes three pages to Austria after World 
War I. The more recent book edited by Gaynor Johnson is also a very general and global 
study that does not focus on Austria.228   
  Costigliola, Rosenberg, Schuker, and Trachtenberg offer scant information on 
American foreign policy toward Austria in the 1920s. Rosenberg focuses on dollar 
diplomacy throughout the entire world. She discusses Latin America, Europe, and Asia. 
However, Rosenberg only writes a few sentences on Austria. Schuker’s main focus is 
Germany while Trachtenberg’s main emphasis is France. Costigliola has the most on 
Austria; nevertheless, altogether he only discusses Austria in a few pages, while he treats 
Germany in much greater depth. In addition, Michael Dockrill, John Douglas Goold, and 
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Gaynor Johnson offer little on British relations with Austria in the 1920s. Indeed, none of 
these authors used the Austrian foreign affairs archives in Vienna (the NPA, Neues 
Politisches Archiv, Austwärtige Angelengenheiten, 1918-1934, Archiv der Republik. Even F. 
L. Carsten a British historian focusing on internal Austrian affairs did not consult Austrian 
foreign affairs archives.229 Therefore, these authors have left a gap in American and British 
diplomacy in Austria in the 1920s. 
 
III. American and British Perceptions of Austria in the 1920s 
Ordinary citizens in Great Britain and especially in the United States in the 1920s 
were more or less ignorant of Austrian political problems. Not surprisingly, they had no real 
knowledge about local Austrian events, such as the reasons for the provincial referenda of 
1921. Those who did know at least something about Austria regarded it as a politically and 
economically troubled state. Nevertheless, most Americans and British had a positive 
attitude toward Austria because of its rich cultural history and natural beauty. When the 
Americans and British in the 1920s thought of Austria, they thought of the same things that 
people today think of, the music of Mozart, a rich Viennese culture exemplified by figures 
like Freud, and Alpine winter landscapes.230 
 An example of what the most well-read and best informed Americans understood 
about Austria can be seen in a detailed article in the August 13, 1922 issue of the 
Washington Post. According to this article, the new Austrian Republic was one-eighth the 
size of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus most Austrians in the immediate aftermath 
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of World War I and dissolution of the Habsburg Empire had considered an independent 
Austria an “impossible proposition” and sought a union with Germany. However, by 1922 
the idea of “a fusion [was] losing force.”231 The Washington Post article was optimistic and 
said that Austria could become a stable and prosperous country if it reorganized its key 
resources of water and wood. Austria’s future rested on its hydro-electric energy. Austria 
could also become a center of trade.  
Moreover, the newspaper article described the Austrians to the American public. It 
said that the Austrians loved to dance, especially the waltz, enjoyed music, and played 
outdoor sports. The Austrians had a rich music tradition that included Mozart and Strauss. 
The article described the typical Austrian dress. Women traditionally wore the dirndl, while 
men wore Lederhosen. The Washington Post concluded that most American tourists found 
that Austria was similar in landscape, culture, and climate to Switzerland.232   
 A similar view is found in a US State Department report of 1921. It also called 
Austria a cultural center and was optimistic about its future in the 1920s. The report cited 
Alexander von Humboldt, who had called Salzburg “one of the most beautiful towns” in the 
world. The report stated that within several years Austria would become a “self-supporting 
and self-respecting” state. According to State Department, Austria’s “natural resources are 
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equal, if not superior, to those possessed by Switzerland,” a country which also lacked a sea 
port. Austrians only needed better confidence in their state.233 
 The British view of Austria was similar to the American. A special titled “The 
Republic of Austria” aired on British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio in November 
1929 for an audience of one million. The Austrian ambassador called the report “terrific 
propaganda for our land.”234 The BBC special especially focused on Innsbruck, Salzburg, 
and Vienna. In describing Austria, the BBC said: 
 During your trip you will visualize beautiful mountains, rivers and lakes, a  
Paradise for winter sports or summer holidays; romantic old castles and monasteries, 
and above all the great capital of Vienna with its splendid palaces and vistas. The 
rich collection of treasures in Vienna will not surprise you, for you will remember 
that Austria is the heir of one of the greatest Empires in history. 
 
The BBC report then went on in detail about Austria’s rich musical heritage.235 Thus, the 
British and American publics had very favorable views about Austria, focusing on its culture 
and natural beauty rather than its recent role as a wartime enemy, that facilitated the pro-
Austrian positions of their governments. 
 
IV. American and British Money and Austrian Independence in the Early 1920s 
In the early 1920s, British and American observers were uniform in their assessment 
that Austria suffered from a poor economy and had a strong Anschluss movement. By 
securing loans for Austria in the early 1920s, Great Britain and the United States hoped to 
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achieve their main foreign policy goals of improving the devastated Austrian economy, 
keeping the country independent, and hindering the growth of Anschluss movements, 
whether national or local. Besides loans, American and British philanthropy toward Austria 
was also generous. 
The Austrian economy was quite fragile in the early 1920s and like the economies of 
so many other European countries at that time particularly devastated by inflation. The 
British diplomats stated that the price of meat in 1920 was eighteen times its pre-World War 
I level, and the price of fuel and potatoes was thirty times higher. The Austrian currency had 
fallen to one fifteen-hundredth of its 1914 value.236 The Washington Post asserted that due 
to ongoing inflation, by 1922 one American dollar was worth 19,000 Austrian kronen.237 In 
1922 alone the cost of living in Austria had gone up ninety-four percent, food and fuel prices 
doubled, and many restaurants closed. According to the New York Times, there was “an 
atmosphere of gloom and apprehension in the city [Vienna].”238  
Besides major inflation, the Austrian economy suffered from massive 
unemployment, shortages of food and heating supplies, and a lack of trade. Economic and 
political unrest was such that British High Commissioner Mr. Francis Lindley discussed the 
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possibility of a civil war in Austria in 1920.239An American economic survey of 1920 
reported that the Austrian “food and coal situation was critical.” The survey also reported 
widespread strikes and unrest throughout the First Republic.240 In 1922 the unemployment 
rate had increased, and almost half the workers of Austria had been without a job.241 
In 1922 British diplomats in the British Embassy in Vienna stated that Austria had 
two main problems. First, its existing industries needed to be restarted, and, second, trade 
with its neighbors restored. In the early 1920s Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and 
Italy continued to block most trade with Austria, as they had in 1918 and 1919. In order to 
solve these problems, the diplomats suggested an international credit scheme for Austria and 
a conference of East Central European states to discuss economic issues, in particular trade. 
The diplomats also recommended that Austrian reparations should be suspended for twenty 
years.242 
American and British observers reported that, in connection with this economic 
hardship, support for the Anschluss movement in Austria was extremely high in the early 
1920s. Regarding the popular sentiment towards Anschluss, in 1920 Lindley reported that in 
Austria the desire for union with Germany was not limited to the Greater German People’s 
Party; instead, this desire expanded to most Austrians who wanted to escape the existing 
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economic stagnation. Lindley also stated in 1920 that the Greater German People’s Party 
had almost unanimous support from intellectuals and the educated middle class, like 
university professors, doctors, and lawyers.243  
The diplomatic reports shaped the British and American governments’ response to 
the Austrian problem in the early 1920s. Regarding the American stance on the Anschluss, 
in May 1921 the United States recognized the new Austrian Republic and its borders but 
reiterated the Anschluss prohibition.244 Because the United States Senate had ratified neither 
the Treaty of Versailles nor the Treaty of St. Germain, the United States signed separate 
treaties with Germany and Austria. On July 2, 1921, the United States officially concluded 
the peace treaty with Austria, two months after granting recognition.245 
In the American peace treaty with Austria the United States reserved the right to 
participate in the Reparation Commission. However, the United States assumed no official 
obligation for the League of Nations, borders of Austria, and political clauses including 
Article 88 that forbade an Anschluss. Austrian Chancellor Johann Schober and the President 
Warren Harding signed the treaty.246 Therefore, although the United States recognized the 
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First Austrian Republic in May 1921, the United States made no official commitment to 
maintain Austrian independence or its borders in the peace treaty. Nonetheless, the United 
States, like Britain, preferred that Austria remain independent in the early 1920s. 
As in 1918 and 1919, the main organization for food relief and philanthropy in 
Europe in the early 1920s was the American Relief Administration, ARA.247 The early food 
relief and philanthropy to Europe was primarily based on humanitarian and political 
concerns because the Americans wanted to bring about economic and political stability to 
post-war Europe.248Although most of the ARA food shipments to Europe came in 1918 and 
1919, Herbert Hoover’s ARA had raised another $212.4 million through 1923. The ARA 
funds came from private Americans, the British government, and other countries.249 
The British and American policy to aid Austria poured tens of millions of dollars of 
food relief and philanthropy into the country during the early 1920s. In addition to 
preventing an Anschluss, the immediate goal of the food relief was to improve welfare 
conditions in Austria. In 1920 the lack of food in Austria was so severe that the United 
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States, Great Britain, and other countries sent food supplies to help starving Austrians.250 On 
March 30, 1920, the United States Congress “authorized the United States Grain 
Corporation, with the approval of the Department of State, to furnish flour on credit to 
relieve populations in the countries of Europe or countries contiguous thereto suffering for 
the want of food.”251 Based on this resolution, on September 4, 1920, the United States 
Grain Corporation allocated flour to Austria. In return for the flour, the United States 
government held an Austrian bond in the amount of $24, 055,708.92.252 The US Grain loan 
was an example of the United States government working together with private companies 
in order to rebuild Austria.253 The British reaction to the Austrian food crisis paralleled that 
of the Americans. According to the Daily Telegraph, the Austrian ambassador in London 
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Baron Georg Franckenstein254 had informed the British government of the Austrian food 
shortage in October 1920. In response Great Britain pledged 10 million pounds in food 
credits for wheat, fat, sugar, rye, barley, corn, and milk.255 In 1920 the Neue Freie Presse 
reported that British food credits included 100,000 tons of potatoes sent to Austria. 256 Thus, 
Britain participated with the United States in food relief to Austria and was the second 
largest donor.  
Also in 1920 Americans and British organized various charitable groups to help 
Austria. These organizations included the American Red Cross and the Friends’ Relief 
Mission.257 In May 1920 the American Relief Committee for Sufferers in Austria purchased 
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Austrian kronen with dollars and deposited money into Austrian banks.258 The Friends’ 
Relief Mission was a joint American and British group that sought to rescue Austrians from 
starvation and hopelessness. The group’s “vast numbers of humane persons” raised money 
and charitable donations for Austria. The main goal of these philanthropic societies was to 
“promote measures of economic reconstruction in Austria without delay.”259  
On August 13, 1922, the American Relief Administration left Austria, but not before 
it had given Austria a final donation that was to feed and clothe 30,000 Austrian children for 
the next two years. Even after the ARA departed, the Austrian government pledged to 
continue working with the “American-Austrian relief work.” As of June 21, 1922, the 
United States government had fed about 362,000 Austrian children.260 From 1919 to 1924 
Austria received 46,934.5 metric tons of relief materials valued at $13,193,794.30 from the 
American Relief Administration European Children’s Fund. Austria received more money 
than Germany from this particular organization, and altogether Austria received the third 
largest amount after Russia and Poland.261 The Chicago Daily Tribune maintained that most 
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of the $13 million came from the United States.262 The fact that Austria received the third 
largest ARA donation in Europe showed the gravity of the Austrian economic and political 
problem in early 1920s and the American desire to help. 
Regarding American nation-building in Austria in the early 1920s, Herbert Hoover 
organized a plan for the reconstruction of Austria, in which the Austrian government 
received private loans and had to employ American Relief Administration agents. William 
B. Causey, whom Hoover had hired in late December 1918, continued to serve as the United 
States adviser to Austria until 1923. Causey and his staff of American experts had worked 
tirelessly to solve Austria’s economic problems and assist Austria in procuring American 
investments. The American agents in Austria helped build a capitalist economy and lessen 
national and social tensions. They often arranged contracts between American businesses 
and Austrian utilities and railroad companies. Causey also accompanied the Austrian 
                                                                                                                                                      
Fund founded the Vienna Emergency Relief Fund to specifically aid Austrian children, as 
well as the elderly. In comparison, Russia received about $29 million and Poland $25.5 
million. Czechoslovakia received $5.4 million and Germany $3.2 million. Hungary got $1.8 
million and Yugoslavia $1.7 million. The total amount that European Children’s Fund spent 
from 1919 to 1924 was $84,639,241.40. While some of the US relief tables listed Austria as 
“German Austria” in 1919, this table that included the 1920s, used the name “Austria.” 
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representatives to Genoa, 263 Geneva, and other conferences that dealt with Europe’s 
financial and economic problems.264  
Furthermore by 1921 and 1922 there was a shift from immediate food relief and 
philanthropy, to long term loans to jumpstart the Austrian economy. Britain and other 
European countries allocated loans to aid Austrian economic recovery and lessen the 
Anschluss movement.  In 1921 Great Britain had advanced 250,000 pounds to Austria; 
France had advanced the same amount, and the Czechs contributed 500 million Czech 
crowns ($16 million).265  In 1922 Great Britain advanced an additional two million pounds 
credit to Austria,266 and France agreed to send 50 million francs.267 In addition, Italy, 
Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Spain promised funds to Austria by the 
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end of 1922.268 Switzerland also considered an independent Austria to be in its best interests 
and participated in the League of Nations’ Austrian relief fund by allocating 20,000,000 
francs.269 
The United States also participated in loans to improve the Austrian economy. 
According to the Chicago Daily Tribune, on August 7, 1922, the Boston banker Edward 
Filene allocated a $50 million loan to Austria. Filene was hopeful that Austria should at least 
be as economically stable as Switzerland in a couple of years. He had surveyed Europe and 
concluded that Austria had enough security for the loan. He believed Austria could repay the 
loan within three months. Filene recommended that the Austrian government cooperate and 
make Austria as economically sound as possible by retiring unnecessary civil servants, 
terminating paper money, balancing the budget, and lowering taxes. The loan was to be 
given directly to the Austrian government and paid out in installments. Disagreeing with 
Henry Morgenthau who had said that Austrian railroads offered the best security, Filene 
stated that Austrian financial security rested in the country’s wood, tobacco, and salt 
monopolies. Filene also believed that Vienna would quickly “prosper” and become a center 
of commerce due to its location in the “heart of Europe.”270 The Boston banker loan was an 
example of the massive American private investment to improve the Austrian economy 
during the early 1920s.271    
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Most Austrians regarded the food relief and loans favorably with the exception of the 
socialists. Even though Chancellor Karl Renner was pro-Anschluss, the United States still 
negotiated food credits with his socialist government in 1920.272 Regarding food relief, the 
socialist Austrian Foreign Minister Otto Bauer regretted foreign credits, but said he had no 
choice other than to accept them. Bauer stated: “We had to receive foodstuffs from foreign 
countries and to accept them on the terms which the foreign countries dictated to us without 
asking us.”273 On the other hand, in April 1921, the state official from Salzburg, Adalbert 
Preschke, wrote a letter thanking President Harding and Americans for their “noble work 
done in feeding the starving children.”274 Overall, the US State Department report said that 
Austrians had “cordial” feelings toward Americans in the early 1920s.275 In addition, 
Austrians expressed tremendous gratitude toward Great Britain and its efforts. Baron 
Franckenstein greatly thanked Britain for its enormous assistance in the reconstruction of 
Austria.276  
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As in 1918 and 1919, the early 1920s marked another period of almost unanimous 
support for the Anschluss in both Austria and Germany, which only foreign opposition 
prevented. Immediately after World War I, the Americans and British, motivated by 
humanitarian impulses and political reasons, sent food relief and charity to suffering 
Austrians. In addition, the Americans and British sent loans to bolster the Austria economy 
and prevent an Anschluss in the early 1920s, a policy that continued throughout the entire 
1920s.277 They thus sought both short-term relief from suffering as well as long-term 
economic recovery. 
 
 
V. American Investors during the Early 1920s 
In general, most of the money for philanthropy and loans in the early 1920s came 
from American private investors. Back in the fall of 1919, United States treasury agents 
headed by Russell Leffingwell had put together a European financial reconstruction plan 
that limited federal government spending and stipulated that further loans would mainly 
come from private investors. This plan determined United States foreign policy up to 1938. 
The Federal Reserve, which Woodrow Wilson created, lowered interest rates to encourage 
the private loans.278 
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In the early 1920s, Hoover agreed with Leffingwell that private loans should be used 
to revitalize European economies. In 1921 President Harding invited Secretary of 
Commerce Hoover, Secretary of State Hughes, Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon, J. P. 
Morgan, and several other bankers and businessmen to the White House. At the White 
House Hoover advocated federal government regulation and strict standards for loans to 
Europe. For example, he wanted investors to check the security of the bonds they were 
purchasing. The Department of Commerce provided investors, like Dillon, Reed & 
Company and Chase Security Corporation, reports of specific financial conditions in 
European countries. The United States government preferred that American loans be used to 
purchase American materials. Altogether American loans to foreign countries totaled “many 
hundreds of millions in 1921 alone.”279   
A banking conference in 1922 showed how the American and international banking 
communities thought and spoke about the European crisis and their role. The New York 
Times asserted that on October 4, eleven-hundred bankers met at the American Bankers’ 
Association in the Commodore Hotel in New York City to discuss financial relief to 
Europe.280 The delegates included foreign bankers and diplomats from Britain and France. 
The Bishop of New York William T. Manning likewise attended and gave a speech.281  
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At this banking conference, Thomas W. Lamont,282 an international banker of J. P. 
Morgan & Company, said the “debt problem must be solved before Europe can be 
economically stabilized.” Thomas B. McAdams, President of the American Bankers’ 
Association and Vice President of the Merchant National Bank in Richmond asserted that 
the United States should not isolate itself from solving European problems. British bankers, 
such as Reginald McKenna the head of a bank in London, also attended and spoke on 
reparations and international debt issues. According to McKenna, most American bankers 
were not aware of the reasons for and against the cancellation of war debts.283  
 Lamont told American bankers that they had a “responsibility to foreign affairs as 
well as domestic. American prosperity is interwoven with European stability. There can be 
no settlement over there until the debt question is resolved.” Lamont maintained that 
Americans should bring their values to the rest of the world. The American Bankers’ 
Association President McAdams agreed with Lamont and said American banks had an 
obligation to aid Europe.284  
 Lamont, like the British economist John Maynard Keynes, argued that Germany 
could not pay its reparations and United States should cancel war debts, or at least postpone 
them for several years. According to Lamont, in the 1920s the United States produced half 
of the world’s cotton, 45% of its grain, and 60% of its copper. Moreover, the United States 
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controlled 40% of the world’s gold. Lamont praised the charity record of Americans, who 
had already given $1.2 billion to Hoover’s American Relief Administration after World War 
I and spent another $200 million on sending food to Europeans. Yet, Lamont said the United 
States needed to do even more. Lamont asked, “shall we meet the responsibility that has 
come with our power – or shall we fail? Should we do something or enrich ourselves with 
more of the world’s gold?”285   
 Lamont asserted that American bankers should not be silent; rather they should be 
politically active and urge the United States government to assist in the economic recovery 
of Europe. The United States should not be indifferent. It should seek the readjustment of 
reparations and war debts so that debtor nations could pay off their debts. Lamont wanted 
some debts owed to the United States canceled, while other countries should get a time 
extension for repayment. Seward Prosser, the President of the Bankers Trust Company and 
Chairman of the Committee of One Hundred agreed. Prosser said Europe could not 
revitalize without American help. In addition, British and French bankers and diplomats 
concurred.286  Furthermore, S. W. Straus, an American investor from New York, contended 
that the United States should send loans to European countries. These loans would be used 
for highways, industry, and agriculture.287  
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Therefore, in the 1920s, many American and foreign bankers, who provided most of 
the money for loans, came out in favor of assisting European economic reconstruction that 
included Austria. In discussions held among themselves, such as that in October 1922, at 
least some of the bankers not only wanted to do well for themselves but talked about doing 
good in the world. The United States’ relief effort would not have been possible without 
their help. 
 
VI. The American and British Perspectives of the Provincial Plebiscites in 1921  
 The general European response to help Austria in the early 1920s was particularly 
threatened in 1921 due to a series of local plebiscites that the Austrian government was 
unwilling and unable to prevent. According to the Times [London], when “deaf to Allied 
threats, expostulations, and coaxing,”288 three out of eight provinces in Austria conducted 
their own referenda on the Anschluss question in which most of the inhabitants voted in 
favor of a union with Germany,289 Great Britain, France, Italy and the other European 
nations informed Austria of their objections. The European nations, including Britain, 
threatened to halt loans if the Austrian government did not do more to stop the provincial 
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plebiscites, which they considered steps toward a complete Anschluss and, therefore, 
forbidden. The United States Department of State took no direct action in this matter 
because it perceived it as a European problem. However, especially because this represented 
a unilateral policy on the part of the Austrian provinces to destroy Austrian integrity and 
alter the balance of power and there was no international consent, the United States, similar 
to Britain and the other European nations, did not recognize the separatist movements.290 
Although it protested the plebiscites, Great Britain never came out as forcefully as other 
European countries, in particular France and the Little Entente, in demanding a strict 
enforcement of the peace treaties in the early 1920s. France and the Habsburg successor 
states not only threatened to halt credits, but they once again threatened occupation and loss 
of territory, as they had earlier in 1918 and 1919.291  
Already on March 12, 1920, the American Commissioner in Austria Albert Halstead 
had informed the US Secretary of State about the strong separatist movement in the 
provinces of Tyrol and Salzburg, which he had said was intensified by German propaganda 
and the idea that Germany was Austria’s only salvation.292 Eight days later, Halstead stated 
that Tyrolean delegates wanted to discuss the idea of union with the Americans, British, 
French, and Italians. Halstead wrote, “Without express permission from the Department of 
State or unless the other Missions consider it wise, I shall refuse to receive any delegation 
from Tyrol, which seeks to over come the provisions of the Peace Treaty which prohibit 
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union with Germany.”293 Moreover, in May 1920, Christian Social Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs von Flugel asked Halstead what the US position was regarding the separatist 
movement in Tyrol. Halstead told von Flugel that: 
It was, of course, impossible for me to say definitely what would be the attitude of 
the United States in such an event, but it was necessary to be noncommittal and at 
the same time to indicate perfect loyalty to the provisions of the Treaty of St. 
Germain. Accordingly I stated that it was impossible to announce officially the 
policy of the Government of the United States, but that he should be privately 
reminded that in the Treaty of St. Germain union with Germany was prohibited.294  
 
Halstead also reminded von Flugel that the Austrian Nationalrat had confirmed the peace 
treaty, and since Tyrolean delegates had participated, the Tyroleans had bound themselves to 
the treaty terms. Furthermore, Halstead told von Flugel that the treaty contained provisions 
by which a union could be implemented, that is only with League of Nations approval. 
Halstead concluded that if some time in the future Tyrol wished to legally join Germany, 
then “there could be no question of bad faith on the part of Tyrol.” 295 Thus, Halstead 
reiterated the main American policy toward an Austrian Anschluss that had not changed 
since 1918 and 1919. Although it opposed an Anschluss, the US refused to directly 
intervene. Also, the US was willing to see a union happen with international permission.    
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Concerning a possible Anschluss in 1921, the Times reported that British Foreign 
Secretary Lord George Nathaniel Curzon of Kedleston296 asserted that the United States, 
Great Britain, and other countries would “not tolerate the reappearance in the heart of 
Europe of a great and dangerous Power which is always rattling the sword in the scabbard 
and is a perpetual menace to the peace of the whole world.” Lord Curzon contended that the 
League of Nations and the US must enforce the treaties to ensure peace. He was visiting the 
United States when he made those statements to the Times.297 Therefore, Great Britain, the 
other European countries, and the United States contended that the pro-Anschluss plebiscites 
would compromise the peace settlement. Moreover, the League of Nations and the US 
emphasized their financial stakes. According to the Times in May 1921, the US, Britain, 
France, and Italy said they were not sending millions of dollars in loans to Austria so that it 
can join with Germany.298   
Despite its opposition to the plebiscites, the United States took no direct action 
regarding the separatist movements in 1921.299 On the other hand, British, French, and 
Italian foreign ministers had regularly informed the Austrian Chancellor Dr. Michael Mayr 
and various Austrian ambassadors of their opposition to the provincial plebiscites. 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia likewise expressed their strong 
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opposition. The New York Times reported that Mayr concurred with Britain and the US and 
admitted that “the whole question of credits for Austria is endangered by this inopportune 
unionist agitation.”300 Mayr’s government was placed in a particularly difficult situation 
because he had been negotiating with the League of Nations for loans. In March 1921, one 
month before the first plebiscite had occurred, Mayr had met Lord Curzon in London, where 
Curzon told Mayr that before Austria could receive additional loans, it had to abide by the 
Treaty of St. Germain.301 
On April 21, 1921, the French government told the Austrian Minister in Paris that 
Austria must end the Anschluss plebiscites, or else France would withdraw financial aid.302 
According to the Times, on April 30, the Italian government told the Austrian Minister in 
Rome, “the continued Anschluss agitation was very serious and that in these circumstances, 
it would be difficult to achieve a favorable result for Austria.” In addition, in April the 
British Foreign Office sent Austria a letter stating that: “The plebiscites could not be in 
Austria’s interests.” British Foreign Secretary Curzon stated, “His government would not 
make any direct demand for the plebiscite demonstrations to cease: England would look on 
until the first act of union was attempted, and then it would prevent every such attempt.”303 
Britain said keeping Austria independent was its political mission. Thus, while France and 
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Italy had wanted the Austrian government to stop the plebiscites immediately, the British 
position was to take action only if the plebiscites actually led to imminent Anschluss.  
  Britain, France, Italy, and the Habsburg successor states refused to recognize any of 
the provincial plebiscites, which they saw as unofficial and invalid. The French foreign 
minister called the plebiscites ”Anschluss manoeuvres.” Britain, France, and Austria’s 
neighbors had wanted to keep Austria intact and had no intention of allowing any of the 
individual provinces to separate, for if one province did so, the rest would almost certainly 
follow.304  
Besides the termination of loans, Italy, France, and the Little Entente (especially 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) threatened military occupation of Austria if the ”Anschluss 
agitation” and referenda continued.305 The Times contended that Yugoslavia even had troops 
ready to invade the Austrian province of Carinthia.306 The New York Times asserted that 
France and the Little Entente exercised another form of diplomatic leverage by threatening 
to return the Burgenland region to Hungary.307 Even though it did not go quite as far as the 
other European countries in their threats during 1921 provincial plebiscites, Britain wanted 
the continuance of Austrian independence. Although it did not send official protests or 
threats to the Austrian government, like other countries, the United States refused to 
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recognize or support the plebiscites. Because of the US, Britain, and other countries, no 
Anschluss took place in 1921, whether local or national.  
 
VII. The Lodge Resolution in 1922 
The issue of granting further loans was inevitably tied to the issue of collecting 
previous short-term debts that were coming due. Many Americans advocated the 
postponement of Austrian debts in the early 1920s. President Harding and the US Congress 
received several petitions. The American Friends Service Committee (Quakers) wrote a 
letter to President Warren Harding on February 9, 1922. The Quakers had contacts in 
Austria who had told them that conditions were grim. The Quakers asked Harding for a 
moratorium of Austrian debts because Austria was not in a condition to pay them.308  
In addition, on February 12, 1922, about sixty-five American students from 
Rockford College signed a petition demanding immediate legislation on postponing 
Austrian debts for twenty years. The petition said, ”Be it resolved, that we hereby petition 
our Senators and Representatives in Congress to take immediate action in the form of 
special and immediate legislation that payment of Austria’s debt to the United States be 
suspended for at least twenty years.” The students argued that the situation in Austria was 
worsening. They urged immediate action to prevent starvation and death.309  
Moreover, William Causey and the US State Department wrote and rallied Congress 
to give Austria more time to pay off debts. Causey and US Secretary of State Charles Evans 
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Hughes argued that a moratorium would give Austria a chance to recover, reestablish its 
industries, balance its budget, stabilize its currency, lessen the Anschluss desire, and put the 
country in a position where it can repay future debts. In the US Senate Henry Cabot Lodge 
campaigned for a temporary moratorium on Austrian debt repayment. The Lodge Resolution 
that postponed Austria’s debt and reparation payments finally passed on March 16, 1922. 
According to the Lodge Resolution: 
[Because] the economic structure of Austria is approaching collapse 
and great numbers of people of Austria are, in consequence, in imminent danger of 
starvation and threatened by diseases growing out of extreme privation  
. . . this government wishes to cooperate in relieving Austria from the immediate 
burden created by her outstanding debts: Thereby be it resolved by the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
that the Secretary of the Treasury [Mellon] is hereby authorized to extend, for a 
period not to exceed twenty-five years, the time of payment of the principal and 
interest of the debt incurred by Austria . . .310  
 
Thus, United States offered the carrot while France was threatening the stick. The United 
States had refused to intervene in the 1921 plebiscites and had offered loans instead. The 
realization that Austria could not immediately repay the loans led to the Lodge Resolution, 
which made it possible for Austria to get additional loans. 
  
VIII. The London Conference in 1922  
Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Japan and other countries 
met at the London Conferences from August 7 to August 14, and again from December 9 to 
11, 1922, to discuss war debts and reparations, but for Austria the meeting was crucial 
because of the loan issue. According to the New York Times, the United States was not 
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officially present, and Secretary of State Charles Hughes did not attend. However, Ernest 
Harvey was sent as an American observer to represent the United States in an unofficial 
capacity.311 The biggest problem at the London Conferences was reparations with Germany. 
At the end of the first London Conference, however, the League of Nations also agreed to 
grant an international loan to Austria. In the end, these conferences were a failure 
concerning any solution to German reparations, but a smashing success for Austria in terms 
of demonstrating broad international support for additional loans.      
On August 15, 1922, after the conference had deadlocked on the reparations issue, 
Ambassador Franckenstein met British Prime Minister David Lloyd George.312 He relayed 
the Austrian government request for a loan in the amount of fifteen million pounds. The 
major powers313 could not look upon a possible collapse of Austria with indifference, he 
pleaded. Lloyd George, Poincaré, and other statesmen then met Austrian Chancellor Ignaz 
Seipel in London, where they reached an agreement on the reconstruction of Austria.314 The 
League of Nations allocated an international loan in the amount of 650 million gold kronen 
(crowns),315 or $126 million.316 Even though the United States was not a League of Nations 
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member, most of the money still came from American bankers. In fact, $78 million of the 
$126 million international loan came from the United States.317 Also, Great Britain funded 
25% to 30 % of the loan.318 Austria received the loan in 1923.319   
In addition to supporting the Austrian loan, the British played a particular role in 
overseeing Austrian stabilization through the League of Nations Financial Committee, 
which London officials and the Bank of England controlled. As one condition of the 1922 
loan, this League of Nations Financial Committee enforced strict rules in Austria on budget 
balancing, tax collection, and expenditures, and it created a politically independent national 
bank that employed foreign advisers.320  
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Although there was no evidence in the US Department of State documents that the 
United States government directly pressured Austria into remaining independent in order to 
receive loans, many American investors, as well as many British and other foreign investors, 
made it a condition in the August 1922 League of Nations loan that Austria maintain its 
independence, because otherwise they feared losing their money. Investors were worried 
that in the event of an Anschluss, Germany might seize foreign investments in Austria 
without any compensation.321 Therefore, the League of Nations set two kinds of conditions 
on Austria for loans. The first condition was prohibition of the Anschluss—which in contrast 
to France and Little Entente for the bankers was motivated by fear of losing their 
investments rather than fear of growing German power—and the second one was the close 
supervision of domestic Austrian financial practices and fiscal responsibility. Despite these 
conditions, the significance of this loan for Austria was great, for it was the largest 
international loan to Austria that the United States, Britain, and other countries agreed to pay 
during the entire inter-war period.  
 
IX. The Geneva Protocols of 1922 
 The major powers held another conference in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1922 to 
specifically deal with Austrian sovereignty. While the conferences in London in August and 
December dealt with global financial issues, in particular reparations and world economies, 
and included countries like Japan, the conference in Geneva was much smaller and only 
some European countries attended. On October 4, 1922, Great Britain, France, Italy, and 
Austria met in Geneva and signed the three protocols, collectively called the Geneva 
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Protocols, which guaranteed Austrian independence.322 The conference in Geneva occurred 
on the same date as the bankers meeting in New York, but there was no connection. The 
Washington Post stated that the United States was not present at the meeting in Geneva, but 
the United States had unofficial delegates present, such as William Causey, who represented 
American interests in Austria.323 The New York Times wrote that Lord Balfour headed the 
British delegation, while M. Hanotaux headed the French team.324 Chancellor Seipel 
represented the Austrian side. Germany was not present at this meeting.325  
According to the Times, protocol number one concerned the “sovereignty” of 
Austria. Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and other countries recognized 
Austria’s “territorial integrity.” At the same time, Austria renewed its pledge to maintain its 
own independence. No economic or financial measures could be taken that would 
compromise Austrian independence.326 Therefore, whereas, the Treaty of St. Germain only 
forbade a political union, the Geneva Protocols explicitly forbade Austria from seeking any 
form of economic union with Germany as well without the consent of the League of 
Nations. 
The American and British press stated that protocol number two described the 
League of Nations loan that the major powers had promised Austria in the London 
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Conference in August 1922 and listed the obligations of the Austrian government. The main 
creditors to whom Austria had to pay interest were Great Britain, the US, France, Italy, and 
Czechoslovakia. Austria had to secure the interest with its customs and tobacco monopoly. 
Austria could also not take out additional loans from any other country, thus burdening itself 
with further debt and possibly jeopardizing its capacity to repay, without permission from 
Britain and other creditors.327 
In protocol number three, Seipel granted the League of Nations control of Austrian 
finances for two years and agreed to conduct various financial reforms in Austria. The 
London Conference had already given the League limited financial powers over Austria. 
Examples of Austrian financial reforms necessitated by the League at Geneva were 
balancing the state budget, controlling the issuance and printing of paper money, and 
increasing postal, railway, and telephone taxes. The League of Nations appointed 
commissioners to monitor and observe Austria and to make sure the reforms were made. In 
addition, each of the creditor nations, such as Britain and the United States, established a 
committee to control and oversee its interests. These committees met regularly in Geneva or 
London.328 Thus, the Geneva Protocols mandated foreign supervision and set conditions for 
ensuing loans.  
The Austrian Chancellor Seipel welcomed American and British diplomacy. 
According to the Washington Post at Geneva, “Seipel had tears in his eyes as he signed,” 
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and he predicted a “brighter” future for Austria.329 The Times asserted that Seipel said that it 
would be most satisfying if in several years, an Austrian Chancellor could stand before the 
League of Nations and tell its members that Austria has been “rehabilitated” and its 
economic administration was “sound.” Seipel also said that once Austria was stable, it 
should be released from League of Nations financial control.330   
Like Seipel, Britain and the United States supported the international policy in 
promoting Austrian sovereignty. According to the Times, at Geneva Lord Balfour thanked 
the participating countries for their help in “preventing the collapse of Austria, which was in 
a state of destitution to which there was no parallel in past history except for Russia.” Lord 
Balfour said Austrian recovery would take time but asserted that “the League of Nations had 
given the Austrians something to hope for and something to struggle for.”  He was confident 
of the success of the Geneva Protocols and optimistic about Austria’s future. Austria, he 
said, was much “better off.”331 The Washington Post stated that the United States, although 
not officially present, also believed that “the League of Nations [would] save Austria.332 
Therefore, the Geneva Protocols marked a culmination of efforts to bolster and stabilize 
Austria economically in return for political concessions.   
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X. The Anglo-American Client-State, Economic Recovery, and the Anschluss 1923-
1929  
  With the help of the Americans and British who backed the First Republic with 
loans and support between 1923 and 1929, Austria enjoyed economic recovery, 
reconstruction, political stability, a hard currency, and some prosperity. Britain and the 
United States intended the aid to stabilize conditions in Austria and lower the desire for 
Anschluss.333 Because Austria was so dependent on American and British funds and because 
the partnership also played a limited, but not insignificant, role in Austrian financial, 
domestic, economic, and foreign affairs, Austria approached the status of an Anglo-
American client-state during this time period. 
During the mid- and late 1920s three key things happened to Austria. It received 
massive conditional loans from abroad. It experienced economic recovery. And the 
attraction of an Anschluss lessened when compared to the early 1920s. However, even in the 
mid- and late 1920s there was still a strong Anschluss movement, in which economic—and 
not just nationalist—factors continued to play a roll.334 First, the United States and Great 
Britain continued to send new loans to Austria in the mid- and late 1920s, many of which 
continued to stipulate explicitly that Austria remain independent. J. P. Morgan & Company 
allocated a $25 million loan to Austria on June 11, 1923. The loan was a product of the 
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Wilson and Harding administrations’ policies of government officials and private investors 
cooperating in European reconstruction.335 Most of the money came from J. P. Morgan & 
Company, 336  but other American investors included the First National Bank of New York, 
Dillon, Read & Company, Kuhn, Loeb & Company, Harris, Forbes & Company, and the 
Guarantee Company of New York. The J. P. Morgan & Company loan of 1923 was 
conditional upon “the political integrity and economic independence of Austria.”337    
Many other American businesses pumped money into Austria in the mid- and late 
1920s with consent from the US State Department. In May 1925 Morgan, Livermore & 
Company received permission from the US Department of State to send a $2 million loan to 
the Lower Austrian Hydro-Electric Power and the Alpine Mountain Steel Corporation for 
development and expansion.338 Moreover, in December 1926 the US State Department 
granted Messars and F. J. Lisman & Company of Washington D.C. permission to allocate a 
$4 million loan to the Tiroler Wasserkraftwerke Aktiengesellschaft (Tyrol Hydro-Electric 
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Power Company) to build a second hydro-electric station in Innsbruck, Tyrol.339 J. P. 
Morgan & Company, Morgan, Livermore & Company, and Messars and F. J. Lisman & 
Company were three examples of many American investors in Austria during the late 
1920s.340  
 On October 12, 1927, the Committee of Control of the Guarantor States for the 
Reconstruction of Austria met in London.341 In a letter written by Seipel in October 1927 to 
Dr. Albert H. Washburn, an American Minister in Austria, the Austrian government 
requested another loan of 723 million schilling. Seipel stated that “Austria succeeded, thanks 
to the magnanimous support it received from all the nations participating in the work of its 
reconstruction, to save its finances from utter ruin and to establish the permanent 
equilibrium of the budget.” However, according to Seipel these funds were now 
“exhausted,” and he wanted money for “further reconstruction.”342 On October 17, 1927, 
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Austria, whose national debt equaled $300 million,343 also requested a thirty year 
postponement of loan repayments.344 On December 6, 1927, the United States agreed to 
send Austria an additional loan, payable in twenty years.345 Because Austria had 
successfully revitalized its economy and balanced its state budget, Austria received a second 
international loan of about $100 million, most of which would be funded by the American 
investors.346 
As in the early 1920s, Austria expressed gratitude for American loans in the mid-
1920s. There had been a minor incident, though, concerning the loans. The New York 
Tribune reported in February 1924 that when German and Austrian embassies did not lower 
their flags at half-mass in honor of Woodrow Wilson, who had died, many Americans, in 
particular war veterans, expressed outrage, and some threatened the termination of loans to 
Austria and Germany. Ultimately tensions died down, and the United States did not stop 
sending loans. Nevertheless, this affair demonstrated how vulnerable Austria was to shifts in 
American public opinion.347 In May 1925 the Austrian ambassador in Washington D. C., 
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Edgar Prochnik,348 sent a letter to President Calvin Coolidge and the Secretary of State 
thanking them for the loans.349 Writing to the President, Prochnik noted: “That the United 
States repeatedly expressed their readiness to lend a helpful hand to those, who seriously and 
conscientiously strive to help themselves, stimulates their spirit and encourages them to 
increased activity.”350 Coolidge responded that the sentiments of “appreciation” were 
“gratifying” and that the United States “admired the courageous struggle of Austria toward 
reconstruction.” Coolidge concluded that he would be happy to strengthen good relations 
between Austria and the United States.351 
Second, in the mid- and late 1920s the Austrian economy had greatly improved. In 
conjuncture with foreign loans, Chancellor Seipel’s domestic reforms, which included 
currency stabilization and a return to the gold standard, improved economic conditions in 
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Austria. The Austrian economy was further helped by the fact that Germany experienced 
hyper-inflation. Germany’s economic crisis temporarily eliminated it as a major economic 
competitor and contributed to ”the sudden boom of 1923" in Austria.352   
The Times repeatedly reported that economically Austria was doing much better in 
the mid-and late 1920s.353 In 1925 a British reporter in Vienna stated, “Though all the world 
heard of the tragedy of Vienna, few have heard of her recovery. Vienna . . . presents a 
smiling, nonchalant face to the world again.”354 Austria’s economic betterment was 
confirmed by two League of Nations’ experts, Charles Rist and W. T. Layton, who in 1925 
gave the Austrian economy a “clean bill of health” and concluded that Austria had made 
“slow but definite improvement.” Rist and Layton also said that the Austrian economy 
would improve further if it continued modernizing its industry and agriculture. Austria’s 
trade deficit would be eliminated when Austrian products competed in the global market.355  
Third, the Anschluss desire was lower from 1923 to 1929 than it had been earlier due 
to the economic recovery;356 therefore, through loans and pressure, the Americans and 
British had played a pivotal role in securing not only Austria’s economic recovery but also 
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its independence. In the year 1923 the Anschluss desire was especially low because Austria 
had begun to make a recovery with the help of foreign loans while Germany was at the point 
of total economic breakdown.357 The fact that Germany was undergoing an economic crisis 
in 1923 made union with Germany less appealing. Moreover, throughout the period from 
1923 to 1929, there were no further provincial plebiscites favoring union with Germany as 
there had been in 1921, and the number of major pro-Anschluss demonstrations or 
disturbances declined when compared to the more turbulent 1918 to 1922 period. Except for 
one huge riot in July 1927, the mid- and late 1920s in Austria were relatively stable. On July 
15, the political conflict between socialists and Christian Socials intensified after the 
announcement of a trial verdict in which a group of men who had killed workers were set 
free. Angry socialists set the Austrian Justice Palace on fire, and in a confrontation with 
rightwing groups about eighty people died and hundreds more were injured in Vienna. The 
Greater German People’s Party also used the occasion to harass Jews at the University of 
Vienna. This was the largest such disturbance in the 1920s. 
In addition, during this period the Christian Social Party, whose conservative leaders 
wanted to uphold Austrian independence, remained firmly in power with the socialists in 
opposition. The Americans and British greatly cooperated with the Christian Social 
government, in particular Chancellor Seipel, who had been largely responsible for securing 
the international loan from the League of Nations. The United States State Department 
favorably viewed Seipel as the “foremost protagonist of an independent Austria.”358 During 
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the intense internal fighting among the Christian Socials, socialists, Greater Germans, and 
communists, which culminated in the July 1927 revolt, Britain gave solid support to Seipel 
and his government. After the revolt, Seipel attempted to disarm paramilitary organizations 
that both contributed to political destabilization in Austria and had the potential to frighten 
away foreign loans. Although he was unsuccessful in his disarmament campaign, he at times 
managed to lessen the factionalist fighting.359 
Despite the relative lessening of the Anschluss desire in Austria when compared to 
the early 1920s, the Anschluss movement during the second half of the 1920s was still 
significant.360 Nonetheless, the late 1920s was a time of enormous economic recovery and 
fewer incidents overall of pro-Anschluss activity as compared to the chaotic early twenties 
due to American and British money. The Americans, British, French, and Hungarians 
reacted somewhat differently to Austria’s Anschluss endeavors in the mid- and late 1920s. 
Britain and the United States continued their position of opposing an Anschluss without 
international consent. According to British diplomatic reports, in 1927 Hungary’s official 
position on the Anschluss was mixed but more accepting of a possible Anschluss than any of 
Austria’s other neighbors.361 Meanwhile that same year a French newspaper contained a 
serious warning on the dangers of the increasing Anschluss movement in Austria. In 
December 1928, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand made it clear in a meeting with 
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the German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and the British Foreign Secretary Sir 
Austen Chamberlain that France considered any attempt of Germany to annex Austria an act 
of war; this warning by a French moderate showed the deep concern over the Anschluss 
movement in France.362 Once again in Europe, France came out more strongly against the 
Anschluss than Britain, the United States, and Hungary. 
Despite its economic recovery in the late 1920s and somewhat dampened support for 
Anschluss, Austria was still fragile and volatile. Austria’s neighbors, particularly the 
Habsburg successor states, continued to maintain high tariffs, import prohibitions, and 
transit obstructions against Austria. Therefore, the Americans and British continued to help. 
American and British loans to Austria during this time period included the Morgan & 
Company loan, the second international loan of 1927, and several smaller loans. American 
and British loans had brought about times of stability and economic improvement to their 
Austrian client-state, which successfully lessened the Anschluss movement in the late 1920s, 
but never eliminated the Anschluss desire entirely. The slightest economic problem would 
bring another crisis in Austria. American and British diplomacy in the mid- and late 1920s 
regarding loans, economic reconstruction, and world peace, was further exemplified by the 
Dawes Plan, Locarno Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which brought about a sense of 
stability throughout Europe. 
 
XI. Cultural Exchanges between the US, Britain, and Austria during the 1920s 
Besides economic and political issues, cultural issues were important to  
Austria’s relations with the US and Britain. The primary cultural challenge facing Austria 
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and the rest of Europe in the 1920s was how to deal with modernization and increasing 
American influence that extended all over Europe. Examples of American cultural 
penetration were Hollywood movies, American cigars, jazz, American household 
appliances, automobiles, assembly line production, and literature.363 The hundreds of 
thousands of American soldiers who fought in the American Expeditionary Force in France 
during World War I, as well as the many who participated in the occupation of the German 
Rhineland after the war from 1919 to1923, likewise spread American ideas and customs. 
France, in particular, received droves of American tourists. For example, in 1929, 251,000 
American tourists visited Europe, and they spent about $323 million. The number of tourists 
only declined after 1930 with the onset of the Great Depression.364 Most Austrians embraced 
American culture, although some Austrians were anti-American and expressed these 
sentiments simply through a refusal to buy American products. However, there were no 
overt instances of anti-Americanism in Austria, such as occurred occasionally elsewhere in 
Europe in the 1920s, like demonstrations in front of the American Embassy or the 
harassment of Americans in France.365 
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 There were many cultural exchanges between the Austrians and the Americans and 
between the Austrians and the British during the 1920s. Cultural exchanges took place 
through international organizations and through the exchange of people and art. An Anglo-
Austrian Society was formed in London in 1923 along with its counterpart, the Anglo- 
ısterreichischen Gesellschaft, in Vienna. The objective of the Anglo-Austrian Society was to 
promote good relations between Britain and Austria in art, culture, science, education and 
commerce. In 1924 Lord Balfour addressed the first annual dinner of the Anglo-Austrian 
Society, which Austrian Ambassador Baron Franckenstein attended. Franckenstein conceded 
that Austria could not have recovered without Britain and lauded Lord Balfour in particular. 
According to the Daily Telegraph, the Anglo-Austrian Society called Lord Balfour the 
“guardian angel of Austria.”366 
 An American counterpart, the Austro-American Society (Amerika –İsterreich 
Gesellschaft), was formed in the 1920s.  In March 1926 the Austro-American Society helped 
establish the Austro-American Institute of Education in New York and its partner the 
Amerika-Institut in Vienna. 367 Many professors of the University of Vienna and other state 
employees were members of the Amerika-Institut, such as Dr. Josef Redlich, Dr. Anton 
Rintelen, and Johann Schober.368 These international organizations represented a collective 
effort to stress friendship between the Austrian, Britain, and the United States. 
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 In addition, there were many exchanges of people among the Americans, Austrians, 
and the British in the 1920s.369 Even though Austria in contrast to Germany was not 
occupied by the British, French, and American troops,370 there was a massive interchange of 
people, in particular tourists, students, and professionals. In 1925 Stanford organized a 
student exchange with the University of Vienna. Also, in 1925 Ms. Caroline Porter of the 
Institute for International Education visited Austria, and the St. Louis College of Physicians 
sent American doctors to Austria.371 In 1926 British charity groups funded British teachers, 
policemen, doctors, school principals, professors, and researchers to go to Austria.372 Also, 
in 1926 the Anglo-Austrian Society funded Austrian students who wanted to study in 
Oxford.373 In September 1926 the New York University organized an eight month cruise 
around the world for four-hundred and fifty college students and forty university professors. 
The trip featured thirty-five countries and included several Austrian cities, like Vienna and 
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Graz.374 In 1928 Viennese Rotarians visited London, a trip that Chancellor Ignaz Seipel 
called “propaganda for Austria.”375  
In April 1929 four American children who had won the First Annual Flag Contest 
visited Austria.376 According to the New York Times, in June 1929 the Foreign Students 
Committee, an American philanthropic organization, assisted Austrian and other foreign 
students who wanted to study in the United States.377 Individuals participating in these 
exchanges were to establish first-hand contacts with different people and countries. 
Austrians in Britain and the United States and Americans and Britons in Austria formed 
opinions about one another based on these interactions. 
Large-scale cultural exchanges were also instituted.  In September 1926 the Vienna 
Philharmoniker, one of the most prestigious music orchestras in the entire world, had a 
concert tour in the US.378 The concert tour helped Americans become more familiar with 
Austrian music. Also, in the spring and fall of 1927 Britain held a British Art Exhibition in 
Vienna under the care of the Anglo-Austrian Society. It featured paintings from William 
Hogarth to more modern ones.379 Although the Austrians were familiar with German and 
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even French art (due to a past French exhibit), British art was relatively unknown in Central 
Europe. The British art exhibit’s purpose was to show Austrians examples of British art.380 
In addition, the Austrian government founded an English library in Vienna in November 
1927.381 The opening of the British library in Vienna affected what Austrians thought of 
British literature, while the art exhibit influenced the Austrians’ opinion of British art.382 
The purpose of these exchanges was educational and cultural-- to encourage interest 
in foreign affairs and greater awareness of different cultures. Cultural exchanges fostered 
perceptions of cultural identity. Furthermore, these interactions strengthened international 
understanding and good-will between Austria and Britain and between the United States and 
Austria.  
     
XII. Conclusion 
During the 1920s, the United States and Great Britain had fostered strong political, 
economic, financial, and cultural connections with Austria. In addition, of all the major 
powers, Britain and the United States had the most similar foreign polices. Both preferred 
that Austria remain independent and wanted no Anschluss, unless the League of Nations 
allowed it. Meanwhile, France and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania), as well as Italy, strongly opposed an Anschluss and took more aggressive actions 
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in enforcing the peace settlement, such as the threats to occupy Austria in 1921 and the 
French occupation of Germany’s Ruhr region in 1923. 
British and American diplomats correctly believed that Anschluss sentiment from 
1920 to 1929 was strongly linked to the economic status of Austria. In the early 1920s there 
had been great economic distress in Austria, and Anschluss demand had been high as shown 
by the unofficial plebiscites in three Austrian provinces where the vast majority of the 
population voted to join Germany. The United States and Britain refused to recognize the 
referenda which had taken place without international consent. While the United States took 
a wait and see attitude, choosing not to place demands on the Austrian government to stop 
the referenda, Britain took a more active role and officially protested the plebiscites. 
However, British policy never went as far as France and others who threatened occupation 
and loss of land. 
The United States and Britain were also the biggest creditor nations. Aided by their 
pocketbooks, the British and Americans pumped massive amounts of money into Austria. 
Most of the money on the American side came from private investors, many of whom 
preferred that Austria remain independent because they did not want to lose their investment 
in case of an Anschluss. The Americans and British succeeded in their goals of economic 
betterment in Austria and lowering, although not terminating, Anschluss desire in the mid- 
and late 1920s. 
Furthermore, cultural exchanges, like the Vienna Philharmoniker concert in the 
United States, strengthened the ties between Americans, British, and Austrians. The 
generally positive image of Austria held by the American and British publics was reinforced 
by tourist visits and cultural exchanges. The Lodge Resolution, London Conference, and 
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Geneva Protocols represented American and British foreign policies regarding Austrian 
independence and economic stability. Although the American and British loans immensely 
helped the Austrian economy in the 1920s, the loans made Austria greatly dependent on 
outside aid and the health of the world economy—a problem that would severely cripple 
Austria during the Great Depression in the 1930s. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
THE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PARTY, 1920-1929 
  
I. Introduction 
 
The Christian Social Party was a Catholic, conservative, party in Austria, whose 
origins went back to the nineteenth century. Most Christian Socials383 were anti-Greater 
German and anti-Marxist, and many were also anti-Semitic.384 In 1897 the party achieved 
electoral success in Vienna, a city that they controlled until 1919.385 During the 1920s its 
members predominantly came from the rural provinces, while the socialists dominated 
Vienna. The official publication of the Christian Social Party was the Austrian Reichspost, 
which first appeared in 1894.  
The Christian Social Party dominated Austrian affairs and provided all but one 
chancellor in the succession of the coalition governments from 1920 to 1929.386 The 
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Christian Social Party regularly received about one-third of the vote throughout the 1920s. 
The socialists also received about one-third of the vote. The final one-third of Austrian votes 
went to various minority parties, such as the Heimatbloc,387 communist party,388 Agrarian 
League (Landbund),389 and Anti-Semitic League (Antisemitenbund).390 The strongest of the 
minority parties in the 1920s was the Greater German People’s Party (Grossdeutsche 
Volkspartei, GDVP).391  
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Although the Christian Socials and socialists were equal in strength during the 
1920s, coalitions allowed either party to head the government. The coalition of socialists and 
Christian Socials that began in 1918 broke up in 1920 because of irreconcilable political 
differences. The Christian Social Party joined a new Groβe Koalition or "Great Coalition" 
with the Austrian Greater German People’s Party and other smaller right-wing groups from 
1922 to 1932 with the socialists in opposition. Despite their different positions on the 
Anschluss issue, the Christian Social and Grossdeutsch alliance was primarily held together 
by their shared antagonism to the socialists. Thus, anti-socialism was more important to the 
Greater German People’s Party than the Anschluss issue. Therefore, the “Great Coalition” 
allowed the Christian Socials to lead the government in the 1920s while excluding their 
socialist rivals from sharing power.  
The two most important questions facing the Christian Social Party concerning the 
fate of Austria  in the 1920s were independence or union with Germany on the one hand and 
republic or monarchy on the other. In contrast to the Austrian socialist and Greater German 
People’s Party, both of which strongly advocated a Grossdeutschland based on a union of 
Austria and Germany, the majority of the Christian Social Party members officially opposed 
the union with Germany and forbade any of its members from participating in the Anschluss 
movement.392 Instead it supported a free and independent Austrian Republic and 
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championed the American, British, French, and Italian proposal for a Danube Confederation 
that called for a trade union among the successor states.393  
However, the position of the Christian Social Party on the Anschluss question was 
complicated and inconsistent because there was an important splinter group within the party 
that supported a union. Particularly in the years 1918-1919, when the Anschluss movement 
in Austria was at its peak, many Christian Socials called for a union with Germany. The 
early 1920s marked a split between national Christian Social Party policies and some local 
Christian Social factions regarding the Anschluss. However, by 1922 economic prosperity 
had begun to return to Austria, and Christian Social leaders, in particular Ignaz Seipel, were 
able to from a strong anti-Anschluss platform based on anti-socialism, opposition to 
Germany and Prussia, Austrian nationalism, and Catholicism. From 1922 to the rise of 
Nazism in the early 1930s, about one-fourth of the Christian Socials belonged to this pro-
Anschluss splinter group. Therefore, the anti-Anschluss Christian Socials were a majority 
within their own party, but because most Austrian political parties and most Austrians 
themselves embraced a union with Germany up to the early 1930s, overall, the anti-
Anschluss Christian Socials were a minority. 
To bolster their opposition to the Anschluss, the Christian Social Party and its leaders 
also wanted to create a sense of Austrian separateness from Germany. However this proved 
very difficult because the Austria Republic was a new state that had not existed before 
World War I. The Christian Social Party members who wanted to forge a separate Austrian 
national identity struggled against strong forces of regionalism and greater German 
nationalism. 
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Moreover, unlike the socialists who fervently championed a Republic, the Christian 
Social Party had no clear stance on the monarchy issue. Many leading Christian Socials such 
as Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt von Schuschnigg had monarchist leanings. When Austrian 
Chancellor Johannes Schober organized a public mass for the funeral of Kaiser Karl at the 
Stephan’s Cathedral on April 6, 1922, most Christian Social Party members attended.394 In 
the 1920s Schuschnigg became a member of several legitimist organizations.  
Furthermore, there was a strong link between the Christian Social Party and Catholic 
Church. The Christian Social Party was with few exceptions a “Catholics only party.” 
Besides Seipel, who was both a theologian and a priest, other Christian Social members, like 
Franz Martin Schindler and Ambros Optiz were clergymen.395 The Catholic Church, to 
which most Austrians belonged, likewise distanced itself from a union with Germany and its 
Protestant majority.  
 The most important leader of the Christian Social Party in the period from 1920 to 
1929 was Ignaz Seipel. He contended against great odds in order to keep Austria 
independent. He also fostered close relations with American, British, and other European 
governments. The Christian Social Party government received many loans from the 
Americans and British during the 1920s. 
 
II. Historiography 
 Historians who have written on the Christian Social Party include John Boyer and 
Dietmar Hann. Boyer investigates the early Christian Social movement in Austria. Hann 
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examines the Christian Social Party and the Anschluss movement. Boyer examines the rise 
and decline of the Christian Socialism in Austria-Hungary. The roots of Christian Socialism 
in Austria-Hungary can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth century; however the book 
mainly focuses on the years 1897 to 1918. It begins with the Christian Social Party’s 
electoral triumph in 1897 and ends with World War I and the disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. The party in the late nineteenth century was conservative, Catholic, and 
anti-Anschluss, unlike its main opponents, the socialists and Greater German People’s Party.  
After winning the elections in Vienna, the Christian Social leader Karl Lueger was 
appointed by Franz Joseph as mayor in 1897. For the first time, the Christian Socials 
controlled the administration and bureaucracy in the capital city.  Following victory in urban 
Vienna, the party also stressed rural and agrarian interests and reached out to peasants and 
clerical politicians. According to Boyer, the party also tended to favor German Austrians 
over other ethnic groups and appealed to anti-Semitic circles. The Christian Socials also 
won big in the imperial parliamentary election of 1907, the year when Franz Joseph 
introduced universal male suffrage, and became the largest single party in the Reichsrat.396 
However, Boyer contends that after 1907 the Christian Socials declined, while the 
socialists rose. The death of Lueger in 1910 was a great loss for the Christian Socials. 
Lueger’s successors, Albert Gessmann and Richard Weiskirchner, did not have his public 
appeal, and the 1911 elections were a major defeat for the Christian Socials. During World 
War I, the party continued to decline, and in 1919 the socialists, who appealed to the 
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working class, won big in elections.397 Dietmar Hann’s work contends that throughout the 
inter-war era the Christian Social Party had a split and sometimes indifferent view on the 
Anschluss, and his main emphasis is on the pro-Anschluss Christian Social faction. He also 
focuses only on Austrian domestic politics and not on diplomacy or the Christian Social 
Party’s relation to the Americans and British.398 
This chapter offers a different perspective from Boyer and Hann. Boyer investigates 
the roots of Christian Socialism and its pre-war dominance—a period of time in which the 
pro-Anschluss challenge was not a major factor. In contrast, in the 1920s the Christian 
Social Party had to contend with a much stronger Anschluss movement in the wake of the 
collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy. Also, Hann mostly uses newspapers and secondary 
sources. Hann does not use internal party documents pertaining to the Christian Social Party. 
This chapter uses the Christian Social Party archives found in the Politische Akademie der 
ÖVP (österreichischen Volkspartei) in Vienna and the recently published Dieses Österreich 
Retten: Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage der Ersten Republik, edited by Robert 
Kriechbaumer, which is a primary source document that offers a complete transcript of the 
Austrian Christian Social Party assemblies and meetings that were held regularly several 
times a year. The document contains a first-hand account of party members’ speeches, 
discussions, and reports. It begins with the first Christian Social Party meeting on December 
15, 1918, and ends with a transcript of speeches made at the last party meeting on May 14, 
1934. 
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 This chapter analyzes the party’s stance on the Anschluss and American and British 
diplomacy. Furthermore, contrary to Hann, this chapter unquestionably contends that by 
1922 the vast majority of the Christian Social Party members opposed an Anschluss, and the 
Christian Social Party policy of championing an independent Austria went along with 
Americans and British interests.  
 
III. The Christian Socials from the Peace Treaty  to the 1921 Provincial Referenda 
The early 1920s was another time period of division within the Christian Social Party 
concerning the Anschluss issue. In June 1920 the coalition between the Christian Socials and 
socialists that began in November 1918 disintegrated. With the immediate post-war crisis 
over, the deeply rooted ideological differences resurfaced.399 The period 1918 to 1920 was 
the only time that these two parties worked together during the First Republic. 
On October 1, 1920, Austria enacted the Austrian constitution that established the 
Nationalrat (National Assembly), which replaced the Constituent National Assembly and 
became the permanent main chamber of the Austrian parliament.400 In the October 17, 1920 
                                                 
399
 Mr. Lindley to Earl Curzon. 14 June 1920. Vienna. British Foreign Office (FO) 
371/3538. Besides long- term causes, like the political rivalries, Lindley also said that the 
immediate cause of the break-up of the coalition in June 1920 was socialist Julius Deutsch’s 
reforms to the Republican army that he implemented without consulting parliament. 
 
400
 According to the political structure of the constitution, Austria was divided into eight 
provinces Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, and 
Vorarlberg. Vienna became a ninth province after World War II. Regarding the legislature, 
the Nationalrat (sometimes also called the National Council) was elected on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The second chamber of the Austrian parliament was the Bundesrat 
(Federal Assembly), which represented the Austrian provinces. The Landtage, or 
parliaments of the Austrian provinces, elected the Bundesrat members. Regarding the 
executive, parliament chose the federal president who appointed the federal chancellor. The 
Austrian Constitution of 1920 also granted women’s suffrage. In 1929 Chancellor Schober 
made revisions to the constitution and altered provisions concerning the president. In 1929 
 158 
elections, the Christian Socials gained a plurality over the socialists in the Nationalrat by a 
margin of eighty-two seats to sixty-six. The Greater German People’s Party received twenty 
seats, and the Bauernbund (Peasants’ League) got seven seats.401 Because the Greater 
German People’s Party did not want to form a coalition with the Christian Socials at this 
time, the Christian Socials formed a coalition with neutral delegates, like Michael 
Hainisch.402 Thus, following the October election, the Christian Social Party replaced the 
socialists in leading the Austrian government, and the party’s objectives, at least at the 
national level, included maintaining Austrian independence.  
However, the struggle for Austrian independence was far from over because most 
Austrians and many Christian Socials, especially in the provinces, still desired an Anschluss 
in the early 1920s. In addition, the Christian Social government faced severe difficulties due 
to the poor economic conditions and massive inflation. The strife between the rural 
provinces and Vienna intensified and culminated in local separatist movements, which the 
Christian Social Party Chancellor Dr. Michael Mayr opposed.403     
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In the early 1920s the strength of the Anschluss movement had weakened some since 
1918 and 1919, but the Christian Social Party was still divided. During this period, Christian 
Social Party Nationalrat members and other Christian Social national leaders in Vienna 
began to distance themselves from the Anschluss movement, even though its future coalition 
partner had other aims. In 1920 the Greater German People’s Party, which was to become 
the coalition partner of the Christian Socials from 1922 to 1932, declared that its main 
objective was “the Anschluss of Austria and Germany . . .  threats or promises from the 
enemies of our people cannot hinder us from our relentless pursuit of Anschluss thought.”404 
Nonetheless, the Christian Social union leader Leopold Kunschak405 and Dr. Friedrich 
Funder406 turned away from the Anschluss thought by 1920. Kunschak and Dr. Funder, the 
chief editor of the Christian Social Reichspost, appealed to Catholic and petit bourgeois 
circles. Kunschak conceded that most people in his party felt that Austria was an unviable 
state and thus were divided in their support among four alternatives: Anschluss, a Danube 
Confederation, a Catholic South German state, and an independent Austria.407 When the US, 
Britain, France, Italy, and Germany did not seriously consider a South German state and the 
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Danube Confederation plan collapsed, the only two options for Austria were independence 
or Anschluss. Kunschak and Funder championed the former option at Christian Social Party 
meetings.408 
Chancellor Mayr represented another key national Christian Social figure who came 
out against the Anschluss in the early 1920s. Like Funder and Kunschak, Mayr opposed the 
Anschluss because he was anti-socialist, anti-Prussian, and favored Austrian alternatives to 
union with Germany. He especially feared Austrian socialists merging with German 
socialists. Mayr’s regime was the first non-socialist government in Austria, and he wanted to 
take a different course from the socialists who had followed a pro-Anschluss policy. Mayr 
also expressed anti-Prussian sentiments and feared Austria would be taken over by 
Germany, whose population was ten times that of Austria. He had worked tirelessly on 
negotiating the adoption of the First Republic’s Constitution of 1920. Also, in 1920 Mayr 
talked with the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš in order to to work out 
friendly relations and a possible Danube Confederation.409  
On March 5, 1921, the Christian Social Chancellor Mayr, who strongly advocated 
Austrian independence and who had made it possible for Austria to join the League of 
Nations in December 1920, went to London in order to work out an international loan for 
Austria, primarily from the Americans, British, French, and Italians. The fact that Mayr 
went to London for help showed the major foreign policy shift taken by the Christian Social 
Party in the early 1920s. The socialist Karl Renner who had been chancellor from November 
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1918 to June 1920 and his Foreign Minister Otto Bauer had been conducting Anschluss 
negotiations with Germany.410  
Nevertheless, besides the socialists and Greater German People’s Party, the anti-
Anschluss Christian Socials also had to contend with pro-Anschluss members within their 
own party. A significant difference between the 1918-1919 and early 1920s ”Anschluss 
movement” was that the former had been led by the socialists whose stronghold was Vienna. 
The latter was led by the middle class, peasants, and rural educated classes who were mainly 
anti-socialist,411 lived in the provinces, and belonged to the pro-Anschluss faction of the 
Christian Socials.412 Despite Mayr’s protests, the Christian Social governments in the 
provinces initiated Anschluss referenda in Tyrol, Salzburg, and Styria in 1921. Economic 
distress and regionalism primarily fuelled the provincial separatist movements. 
The first province to hold a referendum was Tyrol, which on Sunday, April 24, 1921, 
conducted a plebiscite in which 144,342 out of 146,569 Tyroleans, or 98.5 percent, voted in 
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favor of union with Germany.413 Mayr and his government tried to stop the Tyrolean 
plebiscite before it happened but to no avail.414 Because Tyrol had conducted the plebiscite 
on its own without permission, the Austrian government considered the plebiscite unofficial 
and did not recognize it. In the summer of 1921, the Tyrolean Diet even introduced its own 
currency separate from Austria and based on the German mark, which the Austrian 
government also ruled illegal.415 Once again completely disregarding the objections of the 
Mayr government, about one month later the provinces of Salzburg and Styria also 
conducted plebiscites on the Anschluss issue. In both provinces, a decisive majority of the 
people voted for a union with Germany. Salzburg conducted a referendum on May 29, 1921, 
in which 95,000 out of 102,000, or 93 percent, voted in favored union.416  
Economic factors greatly influenced the plebiscites. British delegate Sir Francis 
Oppenheimer had already explained in 1919 that: ”what was left to new Austria of the 
German Tyrols is so narrow a strip on the northern watershed of the Alps that economic 
needs will eventually compel its inhabitants to join Bavaria.”417 Like Vorarlberg which 
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decided to join Switzerland in 1919, the provincial separatist movements in the early 1920s 
were at least partially driven by economic motives.  
In addition, the pro-Anschluss plebiscites reflected regional disputes. There had been 
a steadily growing rift between the rural provinces and the metropolis of Vienna since the 
end of World War I. Tyrol and Salzburg were the most regionalist provinces. Tyroleans 
were especially angry over the loss of South Tyrol. Dissatisfied with the Austrian 
government in Vienna, they felt compelled to take matters into their own hands. A dispute 
between German-speakers and Italians in Tyrol angered, incensed, and mobilized the 
Tyroleans’ sense of regionalism. Tyroleans were hostile to the “Allies,” in particular the 
Italians, and they were also hostile toward Vienna, because they believed the Austrian 
government was not doing enough. Tyrolean State counselor Dr. Joseph Steidle had stated to 
the Reichspost on March 4, 1920, that a union with Germany would increase the chances of 
regaining South Tyrol.418 The 1921 plebiscite results showed that the Tyroleans turned 
toward Germany, not Austria.419 Historian Hermann Kuprian contended that out of all the 
Austrian provinces, the Anschluss movement from 1918 to 1921 was strongest in Tyrol. He 
stated that although the local Christian Social Party in Tyrol had voted in favor of the 
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Republic in November 1918, the Tyrolean Christian Social Landtag or Provincial Assembly 
representative Johann Steinegger had opposed the national Christian Social Party platform 
of the 1921 Nationalrat in Vienna, which advocated an economic union with Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and other Habsburg successor states.420  
Although economic and regional reasons were predominant, anti-socialist and 
German nationalist sentiments also motivated the 1921 plebiscites. It was no coincidence 
that Tyrol and Salzburg were also the most German of the Austrian provinces. According to 
the British diplomats, bordering with Germany, Tyrol had always had close ties to its 
northern neighbor. 421 Finally, the provincial plebiscites were Christian Social protests 
against “Red” Vienna, which the socialists controlled throughout the inter-war period. The 
Tyrolean Christian Social Party likewise expressed its disgust with the socialists whose 
political goals they identified with Jews and Bolshevism.422 The fact that the largest party in 
Germany in the 1920s was socialist did not discourage the pro-Anschluss, local Christian 
Socials, who looked at the overall benefits of an Anschluss -- economic betterment, closer 
ties with Germany, and freedom from the “socialist”, “Jewish”, and financially bankrupt city 
of Vienna that they despised. Thus, ironically both Christian Social anti-Anschluss and pro-
Anschluss supporters used anti-socialism to promote their causes. The former were against 
joining socialist Germany, and the latter wanted to get away from socialist Vienna.  
Chancellor Mayr received pressure from both sides of the Anschluss question, but 
came out against it. In the early 1920s the Christian Social Party was divided between anti-
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Anschluss advocates at the national level, like Mayr, Funder, and Kunschak, and pro-
Anschluss advocates in the provinces, like Johann Steinegger of Tyrol. The fact that Mayr’s 
Christian Social government was powerless to prevent the regional plebiscites from taking 
place showed the weakness of Vienna. Mayr resigned in June 1921 because the Austrian 
province of Styria refused to stop its referendum on the Anschluss. Ultimately, these 
provincial pressures gave way to international counter-pressure.423 After the failure of the 
1921 plebiscites the Christian Social Party members, both national and provincial, began to 
realize that they had to accept an independent Austria. In the following years Mayr’s 
Christian Social Party successor Seipel continued where he had left off in working with the 
Americans and British and maintaining Austrian independence.424  
 
IV. The Christian Socials under Ignaz Seipel 
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 After Ignaz Seipel425 became Chancellor in 1922, the Christian Social Party for the 
first time since World War I was predominantly anti-Anschluss because of economic 
prosperity, Seipel’s domestic policies, and foreign intervention. Seipel, whose father had 
worked in a Viennese theater, came from a lower-middle class background. He received a 
doctorate in theology and was trained as a priest. If it had not been for World War I, after 
which he entered politics, he presumably would have become either a teacher or 
churchman.426 Since the February 1919 elections, Seipel had steadily gained power within 
the party.427 He served in the Constituent National Assembly from 1919 to 1920, and, 
following the drawing up of the constitution and parliamentary elections, in the Austrian 
Nationalrat. Seipel was the leader of the Christian Social Party from 1921 to1924 and again 
from 1926 to 1929.428 He was also Austrian Chancellor for most of his time as party leader, 
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from 1922 to 1924 and, after a near fatal assassination attempt, again from 1926 to 1929.429 
In 1930 Seipel became the Austrian foreign minister.430   
Regarding his political beliefs, Seipel was somewhat right wing and anti-democratic. 
He asserted that Catholics should obediently follow a Christian leader, and he came to 
believe in what he called “true democracy,” which for him was democracy without political 
parties.431 He formed this principle of “true democracy” in 1927, which had been a year of 
brutal political fighting between the socialists, Heimwehr, and Christian Socials. In a speech 
in Tübingen, Germany, in 1929, Seipel discussed the problems of a democratic 
government.432 Seipel had become increasingly disappointed with the party strife and 
conflict seemingly inherent in democracy and thus wanted to find an alternative to 
parliamentary government. He considered fascism and authoritarianism but ultimately 
resisted the temptation of a drastic turn to the far right to which so many others succumbed 
at this time. He maintained Austrian universal suffrage and did not stop elections. Therefore, 
Seipel opposed "parliamentary democracy" based on political parties in principle, though not 
in actual practice. He favored a plebiscitary democracy providing consent and support for a 
leader but in fact did not subvert the parliamentary government over which he presided as 
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chancellor. Victor Klemperer states that: “While he saw the Church challenged and the 
Monarchy toppled, he never understood the uncertainties of the doubters or the agonies of 
the disinherited, and he turned toward democracy and the Republic with his reason but not 
with his heart.” Realizing that there was no ideal democracy, he reluctantly had to 
accommodate to imperfect democracy.433   
Seipel’s views on a Habsburg restoration varied from sympathetic to indifferent. 
Even though Seipel had grown up in the old imperial Austria, his primary political objective 
was neither to restore the Habsburg Monarchy nor to restore Austria to world power. He 
wanted to seek a political and economic order in Central Europe that would best fit the 
different ethnic groups. In 1918 Seipel, a member of the Constituent National Assembly, 
said that “With us there was an agreement among the parties not to raise now but to leave 
for the future Constituent Assembly the question of republic or monarchy.”434 According to 
the Neue Freie Presse, in the late 1920s he continued to temporize, stating that the 
monarchy should not be restored now but possibly in the future.435   
In addition, Seipel was strongly anti-Anschluss,436 and under his leadership the 
Christian Social Party became largely anti-Anschluss based on his party policies of ant-
socialism, pro-Austrian nationalism, opposition to Germany, and identification with 
Catholicism. Already in November 1918 the Reichspost had stated that it feared “the party 
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advantages that the socialist central organ hopes from the Anschluss with Germany.” Thus, 
the newspaper expressed the concern that Seipel and most Christian Socials had of the 
Austrian socialists linking with German socialists and forming a “Bolshevik” Greater 
Germany.437 On December 17, 1918, Seipel had stated that  ”. . . in Germany of today in 
which the terror of soldiers’ councils and a socialist dictatorship prevails, in which a Kurt 
Eisner can rule and so forth, we have no business.”438 Seipel’s contempt for socialism led 
him to forge the Great Coalition with the Greater German People’s Party on May 28, 1922. 
The Greater German People’s Party sacrificed its pro-Anschluss position for an alliance 
based on mutual hatred of socialists. The Christian Socials and socialists had differences 
over church and state issues, and Seipel’s strong ecclesiastic influences heightened his 
disdain of atheist socialists.439 Whereas the socialists had allowed the Christian Socials to 
attend the peace settlement in 1919, Seipel did not allow the socialists to go to the Geneva 
conference in 1922, which added to simmering political tensions between the socialists and 
Christian Socials. Socialists responded by condemning “Kaiser Seipel” or the “Prelate’s 
government.”440 The Christian Socials and the socialists were bitter foes, and the Christian 
Socials wanted to distance themselves from the pro-Anschluss socialists. Thus, many pro-
Anschluss Christian Socials and the Greater Germans comprised their pro-Anschluss 
sentiment in favor of prioritizing anti-socialism.  
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Besides the anti-socialist factor in opposing an Anschluss, Seipel was a true Austrian 
nationalist. Seipel believed that an independent Austria was better for all the German lands 
or “Gesamtdeutschtums.”441 According to the Reichspost, in contrast to so many other 
Austrian leaders, Seipel asserted in June 1921 that indeed “Austria [was] a viable nation 
(lebensfähig) -- if we want it to be.”442 After becoming Chancellor in May 1922, Seipel 
pledged his allegiance to the Austrian Republic in a speech in June. He reiterated his stance 
that Austria was viable. Seipel said “In order to be able to do good work for a state one must 
believe in its capacity to live . . . we will do all in our power and aid [Austria] to live.”443 In 
the speech Seipel also reminded Austrians that the Christian Social Party had ratified the 
peace treaty, and Austria had to “abide by its consequences.”444 In the 1920s Seipel 
attempted to raise Austrian national awareness.  
Moreover, Catholicism motivated Seipel’s anti-Anschluss sentiments, as well as his 
anti-socialist views and domestic policies. As a clergyman, neither he nor the Catholic 
Church wanted to join with mostly Protestant Germany. Seipel wanted Austria to remain a 
Catholic state. Seipel and the Christian Social Party sided with the Catholic Church on 
political issues. He opposed secularization, the separation of Church and State, divorce, birth 
control, and cremation. On the other hand, he advocated increased state funding of the 
Church and prayers in school. In addition, Seipel and the Church shared a hatred of 
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socialism. Whereas the socialists promoted urban and working class interests, Seipel and his 
party promoted rural and peasant interests. Seipel and the Church felt that a good Christian 
could not be a socialist. The fact that many of the socialist leaders in Austria also happened 
to be Jews, like Otto Bauer, was another source of contention between the Christian Socials 
and socialists.445 Thus, Seipel supported political Catholicism.  
Furthermore, Seipel agreed with American, British, French, and Italian political 
concerns and said an Anschluss would threaten world peace.446 The Austrian press asserted 
that Seipel also welcomed American and British loans and supported their policies in 
Austria.447 Seipel believed that once the economic situation in Austria improved, Anschluss 
desire would decline. He was known to have sometimes exploited fears of a possible 
Anschluss to encourage economic aid from the League of Nations.448 Seipel even supported 
the Danube Confederation plan.449 Seipel stated: “The Anschluss is a topic over which we 
should not become too heated. This is not a question on which our life depends.”450  
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 At the Christian Social Party meeting on July 7-9, 1921, Seipel found strong support. 
Frau Franziska (Fanny) von Starhemberg,451 the mother of the Heimwehr leader in the 1930s 
Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg and a devout Catholic and Christian Social member, stated 
that the Anschluss movement was detrimental and that they were Austrians first. Leopold 
Kunschak of the Christian Social Party asserted that Austria must follow the lead of Seipel 
and argued that the number one goal of Austria should be to secure its industry so that 
Austria could live. He said that Austria could not count on the help of Germany. According 
to Kunschak, “We can only save this Austria with the policies that Dr. Seipel has set forth. 
Whoever says that by way of the Anschluss this goal can be achieved at the moment is 
ignorant or a liar. . . . We have the duty . . . to maintain this Austria.”452          
In 1922 Seipel received even more support from national and provincial Christian 
Socials. Christian Social Landtag member August Graf Segur stated that Anschluss 
supporters were pro-Prussians and Austria would only move forward if independent. 
Mentioning Prussia and “Prussianization” unleashed negative connotations of centuries of 
regional rivalry and helped to create feelings of Austrian nationalism. In 1922 Dr. Anton 
Jerzabek and Wilhelm Miklas likewise gave their support to Seipel. Friedrich Schönsteiner 
said that if only the Christian Social Party had taken a clearer stance on the Anschluss issue 
sooner, then the pro-Anschluss referenda and demonstrations would not have occurred in 
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1921.453 Thus, under Seipel’s leadership the Christian Social Party clearly and decisively 
opposed the Anschluss.  
Yet, Seipel continued to have some political foes from within the Christian Social 
Party ranks who questioned the ethics behind accepting international loans primarily from 
the US and Britain and suggested it would be better to get financial help from Germany 
instead. Professor Josef Mittelberger from Vorarlberg and Dr. Franz Rehrl of Salzburg 
remained firmly pro-Anschluss in their speeches. Dr. Heinrich Seibert from Salzburg 
resented the fact that at the July 1921 party meeting all Anschluss supporters were called 
ignorant and liars. Seibert questioned how long the Americans and British would continue to 
send loans. These individuals represented the minority pro-Anschluss Christian Social Party 
faction. Nevertheless, at the end of the Christian Social assembly, the party agreed to accept 
the reconstruction of the Austrian economy with the aid of the League of Nations loans.454    
 Precisely because Austria had major economic problems, especially soaring inflation 
in the early 1920s, economic concerns demanded attention equal to that devoted to the 
Anschluss issue. Seipel’s economic reform package included return to the gold standard, the 
introduction of a new currency in the form of the schilling, and bank reform. Seipel hoped to 
stabilize the economy by switching the Austrian currency from the kronen to the schilling 
and by tying the Austrian currency to the gold standard. The larger banks in Austria were to 
participate in a fiscal reform. In addition to internal reform, however, the gravity of the 
economic situation made the acquisition of foreign loans imperative. 
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In October 1922 Austrian Chancellor Seipel went to London Conference where he 
signed the League of Nations Protocol for the reconstruction of Austria, and in 1923 Austria 
received a loan from the League of Nations.455 The money was to be used for the financial 
reform efforts and to pay for the change to the schilling.456 The Seipel government also 
spent the money on reparations, interest rates, pensions, railroads, businesses, industries, and 
utility companies.457 At the Christian Social Party assembly in October 1922, Seipel 
tempered his gratitude. He had stated that since the “Allies” had weakened Austria, the least 
they could do was to send loans.458 Despite such public reticence Seipel welcomed foreign 
loans,459 and he contended that they were necessary for Austrian economic recovery and the 
continuance of its existence.460   
 Electorally, Seipel’s policies proved successful. In October 1923 the Christian 
Socials received eighty-two seats, the socialists sixty-eight, the Greater German People’s 
Party ten, and an Agrarian League five seats.461 Seipel won in the 1923 election despite 
some discontent over the League of Nations' control of Austrian finances. Thus, at least a 
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plurality of Austrians supported Seipel and his policies. Under Seipel’s government during 
the mid-and late 1920s, the economic situation in Austria slightly improved. And 
consequently the Anschluss desire greatly lessened within the Christian Social Party and 
somewhat among the entire Austrian populace.462 Therefore, economic improvement under 
Seipel strengthened the Christian Social Party’s positions as a champion of Austrian 
independence.  
Seipel's foreign and economic policy had implications for the Anschluss movement 
within Austria. When the Seipel government signed the Geneva Protocol with the major 
European powers, with the exception of Germany, on October 4, 1922, it also agreed to 
uphold Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain that prohibited an Anschluss with Germany. 
While the Christian Socials maintained that this course of action was necessary, the 
socialists and the Greater German People’s Party opposed the Geneva Protocol for this very 
reason. The socialist Bauer saw Seipel as a “traitor” because he accepted a renewed 
Anschluss prohibition based on the Geneva Protocol in order to receive a loan from the US, 
Britain, France, and Italy.463 In addition, Seipel supported the Danube Confederation as an 
economic alternative to the Anschluss.  In 1926 the Austrian foreign minister under Seipel, 
Dr. Heinrich Mataja, put forward another Danube Confederation plan, after the first one in 
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1919 had failed,464 but Mataja had no more luck than his predecessors.465 Undeterred Seipel 
still favored close economic and political ties with the successor states. In November 1927 
Seipel said that there would be no peace in Europe, if neighbors refused to work together.466     
Although Seipel stressed Austrian political independence as a major goal of the 
Christian Social Party, he also advocated close cultural ties with Germany in the 1920s. The 
Neue Freie Presse contended that in 1922 Seipel stated that “Austria has remained a 
German state, which works together with the Reich, because of my polices. This policy is to 
be carried out without any big words.”467 Yet, in August 1923, fellow Christian Social Dr. 
Karl Lugmayr asserted that Austria should not only be politically independent, but also 
develop its cultural independence.468 Seipel, however, disagreed with Lugmayr. According 
to the Österreichische Nachrichten, Seipel contended that even though both countries were 
politically separated, the Austrians and in particular the Catholic Germans would always 
belong to the same “cultural unity of the German nation.”469 In November 1926 the 
Christian Social Party declared that, although it wanted Austrian independence, it still 
wanted to maintain close ties to Germany.470 In a speech in 1927, Chancellor Seipel 
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reiterated the Christian Social Party’s position and said that Austria’s relationship to 
Germany could not be closer.471 In addition, the Neue Freie Presse asserted that when in 
June 1928 the Yugoslavian Prime Minister insisted that Austria have no relation with 
Germany whatsoever, Seipel responded that the Central European question could never be 
solved without Germany.472 Thus, Seipel wanted to assert pro-German cultural identity 
despite political independence. 
  The Anschluss movement, although diminished, continued to challenge the Seipel 
government in the mid- and late 1920s. In particular, a number of different interest groups 
and associations among the Austrian pro-Anschluss proponents wanted to merge Austrian 
and German industry and culture. The Austrian-German Workers’ Society (Österreichisch-
Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft) sought a commonality of scientific matters. The Austrian-
German Economic Partnership (Österreichisch-Deutschen Wirtschaftszusammenschluβ) 
wanted an economic union of Austria and Germany.473 The Kärtner Tagblatt maintained 
that the Austrian-German People’s League (Österreichisch-Deutsche Volksbund), which had 
tens of thousands of members including the socialist Renner, sought an Anschluss.474 The 
Christian Social Party had instructed its members to stay away from the Volksbund, which 
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was founded in 1925, but nonetheless four Christian Social Party members had joined the 
organization. Also, in 1925 socialists held demonstrations in St. Pölten and Vienna, where 
they sharply criticized the “Allies’” and Austrian government’s anti-Anschluss position. In 
October 1927, about seventy-five thousand Greater Germans held a demonstration in 
Vienna. The major pro-Anschluss newspaper, Der Anschluss, started up in 1927.475 
According to the Reichspost, many university professors, such as Dr. Karl Gottfried 
Hugelmann, were likewise pro-Anschluss. At the tenth Musicians’ League festival 
(Sängerbundfest) in 1928 Christian Social Richard Schmitz demanded the union of a greater 
German nation, in which its sons could meet.476 Nonetheless, the Christian Social leadership 
maintained its commitment to an independent Austria. Speaking at a Volks-German 
gathering in Berlin in 1926, Seipel said he believed that Austria could have its own national 
awareness and could live without destroying world peace.477 
In the April 1927 election, the coalition of the Christian Social Party and Greater 
German People’s Party got fifty-percent of votes and eighty-five seats. The opposition 
socialists received forty-two percent of the vote and seventy-one seats, and the Agrarian 
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League got nine seats. As an individual party the socialists actually had a plurality, but the 
government was formed by a coalition of the Christian Social Party and Greater German 
People’s Party, who together maintained a narrow majority.478 Even in the late 1920s Seipel 
still had full support of most Christian Socials.479  
 Therefore, during the 1920s, Austrian Chancellor Seipel had dedicated himself to 
creating a separate Austrian identity and preserving Austrian independence. He did not see 
the Anschluss as a practical objective and championed a free, Catholic, and anti-socialist 
Austria. When Seipel, who had resigned from political office in April 1930,480 died on 
August 2, 1932, many newspapers and letters commemorated him and held him in high 
esteem. The Verband der abgeordneten des nationalen Wirtschaftsblocks (union of civil 
servants of the national economic bloc) in remembering Seipel called him a “savior of the 
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Austrian fatherland.”481 Dollfuss and many others likewise called him a “savior” for helping 
the restoration of Austria. A letter from the Austrian Jewish community also expressed 
condolences, in particular because Seipel had been one of the least anti-Semitic of the 
Christian Social Party leaders.482 The Wiener Journal called him the "captain of the ship.”483 
A German newspaper had said that: “German-Austria after long years [had] gotten once 
again a statesman of great stature. ... In the area of foreign policy he [had] made it possible 
for Austria to cast off the role of the world’s beggar and to take over once again an 
important Central European function.”484 The anti-Anschluss position of the Christian Social 
Party instilled by Seipel endured until its official dissolution in 1934.  
 
V. Christian Socialism and Anti-Semitism 
Not only was the Christian Social Party anti-socialist and anti-Anschluss, but it was 
also anti-Semitic. Bruce Pauley argues that Austria was the most anti-Semitic country in 
Europe, and most Austrian political parties to some extent embraced anti-Semitism. Indeed, 
the Christian Social Party had a long history of anti-Semitism. During the nineteenth 
century, Roman Catholics blamed Jews for modernization, capitalism, Marxism, atheism, 
and democracy. Some of the first actively anti-Semitic Austrian clergymen were Sebastian 
Brunner (1814-1893) and Albert Wiesinger (1830-1896). They both edited an anti-Semitic 
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newspaper titled the Wiener Kirchenzeitung. Bruce Pauley calls Brunner the “Father of 
Austrian anti-Semitism” and Wiesinger a “devoted fanatic of hate.” Baron Karl Feiherr von 
Vogelsang (1818-1890), a German Catholic who had relocated to Vienna, was a leading 
member of the Austrian Christian Social Party. Vogelsang edited the Catholic journal 
Vaterland, and he too was an anti-Semitic politician. These three men attended anti-Semitic 
rallies and inspired the most famous late nineteenth century Austrian Christian Social anti-
Semite, Karl Lueger.485 Unlike Georg Schönerer’s greater German nationalism, Lueger 
championed the Catholic Church and Habsburg Empire. In addition, contrary to Schönerer’s 
racial anti-Semitism, Lueger believed in economic, cultural, and religious anti-Semitism. 
Nevertheless, Pauley states that Lueger turned anti-Semitism into an “integrating force of 
political Catholicism,” and was one of the first mayors in Europe elected on “an anti-Semitic 
platform.”486   
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During the inter-period, many Christian Social leaders, such as Dr. Anton 
Jerzabek,487 Dr. Heinrich Mataja,488 Friedrich Funder, Emmerich Czermak,489 and Leopold 
Kunschak were staunchly anti-Semitic.490 At the Christian Social Party meeting in Vienna 
on December 15, 1918, Kunschak stated the Jews were to blame for profiteering during the 
Great War, because the millions spent during the war did not go to Christian families.491 Far 
more shocking, Kunschak asserted that Jews should only be allowed to live in ghettoes. The 
Christian Social Party’s main newspaper, the Reichspost, and its editor, Friedrich Funder, 
were anti-Semitic. The Reichspost blamed Jews for the defeat in World War I and discussed 
a Jewish conspiracy to take over the world.492 
Although the Christian Social Party did not pass any anti-Semitic laws or initiate 
pogroms, the party viewed Jews negatively and wanted their influence restricted. In 1925 
Bishop Sigmund Waitz said Jews were “alien people.” The Schönere Zukunft (Better 
Future), which appeared in 1929 and was edited by Josef Eberle, contended that Jews, who 
                                                 
487
 Dr. Anton Jerzabek (1867-1939) was a Christian Social member of the Provisional 
National Assembly and the Nationalrat from 1920-1930. He also became the leader of the 
Viennese Anti-Semitic League. Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, 24. 
 
488Heinrich Mataja (1877-1937) was an anti-Semitic, Christian Social Party member. He was 
a delegate of the Provisional National Assembly, the Constitutional National Assembly, and 
the Nationalrat (Austrian parliament) from 1920-1924 and 1926-1930. He became the 
Austria foreign minister from 1924 to 1926. Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, 
24; See also, Heinrich Mataja, Österreichische Politik im XIX. und XX. Jahrhundert 
(Vienna: Reinhold, 1935). 
 
489
 Czermak was the Christian Social Party chairman in the 1930s who wrote a book titled 
Order in the Jewish Question. 
 
490
 Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, 24. 
 
491
 Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, 25.  
 
492
 Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution, 153-156, 159. 
 
 183 
only made up 5 % of the Austrian population, had too much influence and wealth. The 
newspaper said that wealthy Jews should have their property confiscated. According to 
Pauley, even Seipel was a “moderate anti-Semite,” who opposed rabid anti-Semitism but 
believed that Jews should not be fully integrated into society. Anti-Semitism continued in 
the 1930s. Dollfuss and Schuschnigg publicly came out against anti-Semitism, but their 
regimes were nonetheless tolerant of anti-Semitism. Dollfuss even quoted von Vogelsang in 
his speeches. Pauley concludes that economic, cultural, and religious but not explicitly racial 
anti-Semitism played a significant role in the Christian Social Party.493   
The Christian Social Party-style anti-Semitism was in line with general Austrian 
sentiments; therefore, it neither helped nor hurt it electorally. However, Christian Social 
anti-Semitism certainly contributed to a political climate desensitized to the issue. Thus, the 
Austrian population was exceptionally vulnerable to Nazi preemption and exploitation of the 
issue and the explosion of Austrian anti-Semitism in 1938. 
 
VI. The Christian Social Government and Austrian Identity 
The Christian Social Party that led the Austrian government took decisive steps to 
undermine any attempts at creating a common Austro-German culture and history. For 
example, the party opposed pro-Anschluss organizations, like the German Austrian League 
(Deutsch-Österreichischer Volksbund) and German Working Society (Deutsche Arbeits-
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Gemeinschaft).494 At the same time, the party encouraged policies that formed a separate 
Austrian national identity and opposed regional separatism.   
 During the 1920s, there were many efforts aimed at creating a common history 
between Austria and Germany. Pro-Anschluss historians, school teachers, and politicians got 
rid of old history texts that emphasized the dynastic struggle between Habsburgs and 
Hohenzollerns, particularly the victories of Frederick the Great over Maria Theresa. These 
old textbooks had heightened the struggle between Catholics and Protestants, and they 
depicted Austria as a mostly Slav state. Updated history books during Weimar showed 
Austria as a German republic whose people wanted to join Germany. German and Austrian 
historians led the way in creating a common “German” history.  Austria had historically 
been an important part of the “Germany” for centuries. Bismarck’s policies in 1866 and 
1870-71 were now seen as only partial steps toward complete unification. The repercussions 
of the goal to create a new, uniform, and standard history were enormous. Professors of 
history influenced university students, and many of these university students in turn became 
public teachers influencing their students. Both secondary and primary schools were 
affected. This “rewriting” of history was a powerful tool in creating a desire for unity and 
was quite successful, although deeply rooted class and regional differences continued. 
Moreover, Stanley Suval observes that Austrians saw their state as “culturally unviable” as 
well. They believed that no small state could effectively sustain culture, which was shown 
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by the massive numbers of Austrian intellectuals, musicians, artists, and scientists re-
locating to Germany during the 1920s.495 
 Furthermore, the Christian Social Party had to deal with persistent regionalism that 
also threatened to undermine the new Austrian Republic. Provincial patriotism was quite 
strong in Austria in the 1920s. In 1921 the Austrian journalist Gustav Stolper stated that 
“German Austria is not an historical-rooted organism; there is no conception of a German 
Austrian state. The Tyrolean, Carinthian, and Styrian consider themselves always as 
Styrians, Carinthians, Tyroleans, and then as Germans, never as German Austrians.” 
According to an opinion poll, even in 1961, sixty-six percent of North Tyroleans identified 
themselves foremost as Tyroleans rather than Austrians.496 In “National Identity or Regional 
Identity: Austria versus Tyrol/Salzburg,” Gunda Barth-Scalmani, Hermann J. W.  Kuprian, 
and Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig likewise maintain that regionalism, particularly in the 
provinces of Tyrol and Salzburg, remains adamantly strong. The people of these two 
provinces see themselves first as Tyroleans and Salzburgers rather than Austrians.497   
In order to combat a common Austro-German history and provincialism, the 
Christian Socials fostered Austrian nationalism and identity. While pro-Anschluss supporters 
wanted to downplay the centuries old dynastic struggle between the Habsburgs and 
Hohenzollerns, opponents of the Anschluss did exactly the opposite and attempted to 
emphasize religious, cultural, political, and economic differences between Prussia and 
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Austria and write a dualistic history. The Neue Freie Presse asserted that even Mussolini, 
who had opposed an Anschluss, warned the Austrians in 1928 of joining a German state 
dominated by thirty-six million Prussians.498  
 Austrian nationalists based their national identity on a unique culture and tradition. 
During the 1920s, Austrian nationalists embraced the annual Salzburg Festival in such a way 
as to distinguish themselves from the Germans. Mozart’s Catholic and baroque Salzburg 
was compared to Wagner’s Protestant Bayreuth. According to Gunter Bischof this “myth” 
was used to create and sustain a sense of Austrianism or “Austrians as the better Germans.”  
Unlike Protestant, militaristic, socialist, Godless, and materialistic Germany, the Austrians 
were good Catholics who cherished their Habsburg past. The Christian Social Party 
especially appealed to the Catholic, pro-Austria, and monarchist elements in Austria.  
Moreover, a true Austrian was either an Alpine peasant or middle class Viennese man.499 
 Most Austrian intellectuals were rightwing and extremely German nationalist, 
especially the Austrian university history professors. However, many Austrian intellectuals, 
writers, and playwrights, such as Hugo Hantsch, Anton Wildgans, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, 
Hermann Bahr, Richard von Kralik, Richard Schaukal, Erwin Hanslik, and Oscar A. H. 
Schmitz, attempted to create a sense of “Austrianism.” Also, besides the former imperial 
generals and civil servants who drove the monarchist movement, a much younger, 
intellectual, and radical group of Catholic and Habsburg loyalists began the “Austrian 
Action” (Die österreichische Aktion) group.  A leading member of the “Austrian Action” 
Alfred Missong wrote that:  
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We cannot talk of an Austrian return to “Mother Germania.” . . . These ideas might 
suffice for German history texts, but they cannot be considered by Austrians. . . . The 
idea came out of the old Ostmark and completely ignores that the Alpine Austrian of 
today is culturally and racially different. The Austrian man is racially a synthesis of 
German and Slav, culturally a synthesis of Roman and Byzantine.  . . . We cannot 
say that Austria has grown out of Germanism alone. Austria cannot return to the 
Reich since it never belonged to the German Reich of today. The best solution would 
be the return of the Germans to the Reich, to Austria, to the Emperor. 
 
Yet another Austrian patriot, Oscar A. Schmitz, stated that Austria’s new role should be to 
serve as a mediator between ethnic groups and a German-speaking center of Europe.500 In 
addition, in the mid- 1920s, a new Austrian national anthem was introduced in the provincial 
elementary schools to help bolster Austrian patriotism and embrace the idea that the leftover 
Habsburg lands that made up “rump-Austria” “formed a coherent whole.”501     
 However, ultimately the Christian Social Party failed in its attempts at encouraging 
Austrian nationalism. The authors in the book Austrian Historical Memory & National 
Identity correctly contend that a separate Austrian identity never successfully formed until 
after World War II, despite many attempts. Friedrich Heer asserted that Austria in the inter-
war period was “in a never ending crisis, constantly threatened by complete loss of 
identity.”502 Bischof contended that the First Republic of Austria “lacked a firm will to exist 
as a small state and never marshaled sufficient self-confidence as a nation” Anton Pelinka 
said that inter-war “Austria somehow got stuck,  half way between a second Bavaria and a 
second Switzerland.” This lack of identity culminated in the Anschluss of March 1938.503 
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Unlike the ruined economy, which could be bolstered with loans, weak Austrian nationalism 
and lack of a clear Austrian identity in the inter-war era was a serious problem that the 
Christian Socials could not fully resolve. 
 
VII. Conclusion   
The Christian Social Party received support from the Austrian Catholic Church, 
clergymen, Catholics, peasants, farmers, conservatives, monarchists, and industrialists. In 
1918 and 1919 when the Anschluss movement was at its peak, the Christian Social Party had 
been divided on the Anschluss and monarchy questions. These divisions almost fragmented 
the party in the immediate aftermath of World War I.  
In the early 1920s, the Christian Social Party continued to be divided as shown by 
the 1921 plebiscites that marked differences between the national Christian Socials who 
wanted to maintain Austrian integrity and independence and some provincial Christian 
Socials who sought a union with Germany. Economic and regional motivations fueled the 
provincial separatist movements. As in 1918 and 1919, pressure from Great Britain, the 
United States, France, and Italy helped shape Christian Social Party policies. These 
countries granted loans to Austria in return for Austria’s refraining from an Anschluss.  
However, by 1922 under the leadership of Seipel, the Christian Social Party became 
a majority anti-Anschluss party, although it still had a pro-Anschluss faction. Reasons why 
the Christian Social Party did not want an Anschluss included fear of “Prussianization,” 
German socialism, and foreign threats or retaliations. There was a long history of tensions 
between Austria and Prussia. In July 1927 the Austrian Kreuzzeiting agreed with Seipel’s 
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policies and said that “Austria and Prussia cannot be forced into the same Reich.”504 Austria 
would be destroyed through an Anschluss. Joining Austria with Germany would be the same 
as if Bismarck had made Bavaria into a Prussian province.505 The Reichspost on July 3, 
1927, stated that Christian Social opponents of the Anschluss had contended that Germany, 
which had forty-million Prussians, would subjugate Austria with its population of six and a 
half-million.506 Moreover, the Weltblatt contended that many Christian Social members 
opposed the penetration and expansion of socialism into Austria that would have resulted in 
the event of a union with Germany.507 The Neue Freie Presse maintained that many 
Austrians likewise feared that "the Austrian military would become a red army.”508 At the 
same time, the Christian Social Party followed American and British policies in order to 
secure loans. In the event of an Anschluss, the party was also concerned about possible 
repercussions, like the loss of money and territories or even occupation.  
Furthermore, the Christian Social Party was anti-Anschluss because it was zealously 
Catholic and represented a form of political Catholicism. The Catholic Church had a big 
impact on the party. For example, Seipel had to first get permission from the Church to run 
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for office. The party leaders feared that they would lose power in the event of a union with 
mostly Protestant Germany. Thus, both the Christian Social Party and the Austrian Catholic 
Church were opposed to an Anschluss. Also, key Christian Social leaders, such as Seipel, 
were true Austrian nationalists rather than German nationalists. Some Christian Socials 
believed that economically, culturally, and politically Austria was a separate state.    
The Christian Social Party led the Austrian government from 1920 to 1929. The 
Austrian Chancellors from this period, with the notable exception of Johann Schober, were 
Christian Socials. Although there were many smaller parties, like the Heimatbloc, Agrarian 
League, and the Greater German People’s Party, throughout the decade of parliamentary 
elections between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Austrian electorate voted for either 
the Christian Social Party or the socialist party. 
Although alone the Christian Socials were a minority, in particular the anti-
Anschluss Christian Socials, in the 1920s the Christian Social Party secured its leadership 
position by forming a coalition government and getting American and British support. The 
Christian Social Party formed the Great Coalition with the Greater German People’s Party. 
Within the Great Coalition cast, the Greater German People’s Party aside its pro-Anschluss 
position in favor of anti-socialism. Despite of the fact that at times the socialists had 
received more votes than the Christian Socials, as in the 1927 election, the Christian Social 
Party and its coalition partners had parliamentary majorities. Ultimately, despite economic 
recovery in the late 1920s, neither Seipel, nor his Christian Social successors Dollfuss and 
Schuschnigg, were able to create a sense of Austrian identity or nationalism that could 
withstand the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party once German armed forces crossed the 
border.      
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
THE LEGITIMISTS, 1920-1929 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Back to Reason! 
 Back to Order and Peace! 
 Back to the Monarchy! 
 We need historic and political authority! 
 We need the Kaiser again!509 
 
On November 12, 1918, one day after Kaiser Karl resigned, the Christian Social 
Party, excluding Wilhelm Miklas and two others who wanted a monarchy, had voted in 
favor of the Austrian Republic along with the socialists and smaller parties.510 Nevertheless, 
Austria was a republic without republicans. Most consistently anti-republican were the 
monarchists, called legitimists because they still believed that the Habsburgs were the 
legitimate rulers of Austria. The Austrian legitimist movement began in 1918 with the 
collapse of the Habsburg monarchy and the establishment of the First Austrian Republic. 
                                                 
509
“Zurück zur Vernunft! Zurück zur Ordnung und Rühe! Zurück zur Monarchie! 
Wir brauchen die geschichtliche und staatliche Autorität! Wir brauchen den Kaiser wieder!“  
Staatswehr, 27 February, 1927. The University of Vienna library had the Staatswehr (call 
number III. 464.800) for the years, 1918-1927 and 1932-1934. It first appeared weekly then 
after 1926 monthly. On March 10, 1923, the Österreichische Nachrichten: Organ der 
Monarchisten Österreichs (call number III. 461.513), also wanted a return of the monarchy 
and state authority. The University of Vienna library had the Österreichische Nachrichten 
for the years, 1923-1926. These two legitimist newspapers were the only ones found at the 
university library and Austrian National library almost in entirety.   
 
510
 Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, 24; See also, Hilde Verena 
Lang, Bundespräsident Miklas und das autoritäre Regime 1933 – 1938 (Dissertation. 
Vienna: University of Vienna, 1972).   
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Similar to Weimar Germany, which many Germans resented, the Austrian monarchists saw 
the First Republic of Austria as an unwanted state imposed upon them by the victorious 
Allies. In particular, because there had been no national referendum among the Austrians, 
Austrian legitimists contended that the banishment of the Habsburgs and the creation of the 
Austrian Republic were illegal. According to monarchists, the First Republic was also 
illegitimate because it lacked any historic precedent.511 To emphasize their own historical 
and imperial roots, the legitimists appropriated the old Habsburg colors of black and 
yellow,512 as well as the double eagle that had been the symbol of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Austrian monarchists did not want the republic. But they distinguished themselves 
from other anti-republican forces on the Anschluss question, for they were adamant 
proponents of an independent Austria. The vast majority of the Austrian legitimists wanted 
to restore the Habsburg monarchy within the borders of the First Republic, following a 
Kleinösterreichische Program. There were only a few monarchists who had 
Groβösterreichische Gedanken and wanted a restoration of the entire, or at least a large 
portion, of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.513   
                                                 
511
 Staatswehr, 2 January 1923. This newspaper article entitled, “Die Republik İsterreich 
ein Zufall,” said that the First Republic only occurred by chance. The Österreichische 
Nachrichten likewise expressed anti-republicanism on March 10, 1923.  
 
512Black and yellow became a part of the monarchist banner. Staatswehr, 6 January 1922. In 
addition, the monarchist motto was “Schwarzgelb bis in die Knochen” (Black-yellow all the 
way to the bones). Staatswehr, 11 June 1922.The monarchists even had a black-yellow song, 
Schwarzgelb heraus! Staatswehr, 25 March 1921. 
 
513
 Friedrich Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus 1918-1938, seine Politik und 
Publizistik (Dissertation.Vienna: University of Vienna, 1956), 40-41; Stephan Neuhäuser, 
Der Österreichische Legitimismus in der ersten Republik (1918 - 1938) unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung seiner Organisationen (Thesis. Vienna: University of Vienna, 1991), 4-6. 
 
 
 193 
The Austrian legitimists in the 1920s faced two major problems.  They were a 
minority with scant success at the electoral polls, and they were severely fragmented into 
various groups, parties, and organizations. Most of the legitimist organizations, such as the 
Wiener Casino, Vereinigung katholischer Edelleute in Österreich (Union of Catholic 
Nobility in Austria), and Österreichische Jugendbewegung Ottonia (Austrian Youth 
Movement Ottonia) were not political parties. However, the Deutschösterreichische 
Volkspartei (German Austrian People’s Party),514 the Wolff-Verband, the Partei der 
Österreichischen Monarchisten, P.O.M, (Austrian Monarchist Party), and Kaisertreue 
Volkspartei (Emperor Loyal People’s Party) were political parties that ran their own 
candidates during elections. The Partei der Österreichischen Monarchisten was the most 
successful of the legitimist parties, but the party still fell short of its electoral aspirations. 
The number one goal of all these legitimist parties and organizations was restoring the 
Habsburg Monarchy.515 But they never unified behind this goal. 
Moreover, there was a strong overlap between the monarchists and Christian Social 
Party members who led the Austrian state in the 1920s. Many Christian Socials had 
monarchist leanings, such as Kurt von Schuschnigg, who had been a member of the 
legitimist organization, the Iron Ring (Der Eiserne Ring) Engelbert Dollfuss and Cardinal 
Theodor Innitzer likewise sympathized with monarchism, as did Ignaz Seipel at various 
times during his chancellorship in the 1920s. Therefore, though few in numbers, the 
legitimists had strong leaders and far-reaching support, although for the Christian Social 
Party monarchism was only a secondary issue. 
                                                 
514
 The Deutschösterreichische Volkspartei began in 1918, and after receiving less than two 
thousand votes, it dissolved in 1919.  
 
515
 Staatswehr, 21 May 1920. 
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The United States, Britain, and other countries recognized the monarchists as 
Anschluss opponents. However, they opposed a Habsburg restoration. Overall, there was 
little interaction between the US, Britain, and Austrian monarchists in the 1920s.516 
During the 1920s the legitimists were decisive in the struggle for a separate Austrian 
state. Compared to other Anschluss foes, the legitimists were the most vocal and determined 
because a union with Germany and Austria would destroy their entire cause—the restoration 
of the Habsburgs. While the Christian Social Party and Austrian industries and industrialists 
were at times indecisive on the Anschluss issue, there was never any doubt concerning the 
unwavering anti-Anschluss stance of the legitimists. First, this chapter examines the 
monarchists’ goals and motives, as well their membership. Second, it examines the many 
legitimist organizations. Third, it looks at the legitimists’ response in the 1920s to the 
attempt to create a Danube Confederation. 
 
II. Historiography 
Regarding secondary sources, there are no books in English on the Austrian 
monarchists in the 1920s. The only German-speaking secondary sources are two 
dissertations and one masters thesis from the University of Vienna. By virtue of focusing on 
the legitimist roles in opposition to the Anschluss and in Anglo-American diplomacy, this 
dissertation studies the legitimists from a different perspective than these German-language 
works.    
 Friedrich Wagner discusses the position of various monarchist, anti-monarchist, 
Christian Social, socialist, and conservative sources on monarchism on a year by year basis. 
                                                 
516
 Austria—The Monarchist Movement. Notes on the Activities of the Habsburgs.  4 
January 1921. Vienna. M695: US Department of State. Roll 6. 
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In a chapter entitled, the “sociology of legitimism,” he discusses why people became 
monarchists, and this is also the main question the book asks. Wagner asserts that 
individuals joined monarchist organizations because they were civil servants, officers, or 
aristocrats whose world had crumbled after 1918. He also contends that members of middle 
class who used to work for the Empire, such as servants, coachmen, and artisans, likewise, 
were also monarchists. Wagner says that initially most monarchists were older men, but later 
on the youth and women also became attracted to an idealized past. In general many people 
who opposed socialism and Nazism were drawn to monarchism. In addition, Wagner states 
that when these youth become disillusioned, they turned toward Nazism.517 
 Ingrid Mosser examines how various political parties and groups, such as Christian 
Socials, socialists, and National Socialists, felt about a Habsburg restoration during various 
time periods. She also investigates what prominent political leaders in Austria thought about 
the Habsburg restoration, like Kurt von Schuschnigg, Egelbert Dollfuss, and Ernst Rődiger 
von Starhemberg. In addition, Mosser examines the ideology behind legitimism and the 
Habsburg restoration question.  
Mosser argues that the Austrian state and its leaders, such as Schuschnigg who had a 
strong affinity toward monarchism, used the legitimist ideology to combat the Anschluss 
movement and Nazism. However, other Habsburg successor states, in particular 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, opposed the idea of a Habsburg restoration. Mosser 
contends that a Habsburg restoration could only work if there was international cooperation, 
which was most unlikely during the inter-war period. Mosser maintains that, ultimately, the 
                                                 
517
 Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus. Wagner also discusses various aspects of 
German history, such as the Protestant Reformation, Maria Theresa, the Austro-Prussian 
rivalry, and nationality, in order to show how monarchists focused on an idealized past 
regarding the Kaiser.   
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attempt to use “[legitimist] ideology” whose goals were unrealistic, to save Austria from a 
much larger state, which had a well-defined ideology, failed. She looks at the years 1933 to 
1938 because these years, not the 1920s, marked the height of the legitimist movement.518  
Stephan Neuhäuser mainly focuses on monarchists from 1918 to 1938, but he also 
includes a discussion of the monarchist opposition during the Nazi years, 1938 to 1945. 
Focusing on Austrian domestic affairs, Neuhäuser provides useful descriptions of various 
monarchist groups. But the thesis lacks any consideration of the international dimension as 
well as any well-defined interpretation or argument.519 None of the other works discuss 
monarchism from the aspect of American and British diplomacy or emphasize it as an 
alternative to the rising Anschluss movement. Regarding sources, this chapter primarily uses 
newspapers because the Austrian archives had scant information on the monarchists.520  
  
III. The Membership of Legitimist Organizations  
                                                 
518
 Mosser also argues that if the First Republic of Austria had been economically unviable, 
than a Habsburg restoration in the same borders of the republic would not have bettered the 
desperate economic situation. She also notes that had a Habsburg restoration indeed 
occurred, then Austrian anti-monarchists would have joined the German army against an 
Austrian monarchy. Mosser discusses the views of the successor states in East Central 
Europe toward a Habsburg restoration, but she does not discuss Great Britain and the United 
States of America.  Ingrid Mosser, Der Legitimismus und die Frage der 
Habsburgerrestauration in der innenpolitischen Zielsetzung des autoritären Regimes in 
Österreich 1933-1938 (Dissertation. Vienna: University of Vienna, 1979), 6, 356-358. 
 
519
 See, Neuhäuser, Der Österreichische Legitimismus. 
 
520
 The Archiv der Republic in Vienna had little on monarchist groups. Searching under 
Bundeskanzerlamt-Allgemein there were several boxes on “legitimation,” but these were 
about the legitimization of children. There also several boxes listing “Habsburg-
Lothringen,” but these boxes concerned the activities of distant Habsburg family members, 
most of whom were banned from entering Austria.  
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The first publication of the monarchist newspaper, Staatswehr, on December 29, 
1918, appealed explicitly to several of these constituencies: “For Our Readers! In a troubled 
time, in which the interests and future of the young German Austria, especially for the 
officers, military, and civil servants, are uncertain, our new military newspaper emerges for 
the wider public.”521 Not surprisingly, most of the legitimist support in Austria came from 
ex-civil servants, military officers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, aristocrats, Catholics, 
and conservatives. Former military officers were especially sympathetic to monarchism 
because the Austrian government, when headed by the socialists, had forced about three 
hundred generals and officers into early retirement. This move had political motives, for the 
socialist Otto Bauer feared a Habsburg restoration attempt and wanted to remove those 
officers whom he suspected of close ties to the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He replaced 
many of these terminated imperial officers with socialist members of the Volkswehr. In 
response to their employment terminations, the ex-military men organized themselves 
politically, and on November 6, 1918, formed the Verband der deutschösterreichischen 
Militärgagisten (Union of the German Austrian Military Officers).522         
                                                 
521Staatswehr, 29 December 1918. In 1918 the Staatswehr had appeared twice a week, every 
Wednesday and Friday, at the cost of thirty-two heller per issue, two and a half kronen a 
month, or twenty-six kronen a year; In 1912 one English pound was equal to 48 kronen. Due 
to inflation, in 1920 one pound was equal to 820 kronen. Mr. Lindley to Vienna Emergency 
Relief Fund. 14 January 1920. BDFA. 2:128; In 1922 one US dollar was worth 19,000 
kronen. Washington Post, 13 August 1922. 
 
522The government retired another four thousand soldiers in accordance with the Treaty of 
St. Germain, which limited the size of the Austrian army. Taking political action, one ex-
officer, Major Friedrich Kollarz became the first legitimist to win a seat in the Austrian 
Nationalrat, which he held from 1920 to 1923. Neuhäuser, Der Österreichische 
Legitimismus, 22-27; See also, Wolfgang Doppelbauer, Zum Elend noch die Schande: Das 
altösterreichische Offizierkorps am Beginn der Republik (Vienna: Österr. Bundesverlag, 
1988). 
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 Voting results did not accurately reflect monarchist strength. The fact that many 
monarchists voted for the Christian Social Party or for the fascist Heimwehr (and its political 
party, the Heimatblock) made it difficult to calculate the exact numbers of monarchists at 
any given time.523 Some legitimists voted for a Christian Social candidate who had a better 
chance at electoral victory. Also, because of international pressure against a Habsburg 
restoration, many legitimists saw no reason in voting exclusively for monarchist parties. 
Nonetheless, throughout the 1920s the monarchists had scant success at the polls and 
remained a small minority. Although the legitimists were not the largest in terms of 
numbers, their political platform was clear. Most legitimists were Catholic,524 anti-
Marxist,525 and anti-Greater German.526 In addition, many monarchist leaders were 
aristocrats that had little or no sense of how to run campaigns in an era of a democratic mass 
electorate. With their steadfast commitment to an independent Austria and the restoration of 
the Habsburgs, the monarchists were relentless opponents of Anschluss, republicanism, and 
socialism.  
 
IV. Key Legitimist Organizations 
                                                 
523
 Regarding the Austrian election, the Staatswehr on December 29, 1918, supported both 
the monarchist and Christian Social parties, but opposed the socialists and Greater German 
Party; The Österreichische Nachrichten expressed similar sentiments on October 20, 1923. 
 
524The Staatswehr, 15 March 1924, contains an article titled “Legitimismus und 
Katholizismus” (Legitimism and Catholicism) that discussed the links between Catholics 
and legitimists. Monarchists saw the Habsburgs as the legitimate Catholic ruling family. 
Österreichische Nachrichten, “Papstum and Kaisertum,”15 May 1924. 
 
525In particular, the Staatswehr, on 13 March 1923, expressed anti-socialism. It had cartoons 
portraying the Austrian socialists, such as Karl Seitz and Bosel, in a negative manner. 
 
526
 The Staatswehr, 17 April 1923, attacked the Grossdeutsch Party, which had criticized the 
monarchists. 
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There were numerous legitimist groups in Austria during the 1920s. Moreover, one 
could be a member of more than one monarchist organization, and many of the same names 
continuously reappear as members of different monarchist groups. Some of these groups 
restricted their memberships to Catholics only. The main legitimist organizations were the 
Wiener Casino,527 the Bund der Österreicher (Union of Austrians),528 Partei der 
Österreichischen Monarchisten or P.İ.M (Austrian Monarchist Party),529 Reichsbund der 
                                                 
527
 The Wiener Casino was founded in 1919. Its members included Prince Johannes von und 
zu Liechtenstein, Albin Schager von Ekartsau, Friedrich Ritter von Wiesner, and Alois von 
Schönburg-Hartenstein. After 1921 it joined the Bund der Österreicher to become the 
Reichsbund der Österreicher. Wiesner had worked for the special commission that had ruled 
that Serbia had been responsible for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 
Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, 32-33, 40. During the 1920s, Dr. Wiesner 
championed a Habsburg restoration and was an agent of former Emperor Charles. In 1921 
Wiesner asked for American funds for the reconstruction of Austria. Although the US and 
other countries gave loans for Austrian economic improvement, they opposed Wiesner’s 
desire for a Habsburg restoration in the 1920s. Austria—The Monarchist Movement. Notes 
on the Activities of the Habsburgs.  4 January 1921. Vienna. M695: US Department of State. 
Roll 6; Fürst Alois von Schönburg-Hartenstein (1858-1944) had been Colonel General 
(Generaloberst) and a member of the house of lords (Herrenhaus) from 1903 to 1918. 
During World War I, he led the Sixth Infantry Edelweiss-Corps. He received the Empress 
Maria Theresa medal of honor. After the war he was President of the Austrian Red Cross 
and joined several legitimist organizations including the Wiener Casino. In 1933 he joined 
the Heimwehr and became the Secretary of the Austrian Ministry of Defense. In 1937 he 
retired after a political scandal. Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, 473. 
 
528
 On August 18, 1920 Fritz von Riedl founded the Bund der Österreicher (Union of 
Austrians). The main objective of the Bund der Österreicher was to weaken the Anschluss 
movement, in particular in the Austrian province of Styria, where in 1921, the vast majority 
of the people had voted in favor of a union with Germany in an unofficial plebiscite. 
Members included Bishop Alois Hudal and Dr. Ude. In May 1921 Fritz von Riedel merged 
his Bund der Österreicher with the Wiener Casino into one group called the Reichsbund der 
Österreicher (Austrian Imperial Union). Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus, 34-35; 
See also, Alfred Härtlein, Härtlein-Manuskript (Vienna, 1937), 123-127. Härtlein was an 
Austrian monarchist and Colonel.  
 
529Dr. Albin Schager von Ekartsau founded the P.O.M. in 1920. It was the first monarchist 
political party in Austria and the most successful. Its major publication was the 
Österreichische Nachrichten. Other members were Ernst Wense and Prince Johannes von 
und zu Liechtenstein. The group met weekly in each district of Vienna. The Kaiser’s family 
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Österreicher (Austrian Imperial Union),530 Wolff-Verband, Österreichische 
Jugendbewegung Ottonia (Austrian Youth Movement Ottonia),531 Vereinigung katholischer 
Edelleute in Österreich (Union of Catholic Nobility in Austria),532 Gebetsliga (Prayer 
League),533 K. Ö. L. Maximiliana,534 and the Kaisertreue Volkspartei (Loyal to the Kaiser 
People’s Party). Most of these groups remained small in number, and some disintegrated 
                                                                                                                                                      
thanked the P.O.M. for its support in 1923. In 1924 the Partei der Österreichischen 
Monarchisten changed its name to the Konservative Volkspartei, and the party reached its 
zenith with fifty-five thousand members. Österreichische Nachrichten, 3 March 1923, 17 
March 1923, 15 May 1924. The group disbanded in 1926. 
 
530The Reichsbund der Österreicher (Austrian Imperial Union) founded on May 1, 1921 was 
under the leadership of Prince Johannes von und zu Liechtenstein. Other members included 
Kurt von Schuschnigg and Kuno Hoynigg. In 1926 the Reichsbund der Österreicher began 
publishing its most significant monarchist newspaper, Der Österreicher. Österreichische 
Nachrichten, 13 May 1926. 
 
531Karl Piegel began the Österreichische Jugendbewegung Ottonia (Austrian Youth 
Movement Ottonia) in 1922. Piegel had created the Ottonia at age sixteen. Unser Kampf 
(Our Struggle) was its major publication. Ottonia was a militant group that did not hesitate 
to use violence against its enemies, the socialist Schutzbund and later the Nazis. On 
December 24, 1928, the Ottonia encountered problems when some of its members were 
arrested for the murder of a socialist. After 1932 anyone who was between six and fifty 
could join. In 1934 the Ottonia counted fifteen-hundred members. Neuhäuser, Der 
österreichische Legitimismus, 122-125. 
 
532Founded in 1922, its members included Kurt von Schuschnigg and Ernst Rüdiger von 
Starhemberg. The Vereinigung katholischer Edelleute in Österreich had about two-thousand 
members. Neuhäuser, Der österreichische Legitimismus, 31. 
 
533
 In 1925 August von Klinkowström began the Gebetsliga (Prayer League) for Kaiser 
Karl, which was published in many languages, even Spanish. Mosser, Der Legitimismus und 
die Frage der Habsburgerrestauration, 38. 
 
534On April, 1 1928, the K. Ö. L. Maximiliana and other legitimist groups dedicated a 
painting to Kaiser Karl in the Michaelerkirche (Michael’s Church) in Vienna. Honorary 
members of the K. Ö. L. Maximiliana included Cardinal Innitzer, Kurt von Schuschniggg, 
and Prince Johannes von und zu Liechtenstein. Neuhäuser, Der Österreichische 
Legitimismus, 39, 104-107; See also, Kaiser Karl Gedächtnisjahrbuch (Vienna, 1930); The 
Peterskirche in Vienna also contains a painting of Archduke Karl. Even today many 
churches in Austria have figures of the imperial double headed eagle. 
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after only several years. 535 Moreover, many of these legitimist organizations published their 
own newspapers and journals. The more important publications were the Staatswehr, 
Österreichische Nachrichten: Organ der Monarchisten Österreichs , Karl Gedächtnis-
Jahrbuch (Emperor Karl CommemorativeYearbook), 536 Unser Kampf (Our Struggle), and 
Ottonia. 
 The career of Gustav Wolff, who founded the radical legitimist and politically 
unsuccessful Wolff-Verband (Wolff association) in 1920, exemplifies a typical Austrian 
monarchist. 537 Wolff had close ties with Kaiser Karl, and his children visited Karl for eight 
weeks. In 1921 an advisor to Kaiser Karl, who was in exile, contacted Wolff and asked him 
if the political situation was ripe for a Habsburg restoration, to which Wolff responded that 
it was too early. Wolff sometimes criticized the Christian Social Party as much as the 
socialists. He had been convicted a dozen times for breaking the laws of the republic. Yet he 
still had his supporters.538  
Wolff was an aggressive and independent person, which sometimes led to friction 
between him and other monarchists. The Wolff-Verband worked closely with the 
                                                 
535
 There were some women’s organizations as well, like the Österreichischer Reichsbund 
Christlicher Frauen (Austrian Imperial Union of Christian Women). Österreichische 
Nachrichten, 17 March 1923. 
 
536The Kaiser Karl Gedächtnis-Jahrbuch (Emperor Karl Commemorative-Yearbook) came 
out annually from 1929 to 1938 and was edited by Hans Zessner-Spitzenberg. 
 
537Gustav Wolff (1870-1963) was born in Vienna. He was wounded in World War I and 
received many medals. He had been a colonel in the army and retired in 1918. He then 
received his doctorate in history from the University of Vienna. After the Anschluss, the 
Nazis arrested Wolff for his significant role in the legitimate movement. He continued the 
monarchist movement after World War II. Mosser, Der Legitimismus und die Frage der 
Habsburgerrestauration, 28. 
 
538Wagner, Der österreichische Legitimismus 1918-1938, 12, 27, 30. 
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Reichsbund der Österreicher. The Wolff-Verband failed to achieve its electoral goals in the 
1923 election, and, consequently, on June 28, 1923, Wolff changed the name of the Wolff-
Verband to the Kaisertreue Volkspartei (Loyal to the Kaiser People’s Party). The 
membership fees of the Kaisertreue Volkspartei were five thousand kronen, which was 
worth about 6.1 pounds at the time.539 In July, 1923, the Kaisertreue Volkspartei asked the 
Christian Socials for parliamentary seats on that party's list for Wolff and Ernst von der 
Wense, but only Ernst von der Wense received one. On October 21, 1923, the Kaisertreue 
Volkspartei had hoped for thirty to sixty thousand votes, but received only 3,474. In 1929 
Major Matthias Martinides left Wolff’s Kaisertreue Volkspartei (Loyal to the Kaiser 
People’s Party) because he had irreconcilable differences with Wolff, and he formed his 
own group, the Kaisertreue Volksbewegung (Kaiser Loyal People’s Movement), which was 
linked to the Heimwehr.540 Both the Kaisertreue Volksbewegung and the Kaisertreue 
Volkspartei broke up in 1938.   
Moreover, Gustav Wolff edited and published the Staatswehr (1918-1925, 1932-
1935), the official publication of the Wolff-Verband. The Staatswehr was overall the most 
important legitimist newspaper. On February 18, 1925, Wolff’s Staatswehr offered an 
alternative to both the Anschluss and the Danube Confederation.541 The newspaper proposed 
a complete revision of the peace settlement and the Entente’s creation of new states after 
World War I. It advocated that the German-speaking states be divided into three countries. 
                                                 
539
 Staatswehr, 8 July 1923; Mr. Lindley to Vienna Emergency Relief Fund. 14 January 
1920. BDFA. 2:128; Washington Post, 13 August 1922. 
 
540
 Staatswehr, 23 October 1923; Neuhäuser, Der Österreichische Legitimismus, 33-34, 41-
42. 
 
541
 Staatswehr, 18 February, 1925. 
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Austria, which included the German-speakers of the Czechoslovakia and South Tyrol, would 
be a monarchy ruled by the Habsburgs. A western German state, which included Bavaria, 
Baden, Württemberg, the Rhineland, and East Frisia, would be ruled by the Wittelsbach 
dynasty. A northern German state that included Prussia would be ruled by the 
Hohenzollerns. In February 1925, the Staatswehr asked for the complete dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia, a nation which “only upset everyone.” Slovakia would be returned to 
Hungary, while the Czechs would have their own republic that included the city of Prague 
and the surrounding area.542 Therefore, the Staatswehr showed Wolff’s opposition to the 
Anschluss and hostility toward Germany and Czechoslovakia. Also, his unrealistic and 
medieval solution explained his lack of electoral success. Besides the Staatswehr, other 
newspapers of the Wolff-Verband had been the Schwarz-Gelb (“Black-Gold”), Unter dem 
Doppeladler (“Under the Double Eagle”), and Alt-Österreich (“Old Austria”). 
 
V. The Legitimists and the Danube Confederation Option 
The anti-Anschluss legitimists welcomed alternatives to a political union of Austria 
and Germany, such as the Danube Confederation. Legitimist groups, such as the Wolff-
Verband and Reichsbund der Österreicher, supported the various attempts at creating a 
Danube Confederation, or free customs union among the successor states, in 1918 and 1919 
and again in the 1920s. The Österreichische Nachrichten, on February 5, 1925 and April 9, 
1925, had headline titles that asked the question: “Anschluss oder Donauföderation?” 
                                                 
542The Staatswehr proposed that besides Slovakia, Hungary would be given parts of 
Transylvania that had been granted to Romania. Yugoslavia would also be dismembered, 
with a Slovenian and Croatian republic separate from Serbia, because the eastern Serbians 
should not rule over the western Slovenians and Croats. Poland should be reduced in size 
similar to that of Napoleon’s Duchy of Warsaw. Staatswehr, 18 February, 1925. 
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(Anschluss or Danube Confederation?). The newspaper supported the latter over the former. 
According to the Österreichische Nachrichten, if the Danube Confederation plan did not 
work due to opposition from the successor states, then a customs union with only Hungary 
and/or Italy was another solution.543  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Most of the organizations of the highly fragmented 1920s legitimist movement had 
few members and little power. Many disappeared from the political spectrum within only a 
few years.  Nevertheless, the monarchists had sympathizers among prominent Austrian 
leaders, such as Schuschnigg and Cardinal Innitzer. More important, throughout the 1920s, 
legitimists championed an independent Austria. 
Organizationally in disarray and politically weak, the monarchists were nonetheless 
ideologically consistent. Overall, the four main principles that Austrian monarchists stressed 
again and again in the 1920s were anti-republicanism, opposition to the Anschluss, 
Habsburg nostalgia, and anti-socialism. Taken together, these four principles formed a 
logically consistent though electorally unsuccessful political platform.  
First, the legitimists claimed that the First Austrian Republic was illegitimate. They 
called it a “deformed abnormality” (Missgeburt).544 Legitimists said they could not believe 
that the Provisional National Assembly and the “mob” had voted for a republic instead of a 
monarchy, and they blamed the socialists.545 The monarchists were in denial that the 
                                                 
543
 “Anschluss oder Donauföderation.“ Österreichische Nachrichten, 5 February 1925 and 9 
April 1925.  
 
544Staatswehr, 9 January 1920.  
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Austrian Republic represented the "true wishes" of the population, and they believed that it 
was the result of the socialists successfully "misleading" the people. While the Austrian 
government had made November 12 an annual national holiday, legitimists regarded 
November 12, 1918, as a day of shame for Austria.546  
Legitimists contended that the republic was politically and economically weak. They 
called the republic corrupt, unviable, and too small.547 In 1920 monarchists stated that the 
republic had not bettered the political situation.548 The Staatswehr called the Austrian 
republic “foreign” and blamed it for the economic crisis.549  
Legitimists also blamed the republic for moral decay. They said the republic had too 
many civil servants and blamed it for the decline in religion and increased divorce rates and 
alcohol consumption.550 On February 21, 1927, the Staatswehr said that regardless if 
fascism, monarchism, or communism triumphed, the days of the immoral republic were 
                                                                                                                                                      
545Österreichische Nachrichten, 21 April 1923 and 17 November 1923. 
 
546
 Österreichische Nachrichten, 17 November 1923. The newspaper also complained that 
the socialist government had removed imperial coins and paintings of the Kaiser from the 
Volksoper (people’s opera) in Vienna; On May 1, 1924, the Österreichische Nachrichten 
criticized the republic for not supporting World War I war veterans like the US, which had 
enacted the Bonus Bill. 
 
547Staatswehr, 10 January 1919 and 9 January 1920. On June 23, 1923, the Österreichische 
Nachrichten asked if the question, “Had the Republic brought peace?” and the answer was a 
definite, “No.” According to the newspaper, Austria could not defend itself and was an open 
country.  Bandits roamed the streets. The socialists and other parties were armed. The 
militarism of the Monarchy had been replaced by the militarism of the republic. 
 
548Staatswehr, 3 January 1919. 
 
549Staatswehr, 7 January 1921. The article “Monarchie oder Republik“stated that the 
republic’s problems were “endless.“ The republic also caused the increase in the price of 
living. 
 
550Österreichische Nachrichten, 30 June 1923.  
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over.551 The newspaper asserted that the republic was a time of infamy, dishonesty, 
disloyalty, and shamelessness. The republic had been not only financially, but also morally 
bankrupt.552 Monarchists reiterated that the republic was inept, and only a monarchy can 
solve Austria’s problems.553 
Second, the legitimists strongly stressed opposition to a union of Austria and 
Germany.554 The primary reason that monarchists opposed an Anschluss of Austria and 
Germany was that it would end any chance of a Habsburg restoration—which had been their 
number one goal. German monarchists supported a return of the Hohenzollerns, not the 
Habsburgs. Other factors were the perception of Weimar Germany as too democratic and 
allegedly even "socialist run.” At the same time, other monarchists criticized Germany for 
being too Prussian.  
The monarchists did not want a union with the socialist Weimar Republic. The May 
28, 1920, Staatswehr called the Anschluss a “crime.” The newspaper also did not want the 
extension of socialism which would occur in the event of a union with socialist run 
Germany.555 In a choice between an Anschluss and a Danube Confederation, most 
legitimists favored the latter.556  
                                                 
551Staatswehr, 21 February, 1927. The title page headlines read: “Auf zum Kampfe főr die 
Monarchie!“  
 
552Staatswehr, 21 February, 1927. 
 
553
 Staatswehr, 7 June 1924. 
 
554Staatswehr,  25 June 1920.  
 
555
 Staatswehr, 28 May 1920. 
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The monarchists also expressed anti-Prussian sentiment in their rejection of an 
Anschluss. Anti-Prussian sentiment was based on centuries of political rivalry between 
Austria and Prussia, going back to Marie Theresa and Frederick the Great. In an article in 
the March 1925, Österreichische Nachrichten, titled, “An Alle Anschluss Freunde!” (to all 
Anschluss friends)  the newspaper said that it could not understand why people supported 
the Anschluss, which would either lead to Austria becoming a Prussian province or to 
Austria’s end (Österreichs Ende).557 
Third, the legitimists championed the nostalgic imperial past and a Habsburg 
restoration.558 Monarchists contended that Austrians had an “Austrian Fatherland” where 
Franz Joseph had ruled. During the Great War, Austrian soldiers had fought bravely for the 
glory of the Habsburg Empire against superior Allied forces. Soldiers who had sacrificed 
their lives for the dynasty returned to find the Empire vanquished. Upset at the destruction 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, monarchists said “it is up to us to fight for the 
monarchy.”559 To inspire others to do so, they appealed to an idealized image of the 
Habsburg past and proclaimed restoration as a panacea for the future. The Staatswehr in 
May 1920 stated “If the world wants a permanent peace— if people want order and 
tranquility. . . . then the beautiful and happy old Habsburg Empire must be restored.”560 The 
                                                                                                                                                      
556Österreichische Nachrichten, 5 February 1925 and 9 April 1925. The paper strongly 
opposed an Anschluss and the pro-Anschluss policies of the Greater German Party members, 
Dinghofer and Franz. 
 
557Österreichische Nachrichten, 21 March 1925 and 19 November 1925.  
 
558
 Österreichische Nachrichten, 13 May 1926. 
 
559
 Staatswehr,  3 January 1919. 
 
560Staatswehr, 21 May 1920.  The article titled, “Alt-Österreich” praised the former 
monarchy. In the 1920s the paper only appeared one a week. 
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May 1923 Österreichische Nachrichten had an advertisement that stated “Kaiser loyal boys 
and girls! It is your duty to read the only greater Austrian Habsburg loyal youth newspaper, 
Unserer Jugend (Our Youth), and to distribute it among the youth.”561 The legitimist 
newspapers  regularly discussed idealized past and romanticized imperial icons, such as 
Prince Eugen of Savoy, Marie Theresa, and Franz Joseph.562 According to the Staatswehr, 
“In the old monarchy there were Austrians and no Austria; today we may have an Austria, 
but, unfortunately, no more Austrians.”563 The legitimists asked why anyone would oppose a 
monarchy that had ruled for centuries. If Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway were monarchies, then why not Austria? The Austrian legitimists 
wanted the restoration of a monarchy under a legitimate Habsburg ruler.564  
Fourth, legitimists were against socialism. They claimed that the socialists were 
traitors, anti-religious, and tied to the Jews and had divided Austrians in class warfare and 
ruined the economy. The monarchists believed that the socialist government’s power was 
based on foreign rather than popular support. The January 9, 1920, Staatswehr said that the 
socialist government cannot rely on “the bayonets of foreigners” to keep Austria together.565  
                                                 
561
 Österreichische Nachrichten, 19 May 1923. 
 
562Staatswehr, 11, June 1920.  
 
563Staatswehr, 10 May 1926. 
 
564The Österreichische Nachrichten, 3 March 1923, had an article titled, “Fur Recht und 
Ordnung, für die österreichische Idee, für Kaiser und Reich, [wir] kampfen.” The 
monarchists are fighting for the Kaiser; The Österreichische Nachrichten, on 10 March 
1923, also said that people should support monarchism with not just words, but also action; 
the Österreichische Nachrichten, 13 November 1924, had anti-socialist cartoons; 
Altogether, the Österreichische Nachrichten was much more radically anti-socialist than the 
Staatswehr. 
 
565Staatswehr, 9 January 1920. 
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Legitimists criticized the socialists for creating class warfare rather than unifying 
Austrians. The Österreichische Nachrichten asserted that socialist leaders acted like 
“Proletarians in the fight against capitalism.”566 The legitimists regularly used phrases, like 
“red terror”567 and “red hordes”568 to describe the socialists. The legitimists also said that the 
if the choice were between a capitalist world with a class system and a world in which 
classes were equal, then the monarchists would favor the former.569 
 Moreover, monarchists in particular regarded the socialists as atheists.570 Karl Marx 
had called religion the “opium of the masses.” When socialists allegedly handed out anti-
clerical fliers, the Österreichische Nachrichten asked how long Catholics would allow these 
insults from the reds to continue. The newspaper maintained “One cannot be a socialist and 
a Christian at the same time.”571  
In addition, monarchists negatively linked socialists with Jews and criticized the 
socialist government’s policies against the Habsburgs. During the 1920s, the monarchists 
frequently used anti-Semitic statements in attacking the socialists. The Staatswehr stated 
                                                 
566Österreichische Nachrichten, 10 March 1923. This newspaper also asked how long would 
the workers allow themselves to be foolishly led.  
 
567
 The Österreichische Nachrichten, 24 March 1923, criticized the socialists for not giving 
enough money for universities.  
 
568Österreichische Nachrichten, 28 April 1923. This paper called Karl Renner and other 
socialists “red hordes.”  
 
569Österreichische Nachrichten, 7 July 1923.  
 
570Österreichische Nachrichten, 21 April 1923. The newspaper was titled, “Religion ist bei 
der Roten Privat Sache“ (religion is a private matter fort he reds). The Österreichische 
Nachrichten, 23 June 1923, blamed Jews for funding red workers. The Österreichische 
Nachrichten, 6 October, 1923, called socialist Karl Sietz a “substitute Kaiser.“ 
 
571Österreichische Nachrichten, 5 May 1923.  
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“We are living in a time of war profiteers, criminals, fools, traitors, East-European Jews, and  
socialists.”572 Legitimists criticized the socialists for spreading the lie that the monarchy had 
enthusiastically wanted the war, and they opposed the socialist confiscation of Habsburg 
property.573  
The legitimists played a supporting role in preserving the independence of Austria in 
the 1920s. They did not have many members, and they failed politically to achieve their goal 
of a Habsburg restoration— a cause which received neither strong backing in Austria nor 
from other countries in the 1920s. Yet, the legitimists were the fiercest of the Anschluss 
opponents. No Austrian newspapers, not even the Christian Social Reichspost, come out as 
strongly in condemning the Anschluss as the monarchist publications, in particular the 
Staatswehr and the Österreichische Nachrichten: Organ der Monarchisten Österreichs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
572Staatswehr,  28 May 1920.  
 
573Österreichische Nachrichten, 5 May 1923.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
THE ANTI-ANSCHLUSS INDUSTRIES AND INDUSTRIALISTS, 1920-
1929 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
  
Austrian industrialists and the chambers of trade to which they belonged split on the 
Anschluss question during the 1920s. Politically, most industrialists belonged to the 
Christian Social Party, though some supported the Greater German People’s Party and the 
Heimwehr.574 The heavily pro-Anschluss supporters were the Salzburger Chamber of Trade 
secretary Dr. Erich Gebert575 and the Vienna Chamber of Trade, Businesses, and Industry 
(Kammer für Handel, Gewerbe, und Industrie)576 President Friedrich Tilgner.577 In addition 
                                                 
574Most of the workers were socialist, while the industrialists were uniformly anti-Marxist 
whatever their stance on the Anschluss issue. Robert Ehrhart, folder 3, Invoice number 
824.145. Robert Ehrhart Papers. 9 folders. Archiv, Institut für Zeitgeschichte. Vienna, 
University of Vienna.   
 
575
 The Salzburger chamber of commerce secretary, Dr. Erich Gebert, said in the 1920s that 
even if twenty-five percent of the Austrian firms and industries would be lost through 
German competition, this would be balanced out by the fact that the other seventy-five 
percent would be permanently secured. Erich Gebert, “Wirtschaft,“ Die Anschlussfrage in 
ihrer kulturellen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung,  Friedrich F. G. 
Kleinwaechter and Heinz von Paller eds. (Vienna: Wilhelm Braunmüller Universität-
Verlagsbuchandlung, 1930), 520-524.     
 
576
 The Viennese Kammer für Handel, Gewerbe, und Industrie (Vienna Chamber of Trade, 
Business, and Industry) and the Wiener Wirtschaftskammer (Vienna Economic Chamber) 
are terms for the same organization and are used interchangeably. 
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to Tilgner, another outspoken pro-Anschluss advocate within the chambers of trade was 
Hermann Kandl.578 Kandl was a member of the Grossdeutsch Party and a member of the 
Vienna Chamber of Trade who expressed his desire for an Anschluss in the 1920s.579   
However, Gebert, Tilgner, and Kandl did not represent the view of mainstream 
Austrian industries, as most members of the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie 
(main Austrian industrial association) opposed the idea of an Anschluss.580 Within this 
organization,581 the main proponents of Austrian independence were Vice President Robert 
Ehrhart582 and the President Ludwig Urban.583 They were joined by Heinrich Lenhart, a 
leading member of the Vienna Chamber of Trade.584 
                                                                                                                                                      
577
 For a transcript of some of Friedrich Tilgner’s speeches, see Tilgner Folder. Wiener 
Wirtschaftskammer Archiv (WWA). Vienna.  
 
578
 The pro-Anschluss speeches of Hermann Kandl (1872-1932) can be found in Folder 
“Kandl.” WWA; See also, Deutsch österreichische Tageszeitung, 2 December 1928.  
 
579Folder “Kandl.” WWA; Hermann Kandl, “Handel, Handwerk, und Gewerbe,“ Die 
Anschlussfrage. 361. Besides Kandl and Gebert, other pro-Anschluss supporters who 
contributed to this book published during the inter-war period were Bruno von Enderes, 
Ernst Streer Ritter von Streeruwitz, and Dr. Kniesche.  
 
580
 See the Ehrhart Papers; regarding the Chambers of Trade see folder 3, Invoice number 
824.44.1. Ehrhart Papers; Salzburger Kammertages, 3 November 1925. Index number E 
25.759. WWA.  
 
581
 The Hauptverband der Industrie was an organization whose members included Austrian 
businessmen, bankers, and industrialists. The main goal of the Hauptverband der Industrie 
was to rebuild Austrian industry after World War I. The association was anti-socialist. No 
title. 25 January 1932. folder 9. Invoice number 824.299.3. Ehrhart Papers; folder 9. Invoice 
number 824.288. Ehrhart Papers. 
 
582
 Ehrhart, however, sympathized with authoritarian regimes. Ehrhart, folder 3. Invoice 
number 824.53. Ehrhart Papers.  9 folders.   
 
583Although Urban was the President, most of the sources on the Austrian industrial 
association come from Ehrhart’s papers. Urban wrote some letters, but these letters are 
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Economic calculations among industrialists about the desirability of an Anschluss 
were shaped above all by the fact that compared to Germany, Austria was much less 
economically developed and industrialized. Austria lacked a Ruhr valley, Skoda works, and 
a sea port. Except for a few areas within the province of Styria, Austria had few industries. 
Austrian products did not have the world-wide reputation for excellence as the “Made in 
Germany” label.585 Most of Austria’s current industries and resources, like hydro-electricity, 
were still relatively undeveloped in the 1920s.586 
                                                                                                                                                      
included with the Ehrhart papers. In comparison to other anti-Anschluss Austrian 
industrialists and chamber of trade members, the weight of the sources is on Ehrhart.     
 
584Heinrich Lenhart (1875-1952) worked for the Landeskammer Vienna after World War II. 
He had acquired his father’s shoemaker business in Vienna in 1899. In 1920 Lenhart was a 
member of the Vienna Chamber of Trade, chief of the Gewerbesektion, business sector, and 
a delegate of the National Bank. On November 23, 1926, Lenhart received a silver badge of 
honor (Ehrenzeichen) for his services to the First Republic. In 1932 he became Vice 
President of Vienna Chamber of Trade. The İsterreichs Wirtschaft Wochenschrift des 
Gewerbevereins of Lower Austria on November 3, 1932, called Lenhart’s shoe business 
“Firma Lenhart.“ Lenhart Folder. WWA; for a photo and biography of Lenhart see Tagblatt, 
28 November 1930. Lenhart Folder. WWA. 
 
585Ernst Streer Ritter von Streeruwitz, “Die Anschlussfrage als Wirstschaftsproblem,” Die 
Anschlussfrage, 351; Ernst Streer Ritter von Streeruwitz (1874-1952) was pro-Anschluss 
Christian Social Party member. He was a chief member of the main Association of 
Industries (Hauptverband der Industrie) and a chief member of the Viennese Chamber of 
Trade (Handelskammern). He was also head of the Association of the Lower Austrian 
Textile Industry (Niederösterreichischen Textilindustrie), curator of the 
Landeshypothekenanstalt of Lower Austria from 1923 to 1934, Nationalrat member, and 
Austrian Chancellor in 1929 following Ignaz Seipel’s resignation. He was a member of the 
Austrian-German People’s League (Österreichisch-Deutsche Volksbund), a pro-Anschluss 
organization; Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, Robert Kriechbaumer ed., 369; 
See also, Isabella Ackerl, “Ernst Streer Ritter von Streeruwitz: Springflut über İsterreich. 
Erinnerungen, Erlebnisse und Gedanken aus bewegter Zeit 1914-1929,” Die 
İsterreichischen Bundeskanzler, Weissensteiner, ed.  (Vienna, 1937).  
 
586Ehrhart, folder 3, Invoice number 824.145. Ehrhart Papers. 
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In the immediate aftermath of World War I, most Austrian industries had condemned 
the Treaty of St. Germain, which they called the “St. Germain Diktat” (St. Germain 
dictate).587 Many industries saw the territorial losses, reparations, and Anschluss prohibition 
as unacceptable. They also blamed the peace treaty for the economic crisis that impaired 
Austrian businesses. The Vertreter von Industrie und Finanz (Representatives of Industry 
and Finance) had met in Vienna in 1918 and had demanded the revival of Austrian 
businesses.588 Yet, this was easier said than done. Many Austrian businesses had financial 
problems and went bankrupt in the 1920s, such as the Veitscher, an engine industry, which 
collapsed in 1920.589 Thus, especially in the early 1920s when the Austrian economy was 
still in shambles, many Austrian industries supported an Anschluss. 
Those industrialists and industries who favored an Anschluss in the 1920s contended 
that the First Austrian Republic was too small to be economically productive on its own, and 
they saw a union with Germany as their only hope of economic betterment.590 The main 
                                                 
587
 Similar to the Germans who had used to expression “Versailles Diktat,” the Austrians 
despised the peace treaty. No title. folder 7. Invoice number 824.241. Ehrhart Papers. 
 
588
 Protokolle der Christlichsozialen Parteitage, 332. 
 
589
 Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, “Economic Performance and the Micro-Economic Development 
in Austria, 1929-1938,” The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria, 115. 
 
590
 Professor Dr. Karl Drexel to Generalsekretar, 24 August 1928. ÖVP Parteiarchiv. Box 
55, “The Anschluss;“ Drexel was also a member of the Chamber of Trade, Business, and 
Industry. In 1930 he and Hermann Kandl wrote a pro-Anschluss speech presented at the 
meeting of the Chamber of Trade, Business, and Industry. Tilgner and Richard Reidl, two 
other pro-Anschluss supporters within the chambers of trade, were also present. The 
members included various occupations, doctors, lawyers, civil servants, jewelers, tailors, 
and so forth; Hermann Kandl and Drexel, “Jahres Hauptversammlung der Delegation főr 
den ısterreichisch-deutschen Wirtschaftszusammenschluss.“ 12 March 1930. ÖVP 
Parteiarchiv. Box 55, “The Anschluss.“ 
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premise was that the Austrian state was “not viable” (nicht lebensfähig).591 Pro-Anschluss 
businessmen argued that an Anschluss would mean better access for Austrian goods to the 
large German market. Austria’s main trading partner in the 1920s was Germany, followed 
by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Poland.592 In 1929 Austrian exports to 
Germany were valued at two-hundred million schilling, and Austria’s imports from 
Germany at five-hundred million schilling.593 At the same time, through a union with 
Germany, not only would Austrian products have better access to the German market, but 
also German products would have better access to the Austrian market. Austria would 
become the gateway for German manufactured goods to Eastern Europe. Vienna would 
become the Hamburg of the East.594 In addition, pro-Anschluss industrialists believed that 
the stable German currency and German investment would end the economic stagnation of 
Austria. They asserted that Austria should naturally receive money and support from 
Germany, not the Americans and British. An example of German investment in Austria was 
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 Bruno von Enderes,  Die Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Anschlussfrage (Leipzig: 
Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Buchhandlung, 1929), 13, 23, 40. Enderes had been the former 
Austrian undersecretary of commerce (Unterstaatssekretär). He was overall pro-Anschluss. 
The Weltwirtschafts-Instituts (World Economic Institute) in Leipzig invited Enderes to give 
a speech on February 1, 1929. This book is a published version of his speech. The majority 
of his work focuses on pro-Anschluss industries. Enderes contends that despite minor 
disadvantages, an Anschluss was mostly favorable. He said that “the Anschluss cannot be 
stopped, because it is a national necessity.” 
 
592
 No title. 31 December 1926. ÖVP Parteiarchiv. Box 71. “Industry.” 
 
593In 1929 the total of Austrian exports was three-hundred fifty million schilling while the 
total of Austrian imports was seven-hundred million schilling. Ernst Streer Ritter von 
Streeruwitz, “Die Anschlussfrage als Wirstschaftsproblem,” Die Anschlussfrage, 353. 
 
594
 Folder 2545.  WWA.  
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the German Preussenkasse, which furnished three-fifths of the total capital of the Austrian 
Postsparkasse in 1925.595 
On the other hand, many Austrian industrialists were anti-Anschluss because they 
feared German competition, argued that Austria was self-sufficient, and were concerned 
about losing ties with East Central Europe. The anti-Anschluss industrialists, together with 
the Christian Social Party government, and the Americans and British, contended that 
Austria was indeed economically viable, lebensfähig,596 by stressing Austria economic 
strengths, which were its natural resources of iron, oil, magnesium, wood, and water. 
Austrian banks held large gold reserves in the 1920s. In addition, Austria was twice the size 
of Switzerland, which was also landlocked, but nonetheless a rich, stable, and productive 
country. The proponents of an independent Austria contended that if Switzerland could 
prosper economically, then so could Austria.597  
Moreover, industries, banks, and companies in Austria worried that an Anschluss 
with Germany would break their ties with the Habsburg successor states, with which the 
Austrian businesses had invested the most money prior to World War I.  For example, 
before World War I, most of the Austrian-held coal mines had been in territories of post-war 
Czechoslovakia, not Germany, and Austrian banks had capital in Hungary.598 However, 
many of these investments and holdings did not survive the breakup of the Habsburg 
                                                 
595Kandl, “Handel, Handwerk, und Gewerbe,“ Die Anschlussfrage, 398; Folder “Kandl.” 
WWA.  
 
596
 Folder 8. 13 January 1931. Invoice number 824.266. Ehrhart Papers. 
 
597
 Österreichische Nachrichten: Organ der Monarchisten Österreichs, 21 March 1925.  
 
598Report by Sir George Clerk, 29 November 1919. BDFA: The Paris Peace Conference of 
1919. 10:35.  
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Empire. Opponents of a union with Germany also discussed the practicality of closer 
Adriatic ports to the south over more distant German ports to the north for Austrian 
export.599   
Furthermore, many Austrian industrialists were concerned that they could not 
compete with German industries. Austrian automobile, textile, chemical, electrical, and 
wood industries worried that they would be over-run with cheaper German products. In 
particular the owners of small and medium sized Austrian businesses contended that they 
would be destroyed in the event of an Anschluss of Austria and Germany. 
The industries of Austria suffered from the rampant economic crises in the early and 
late 1920s. The period from 1923 to 1929, however, marked a period of dramatic economic 
recovery with the aid of American and British loans, which overall most Austrian 
industrialists favored.600 However, foreign intervention came at a price; Austrian finances 
had been placed under the control of the League of Nations for several years, and the loans 
caused minor inflation.601  
 
II. Historiography 
Many historians of Austrian history have dealt with the economy, industry, and the 
Anschluss. The main question that economic historians, such as Jürgen Nautz, Franz Mathis, 
and Hermann Kuprian raise, is the degree to which economic factors motivated pro-
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 Staatswehr, 28 May 1920. 
 
600
 Unnamed newspaper. 28 February 1928. ÖVP Parteiarchiv. Box 71. “Industry.“; Robert 
Ehrhart, “Die Sanierung İsterreichs,“ (The Revitalization of Austria), 24 August 1932, 
folder 1. Invoice number 824.9. Ehrhart Papers. 
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 Ehrhart, no title, May 1933. folder 1. Ehrhart Papers. Although written in the 1930s, it 
discussed the 1920s.  
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Anschluss sentiment. In addition, Peter Fischer has studied the goals and motivations of the 
pro-Anschluss chambers of trade. Concerning motivations for the Anschluss, Jürgen Nautz 
argues that the predominant theme of the Anschluss question was the economic viability of 
Austria.602 According to Nautz, the supporters of a union with Germany were more heavily 
influenced by economic than by German nationalistic considerations.603   
Hermann Kuprian contends that even though there was a prevailing hope of 
economic betterment through a union, the Anschluss desire among industrialists and general 
population in Tyrol from 1918 to 1921 was more strongly motivated by national and 
emotional factors, such as deep concerns over the ”Allies,” than by economic factors.604 
Franz Mathis focuses on the complexity and mixed nature of motives of those in favor of 
Anschluss. According to Mathis, one cannot talk of a single opinion concerning the interests 
of Austrian industry.  However, there was certainly an idea prevalent in the inter-war era 
that through a union with Germany Austria’s economic condition would be greatly 
improved. He too argues that while Austrian industry and chambers of commerce stressed 
both the economic and national benefits of a union, ultimately national factors 
predominated.605 For example, according to Mathis, the finance advisor of Klagenfurt, 
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 Nautz, “Die österreichische Wirtschaft und die Anschlußfrage” Tirol Und der Anschluss. 
389, 391, 392, 395-397. 
 
603
 Nautz, “Die österreichische Wirtschaft und die Anschlußfrage,” 398. 
 
604
 For example, according to Kuprian, on December 1, 1918, the Tyrolean Volksverien had 
demanded a whole Tyrol, a free Tyrol, and a self-governing Tyrol, which included the 
region of South Tyrol that the Italians had seized. Kuprian also discusses the growing 
tensions between the central government in Vienna and the local government in Innsbruck. 
Hermann Kuprian, “Tirol und die Anschlußfrage 1918 bis 1921,” Tirol Und der Anschluss, 
45, 48, 51.   
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Freidrich Kleinwächter, held that the Anschluss would be the right economic and political 
solution to Europe’s German problem. Mathis says that the Salzburger chamber of 
commerce stated that any disadvantages of union, such as increased German competition, 
would be set aside by the advantages of a national community. In addition, Mathis states that 
a professor at the university in Innsbruck, Adolf Günther, said that for himself the Anschluss 
question was above all else a matter of political and “völkisch” as opposed to economic 
concern. Similar to Kuprian, Mathis concludes that overall pro-Anschluss sentiment was 
more nationally and politically than economically motivated.606 
Peter Fischer analyzes the pro-Anschluss aspirations of the Austrian chambers of 
trade (Handelskammern) and the methods that the chambers used to convey their views. Yet, 
he concludes that overall the chambers of trade were “passive” toward the Anschluss.607 
However, his work focusing on the Austrian supporters of a union with Germany neither 
emphasizes the role of Heinrich Lenhart of the Vienna Chamber of Trade, nor investigates 
the Hauptverband der Industrie whose members, in particular Robert Ehrhart and Ludwig 
Urban, came out strongly against the Anschluss. The four authors emphasize domestic 
                                                                                                                                                      
605
 Franz Mathis, “Wirtschaft oder Politik? Zu Den ‘Wirtschaftlichen’ Motiven Einer 
Politischen Vereinigung Zwischen 1918 und 1938,” Ungleiche Partner? 428-429. Mathis 
also discusses Norbert Schausberger who in his book Rüstung in Österreich 1938-1945 
(1970) maintained that the inter-war idea that Austria could only exist as part of a greater 
economic sphere was “a psychologically clever launched fairy-tale” by the pro-Anschluss 
supporters.  Although Mathis comments on how Austria was able to make it on its own after 
World War II, even he recognizes that Schausberger’s statement was a rather extreme 
opposing view, and many voices contend the contrary. 
 
606Mathis, “Wirtschaft oder Politik?“ 431-434, 438-439. 
 
607Peter G. Fischer, “Die İsterreichische Handelskammern und der Anschluss an 
Deutschland,“ Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte, Hintergrőnde, und Folgen.“ 
Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 10. und 11. June 1976 (Munich: Verlag für 
Geschichte und Politik, 1977), 299-300. 
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affairs and pro-Anschluss supporters within industries. This chapter emphasizes the 
industrial opponents of an Anschluss who supported the American and British diplomatic 
position in Austria.   
 
 III. Robert Ehrhart  
A key anti-Anschluss figure among the industrialists, who opposed the reaction of 
Kandl and Tilger to Austria’s post-war economic crisis, was Robert von Ehrhart.608 
Ehrhart’s views on the First Republic, Anschluss, monarchism, and Austrian nationalism 
were similar to those of Ignaz Seipel and Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg. Like 
Starhemberg, Ehrhart came from an Austrian noble family whose roots could be traced back 
for centuries. His family originated in the Ortenau region in Tyrol.609 Robert Freiherr von 
Ehrhart was born in Innsbruck on September 12, 1870. Because he had been raised in the 
old Empire and had come from an old aristocratic family that had loyally served the 
Habsburgs, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 shocked Ehrhart. Like so 
many others, he considered the treaty settlement a Diktatfrieden (“dictated peace”).610 
According to Ehrhart, the state of Austrian industry immediately after World War I was 
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“hopeless,” as state capital had “disappeared,” and resources had disintegrated.611 Despite 
his aristocratic background, his views on the peace treaty, and his statement concerning the 
dire economic situation, Ehrhart pledged his loyalty and service to the new Austrian 
Republic.612      
Ehrhart’s political opinions were similar to Starhemberg’s and Seipel’s. Ehrhart was 
a member of the Christian Social Party. He sympathized with monarchism, but restoring the 
Habsburgs was not one of his main objectives during the 1920s. In addition, he had little 
faith in democracy and believed that an authoritarian government was best for Austria.613 
Thus, he fully sympathized with Seipel’s growing reservations about parliamentary 
government in the 1920s. 
Moreover, Ehrhart was a staunch Austrian patriot. He embraced Austrian 
nationalism over German nationalism, and he sought to preserve the independence of 
Austria. Instead of calling for an Anschluss, he favored alternatives like the Danube 
Confederation. Ehrhart supported Seipel’s domestic and foreign polices, which befriended 
the Americans and British. In the 1920s he remained loyal to the Austrian government, and 
he fiercely opposed the socialists and the Greater German People’s Party that wanted to 
undermine the First Austrian Republic.614 During the 1920s, Ehrhart’s Austrian nationalism 
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and opposition to union with Germany shaped his role as Vice President of the Austrian 
Hauptverband der Industrie (main industrial association). He and President Ludwig Urban, 
who had a close relationship with Austrian industrialists, turned the industrial association 
into an overall anti-Anschluss organization.615  
Ehrhart also supported economic recovery through cooperation with the League of 
Nations, one condition of which was the Anschluss prohibition. In 1921 Ehrhart mildly 
criticized a report from the Finance Committee of League of Nations that told the Austrian 
government that it needed to build its sources of food and supplies. However, it did not say 
how to go about relieving the problem. Ehrhart said “we could have told ourselves that.”616 
The state and the people have to be in the condition to be able to buy food first.617 Despite 
such minor criticism, overall, Ehrhart welcomed the League of Nations plans in Austria. In 
1921 Ehrhart opposed a socialist financial plan where Austria would secure foreign loans 
but without using the League of Nations. He said the plan was based on “naïve 
presumptions,” and it would not achieve its purpose. Ehrhart stated that Austria was 
dependent on the League of Nations for credit.618 Ultimately, although the League of 
Nations control of Austrian finances in the early 1920s brought about some adversities, such 
as inflation and weakened export market, he contended that the loans had predominantly 
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positive effects on Austria.619 In 1922 Ehrhart reiterated that Austria needed “Allied credit,” 
and the Chamber of Trade, Business, and Industry in Vienna and many of the industrial 
corporations that it represented stated that Austria could and should be rebuilt with the help 
of foreign loans.620 Thus, Ehrhart was one of many voices representing the views of 
Austrian industries, industrialists, and chamber of trade members, but he was one of the 
leading anti-Anschluss proponents. Ehrhart’s legacy was that he paved the way for industrial 
opposition to Anschluss, in contrast to the initial reactions of many industrialists to defeat 
and collapse.621 
 
IV. The Anti-Anschluss Industries  
Many members of Vice President Ehrharts’s and President Urban’s Hauptverband 
der Industrie were owners and managers of anti-Anschluss industries.622 Many Austrian 
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businesses and industries feared German competition in the event of an Anschluss during the 
1920s.623 These Austrian industries worried that they would be forced to shut down during a 
merger with Europe’s strongest economical heavy-weight, Germany. Austrian industries 
resented the prospect of becoming an inferior partner (“Minderwertigkeit des 
österreichischen Partners”).624 Other concerns of Austrian industries were reparations, 
taxes, interest rates, “Deutsche (German) Dumping,” tariffs, and higher costs in production 
and transportation. The reparation issue distressed many Austrian industries. By the late 
1920s, Austria no longer paid reparations, while Germany paid reparations until the early 
1930s. Austrian businesses did not want to resume paying reparations in the event of a union 
with Germany.625 Also, some anti-Anschluss Austrian industries argued that a union with 
Germany would bring about higher taxes, higher interest rates, and higher train fares, more 
regulations, and increased raw material prices.626 Moreover, Austrian industries complained 
of “German dumping” during the inter-war period. “German dumping” allegedly involved 
Germany sending manufactured goods to sell in Austria at very low profit margin or even 
below production cost. The German manufactured items sold in Austria were even cheaper 
than in Germany itself. Germans had to pay more for the products to offset the lower prices 
offered to Austrians. This was all done with the intent to smash rival Austrian industries.627 
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Thus, “German dumping” represented harsh German business tactics that would only 
worsen during an Anschluss. As long as it was independent, Austria could regulate the influx 
of foreign goods. Indeed, many industries wanted the Austrian government to protect them 
with higher tariffs. 
The Austrian industries that were the most vocal in their opposition to a union with 
Germany during the 1920s were the electrical, paper, chemical, printing, and automobile 
companies. Austrian electric companies (İsterreichische Siemens Schuckert Werke, 
Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) Union Austria, İsterreichische Brown-Boveri 
Werke AG628and the Aktiengesellschaft főr elektrische Industrie (ELIN))629 feared a 
tremendous loss of capital, workers, and jobs because of an Anschluss.630 Although AEG and 
Siemens were German owned companies, 631 their Austrian counterparts were independent 
and rivals of the German companies. Another foreign competitor in the Austrian and East 
Central European market was the American General Electric (GE).632  
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In addition, Austria had a lucrative automobile industry during the 1920s that 
competed with German-made cars. Austrian car makers included Puchwerke AG,633 Steyr 
Werke AG,634 Austro-Daimler AG, Vienna Automobilfabrik AG Gräf & Stift,635 
Österreichische Saurer-Werke AG,636 A Fross-Bässing Kommandantgesellschaft, 
Österreichische Automobilfabrik AG (İAF),637 Austrian Fiat,638 and Automobilfabrik Perl 
AG.639 Of these, the most important car maker was Austro-Daimler. Eduard Bierenz, a 
friend of the German industrialist Gottlieb Daimler,640 and an Austrian-Jewish industrialist 
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Eduard Fischer641 founded the Austro-Daimler Company on August 11, 1899. The company 
was based in Wiener Neustadt in Lower Austria, and, besides cars, it produced motors for 
buses, trucks, ships, trains, airplanes, and Zeppelins. In 1909 the Austrian engineer 
Ferdinand Porsche,642 who had succeeded first Gottlieb Daimler and then his son Paul as the 
head of the company, granted Austro-Daimler independence from its German parent 
company. Austro-Daimler, whose symbol was the Austrian imperial double headed eagle, 
designed its own cars, and it was a competitor of its German counterpart.643 Besides 
Daimler, other German rivals during the 1920s were Opel, Audi, and BMW. Austrian cars 
could not be made as productively or as cheaply as the cars from the top automobile 
exporting countries, like Germany.644 Small Austrian companies manufacturing cars did not 
enjoy the economies of scale that the large German companies did.  
Furthermore, the Austrian paper, chemical, and printing businesses were against an 
Anschluss. The paper industry feared a loss because the German demand for Austrian wood 
would drive up the price of this vital raw material. The Austrian chemical industries, which 
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could not compete with their main German counterpart I. G. Farben, included the 
Pulverfabrik Skoda-Wetzlar AG that made mineral acid, phosphorus, sulfur, and 
hydrochloric acid,645 the Carbidwerk Deutsch-Matrei AG that made chlorine, alkaline, 
electrolytes, and carbide; the Chemische Fabrik Weissenstein646 that produced ether, potash, 
nitrogen, hydrogen, hydrogen-peroxide, and vinegar; and Solvay-Werke.647 In addition, 
Austrian chemical industries produced hygiene materials, perfumes, laundry detergent and 
other cleaning materials.648 The Austrian printing industries likewise feared disadvantages 
resulting from stiff German competition.649  
The anti-Anschluss Austrian industries felt that they would be strangled by the 
colossal German industries, and they hoped that Austrian economy would be able to stand 
on its own. In general, Austria industries could not compete in those areas where German 
industries were the strongest. Yet, many Austrian businesses, like the piano manufacturers, 
argued that any disadvantages due to increased competition would be offset by the access to 
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a much larger market.650 Also, the Alpine Montangesellschaft, which was an iron and steel 
factory in Styia, favored an Anschluss, but only after it had been bought by a German 
industrialist Hugo Stinnes.651 Yet, a German takeover was exactly what many Austrian 
industries feared. The Austrian automobile, electric, and chemical industries were extremely 
vulnerable and opposed to German competition because Germany was one of the world’s 
largest producers of cars, chemicals, and electric appliances. Even with the economic 
recovery in the mid- and late 1920s, these Austrian industries continued to fear German 
competition. 
 
V. Industries and industrialists in the mid- and late 1920s 
In the mid- and late 1920s the United States and Great Britain sent many loans 
directly to Austrian industries, businesses, banks, and utilities. The United States allocated 
about $16.4 million in loans to Austrian businesses, such as the Austrian electric company, 
Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft Union Austria (AEG),652 the Tyrol Hydro-Electric 
Power Company,653 the Lower Austrian Hydro-Electric Power, and the Alpine Mountain 
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Steel Corporation. Nevertheless, Austrian industries and chambers of trade were divided on 
the Anschluss question during the mid- and late 1920s. Many members of the chambers of 
trade, such as Hermann Kandl and Friedrich Tilgner, were strong advocates of an Anschluss. 
On the other hand, many Austrian industries, like the car industry, and members of the 
chambers of trade, like Heinrich Lenhart, spoke out against an Anschluss. In the mid- an late 
1920s the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie (main Austrian industrial 
association), in particular its President Ludwig Urban and Vice President Robert Ehrhart, 
continued to cooperate with the League of Nations in order to achieve their goal of re-
building Austrian industry and saving the nation.654 Throughout the 1920s the anti-
Anschluss proponents of the Austrian industry and economy remained vigilant and 
ultimately succeeded.   
Contrary to the early 1920s, the mid- and late 1920s was a time of economic 
prosperity, which lessened the Anschluss desire of many industries. Ehrhart asserted that 
American and British loans in the late-1920s had replaced the shortage of credit during the 
inflationary period and led to a balanced budget.655 Due to American and British loans, from 
1923 to 1929 the Austrian gross domestic product, GDP, increased from 8.5 million 
Austrian schilling to 11.3 million schilling. Unemployment dropped from 111,376 in 1923 
to 91,150 in 1924.656 In particular, the Austrian electrical, automobile, chemical, and heavy 
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industries had recovered and reported massive gains by 1926. For example, in 1926 the 
number of cars produced in Austria was 5,300, but by 1929 had increased to 9,100.657 A 
report listing the profits of Austrian industries further indicates economic improvement in 
the late 1920s. In 1920 few Austrian businesses had profits. However, in 1928, 540 Austrian 
industries reported an equity capital of 610 million schilling, while 381 Austrian industries 
reported a net profit of 67 million schilling.658 In addition, due to American and British 
loans, the Austrian chemical and heavy industries’ profits rose about forty-five percent from 
1922 to 1928.659 
Because most Austrian industries had recovered in the mid- and late 1920s, the 
industries’ desire for an Anschluss greatly lessened. Some Austrian industries, like the 
chemical, electric, and automobile companies, had already been against an Anschluss during 
a time of economic crisis of the early 1920s because they feared German competition. The 
economic recovery in the mid- and late 1920s strengthened the Anschluss opposition of 
many Austrian industries. Austrian industries were doing well, and they did not need a union 
with Germany to become productive. The economic betterment proved that Austrian 
industries were viable on their own. Realizing that most of the economic revitalization in the 
late 1920s was primarily due to American and British loans, some Austrian industries also 
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worried about the loss of international financial aid in the event of an Anschluss with 
Germany.  
Regardless of the economic recovery and some lessening of the Anschluss 
movement, overall, Austrian industrialists and members of the chambers of trade still 
remained divided on the Anschluss question in the mid- and late 1920s. In 1924 the Vienna 
Chamber of Trade, Business, and Industry, whose members had about ten thousand 
employees,660 regularly held Kammertag (chamber meetings) and Präsidialkonferenz 
meetings.661 On October 29, 1924, the Präsidialkonferenz and the Viennese Kammertag 
favored working together with the American Chamber of Commerce.662 But one year later, 
at the Kammertag on November 4, 1925, Hermann Kandl rejected American aid and argued 
that only an economic and political union with Germany would solve the entire German 
problem.663 Besides Kandl, Haagen and Vinzl from the Vienna Chamber of Trade and the 
Vice President of the Graz Chamber of Trade, Dr. Hans Pengg, were also pro-Anschluss. 
Nevertheless, Kandl and his followers represented the minority opinion at the November 
1925 Kammertag concerning the Anschluss. Lenhart, Hinterschweiger, and Prettenhofer 
were staunchly anti-Anschluss.664 Moreover, many of the other members of the chambers of 
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trade discussed other critical issues,665 like health insurance for workers, old age pensions, 
unemployment, and a possible gold standard, instead of a union with Germany. Therefore, at 
the 1925 chamber meeting many members avoided the divisive Anschluss issue 
altogether.666  
 In the mid- and late 1920s, the pro-Anschluss voices among Austrian industries and 
chambers of trade argued that Austria had not recovered and it still needed Germany.  In 
1926 Friedrich Tilgner, an Anschluss supporter, became President of the Viennese Chamber 
of Trade. Tilgner and Richard Riedl,667 another leading member of the Viennese Chamber of 
Trade, met with the Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages (DIHT) in April and May 1926 
in order to prepare for the Anschluss of Austria and Germany.668 In 1927 the Austrian 
Verband der ısterreichischen Kaufmannschaft (Association of Austrian Business Groups) 
also voiced its position in favor of a union with Germany.669 The participants of the January 
1928 meeting of the Chamber of Trade included the Nationalrat Vice President Ernst Streer 
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Ritter von Streeruwitz,670 the industrialist Lorenz Rhomberg, Tilgner, Kandl, Dr. Erich 
Gebert, and the bank director Dr. Paul Hammerschlag. Once again Riedl and Tilgner 
demanded an Anschluss.671 However, during that meeting and a subsequent one in Carinthia 
on the April 21, 1928, Ehrhart continued to reject the Anschluss.672   
Despite of the pro-Anschluss side’s fervent demands, a union of Germany and 
Austria did not occur in the 1920s because of major opposition. They remained noisy 
advocates, but Chancellor Ignaz Siepel retained the power to determine many of Austria’s 
economic policies in the 1920s. The Austrian National Bank director and Finance Minister 
in the 1920s under Chancellor Seipel, Viktor Kienbıck, welcomed American and British 
loans and opposed a union with Germany.673 Many members of the Austrian chambers of 
trade, such as Lenhart and Prettenhofer, opposed a union with Germany throughout the 
1902s. Many members of the Viennese Chamber of Trade, Business, and Industry also 
expressed doubts about the enlargement of the economic zone in 1925.674 Many Austrian 
industries, like the chemical and automobile, supported the Seipel government and its 
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policies of Austrian independence and reliance on foreign credit.675 Additionally, in the late 
1920s, the British Sir William M. Acworth stated that many Austrian industries “worked 
tirelessly” to make Austria a viable nation.676  
Furthermore, Urban, Ehrhart, and the Hauptverband der Industrie also supported 
Seipel’s policies that included currency reform, loans, and the Geneva Protocol.677 The 
Hauptverband der Industries contended that from 1925 to 1929 an “enormous amount” 
(ungeheuere Mengen) of public and private foreign credit poured into Austria.678 The 
Hauptverband der Industries estimated the amount of foreign money that Austria received 
to be three-hundred million schilling a year. Despite fears of too much credit, the Austrian 
economy was relatively stable.679 Speaking on behalf of Austrian independence in 1927, 
Ehrhart asked how will Austria continue to get better if some of its own people did not 
support it? Ehrhart attempted to raise Austrian patriotism.680 The problem that Austrian 
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popular support for the First Republic remained tied to the state of the Austrian economy 
continued to haunt the country. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Austrian industries and industrialists were split on the Anschluss question in the 
1920s. The Salzburger Chamber of Trade Secretary Erich Gebert and the Viennese Chamber 
of Trade members Friedrich Tilgner and Hermann Kandl were adamantly pro-Anschluss.681 
Tilgner, Kandl, and Gebert called for an Anschluss which was necessary for the survival of 
Austria.682 Yet, the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie, especially Vice President 
Robert Ehrhart and President Ludwig Urban, and Heinrich Lenhart from the Chamber of 
Trade embraced Austrian independence and foreign loans. In addition, many industries in 
Austria feared German competition, and the Austrian government had protected them with 
high tariffs. In particular, the Austrian chemical and electric industries were anti-
Anschluss.683  
In order to help rebuild Austrian industries, the United States and Britain sent many 
loans in the 1920s. Overall, most Austrian industries welcomed international loans.684 
Thanks to loans the Austrian industries had recovered greatly in the late 1920s. During this 
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time period, the anti-Anschluss industries, together with the Christian Social Party 
government, and the Americans and British, had proven that Austria was economically 
viable, lebensfähig.685 Austria was a country rich in mineral and water resources. Similar to 
Switzerland, Austria had become prosperous and seemingly stable on the eve of the 
depression and subsequent Nazi threat.  
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PART III: INCREASING CRISIS 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
THE DOLLAR AND POUND DIPLOMACY DURING THE 
DEPRESSION AND THE DOLLFUSS ERA, 1930-1934 
 
 
I. Introduction 
   
“No one of us who watches the situation in Europe . . . can doubt the future of Austria is 
intimately bound up with the prospects of peace or war in Europe, and that it will be a 
mistake to allow anyone to suppose that the British government could view with 
indifference an attack on that integrity and independence.”686 (Sir Austin Chamberlain). 
 
This chapter focuses on American and British economic, financial, political, and 
cultural ties with Austria from 1930 to 1934. This chapter ends with the assassination of 
Engelbert Dollfuss in 1934.687 During this time period, Britain and the United States 
continued their economic aid and their policy of maintaining Austrian independence that had 
begun immediately after World War I. President Herbert Hoover’s economic policies 
included the moratorium of 1931 and US participation in several international loans to 
Austria, including the Lausanne loan in 1932. Franklin D. Roosevelt renewed American 
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economic aid and support of Austrian independence even during a huge crisis—the Nazi 
coup attempt of 1934. Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald continued Britain’s pound 
diplomacy to Austria. As in the 1920s, neither Britain nor the United states advocated 
military intervention in Austrian affairs in the period 1930 to 1934.  
 During this same period cultural interactions continued between Austria, Britain, and 
the United States through the exchange of individuals and art and the activities of 
international groups. For example, an Austrian art exhibit took place in New York in 1930, 
and the American novelist Sinclair Lewis spent some time in Austria in the early 1930s. In 
addition, pro-Austrian groups, like the Anglo-Austrian Society and the Austro-American 
Institute of Education, held regular meetings in London, Vienna, and New York. 
In addition, both the United States and Great Britain had political and financial 
interests in an independent Austria during the period 1930 to 1934. They feared that an end 
of Austrian independence would not only compromise the European balance of power but 
also mean the loss of millions of dollars that they had invested in Austria. Thus, Britain and 
the United States opposed an Anschluss. However, unlike other European countries, they 
were reluctantly willing to concede Anschluss provided that three conditions were met. First, 
the union required the consent of an international body. Second, the union would have to 
come about peacefully. Third, the union would have to have the consent of the majority of 
the Austrian and German populace. Yet, because of the fierce Anschluss opposition of 
France, Italy, and the Habsburg successor states, the first condition was virtually impossible 
to fulfill during this time period.   
In the early 1930s uncertainty over the fate of Austria returned because of the global 
depression and collapse of the Viennese Bank, the Creditanstalt. In 1931 Austria requested a 
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customs union with Germany, which the majority of Austrians supported. Perceiving the 
customs union as a step towards an actual Anschluss, both Great Britain and the United 
States would not allow it without approval from the League of Nations. When the 
International Court prohibited the customs union, Britain and the United States encouraged 
other options. The Danube Confederation plan had never gotten off the drawing board in 
1918-1919 and the 1920s, but a variation of it reappeared in 1932, which Great Britain, the 
United States, France, and other countries promoted. 
 Similar to the 1920s, the United States and Great Britain sent money to maintain 
Austrian independence in the 1930s. Ultimately, due to the Great Depression, they could no 
longer continue to send massive loans to Austria in the same extent as earlier. Many 
American banks cancelled their credits to Austria. Also, unlike the 1920s, Austria received 
little philanthropy.688 Nonetheless, even though the Great Depression diminished foreign 
loans to Austria in the 1930s, neither American nor British loans ceased entirely.   
Despite the Great Depression, in the time period from 1930 to 1934, the Washington 
Post stated that the United States was still the biggest creditor nation followed by Great 
Britain.689 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, RFC, continued sending loans to 
countries in need, which included Austria, during Hoover’s administration.690 Some private 
American investors, in particular bankers and companies, also continued to send loans to 
Austria. US loans to Austria, which were mostly paid by private investors, were about $100 
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million from 1930 to 1934.691 Great Britain sent “relief” loans totaling 44,232,000 pounds 
from 1930 to 1934.692 Both Britain and the United States participated in an important 1932 
League of Nations loan. Yet, during the 1930s, foreign loans to Austria came with a degree 
of uncertainty. Each year in the 1930s Austria had to ponder whether Great Britain and the 
United States would continue to send loans or if their funds would run dry because of the 
severity of the Great Depression. 
 Furthermore, the Americans and British had to contend with Nazi Germany, which 
was aggressively challenging the very existence of the First Austrian Republic and had been 
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instigating a wave of terrorism there since the early 1930s. Despite their past openness to the 
Anschluss question, after 1933 the United States and Britain strongly disapproved of an 
Anschluss with Nazi Germany because this would come about neither peacefully nor with 
the consent of the other European countries. Most Austrians at least temporarily ended their 
support for Anschluss as well. Because the American and British commitment to Austria did 
not go beyond uncertain and declining financial aid and verbal diplomatic support, Austria 
also turned toward fascist Italy in its struggle against Nazi Germany. By granting financial 
assistance to Austria to bolster its economy and exercising limited diplomatic pressure, 
British and American foreign policies helped to maintain Austria’s independence in the time 
period from 1930 to 1934, during the worst years of the Great Depression. 
 
II. American and British Perceptions of Austria and Cultural Exchanges 1930-1934 
 The Americans and British continued to admire Austrian culture in the early 1930s. 
However, many American and British politicians, diplomats, and bankers also saw Austria 
in a state of renewed political and economic crisis because of the Great Depression. The 
United States and Great Britain felt they had to protect their financial and political interests 
in Austria. Americans and Britons had seen the old Habsburg Empire as autocratic and 
supported Austrian democracy.  Now once again the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes 
were undemocratic. Yet, by the early 1930s Nazism represented the ultimate evil, and, 
therefore, American and British people were sympathetic to the plight of Austria and 
reluctantly tolerant of its authoritarian turn.693   
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American and British cultural stereotypes of 1920s, such as Lederhosen-wearing and 
Wiener Schnitzel-eating Austrians, were still intact during the 1930s. In early 1930 the 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) did an “international good-will series” on various 
countries in order to inform an audience of about twenty million Americans and Canadians 
of different cultures. Each program lasted thirty minutes, which included fifteen minutes of 
music and fifteen minutes for the ambassador to speak about his country. On February 18, 
1930, Harry C. Butcher, the director of the Washington diplomatic corps who was 
organizing the radio broadcast, informed the Austrian ambassador to the United States, 
Edgar Prochnik, that he wanted to include Austria and said this “would be one of the 
greatest good-will projects you could undertake for Austria.”694 
In March 1930 Austria agreed to the CBS radio program. Prochnik chose Hadyn, 
Mozart, Schubert, and Strauss to showcase Austrian music. In the radio broadcast Prochnik 
discussed Austrian history and culture. He said that Austria was the heir to the Habsburg 
Dynasty, and that it had a great music tradition, as well as many mountains and lakes.695 
Once again Austria was basically represented to Americans as a country of great culture and 
beautiful scenery.    
 Moreover, cultural ties between Austria and the Americans and British were 
significant. Similar to the 1920s, cultural exchanges in the early and mid-1930s 
predominated through international organizations and through the exchange of people and 
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art. The Anglo-Austrian Society’s membership grew in the 1930s and included Sir William 
Henry Beveridge, Lord Robert Cecil, Sir Frederick Lewis,696 the banker Montagu Norman, 
the Duchess of Portland, the Archbishop of York, and the Reverend Dean of Windsor. The 
Austrian ambassador to Britain Baron Georg Franckenstein was the vice chairman of the 
group.697 The London Rotarians thanked the Austrian Rotarians for their warm welcome in 
November 1931 in Vienna. Newspapers from around the world covered the event. That 
same month the London-Salzburg Society formed and met in London. These successful 
societal and club meetings were “positive propaganda” for Austria.698 
In December 1931 the Austro-American Institute of Education in New York, whose 
members included Ambassador Prochnik, American Secretary of State Gilchrist B. 
Stockton, and former Austrian President Michael Hainisch, made plans to commemorate the 
two-hundredth anniversary of George Washington’s birth on February 22, 1932.699 On 
February 5, 1932, Prochnik presented President Hoover with a gift from the Austrian people 
to the American people. The gift was a porcelain statue of George Washington riding on a 
horse. The Austrian sculptor Doebrich and the Austrian Augarten porcelain manufacturer 
created the statue. The statue’s inscription read, “1732 – Austria to the United States of 
America, With Friendship, Esteem, and Admiration – 1932.” It also had a coat of arms 
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representing the Austrian provinces.700 Also, in order to honor Washington, Austrian 
President Wilhelm Miklas attended the opening of a new residential area on May 26, 1932, 
called “George Washington-Hof” in the Wienerberg, which is in the tenth district 
(Favoriten) of Vienna.701 By honoring Washington, Austria showed its gratitude to the 
United States and the American people, as well as its admiration of American culture. The 
Austrians showed their generosity to Britain, too. In April 1932 Franckenstein had presented 
Princess Elizabeth, the future Queen of England, with an Augarten porcelain.702 
In addition, there was an exchange of Austrian music, art, and theater in the early 
and mid-1930s. In early 1930 the International Exposition of Modern Art, which the College 
of Art Association organized, had a meeting in New York about Austria. Surprisingly, more 
Americans attended the Austrian meeting than the German and French ones that had been 
held earlier. At the meeting the speaker talked about how many Americans had made 
Austria their second home, including the author Sinclair Lewis, who had a house in the 
Semmering ninety kilometers from Vienna. Several Austrians also attended, like Professor 
Leo Katz who specialized in modern art, science Professor Adolf Lorenz, and Madame 
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Elisabeth Schumann, who was part of the Vienna State Opera.703 The art exposition 
exemplified American appreciation of Austrian art.  
In November 1930 an Austrian art exhibit was held in New York. Thirty-four 
modern Austrian painters, including Gustav Klimt,704 Egon Schiele,705 Oskar Laske, Franz 
Sedlacek, and Ludwig Ferdinand Graf, were part of the exhibit.706 The Austrian pictures and 
paintings allowed Americans to familiarize themselves with Austria and its culture. 
In June 1931 Mina Schmidt, who was the head of the Costume Workshop at the 
University of Chicago, wanted to honor “Universal Motherhood and Sisterhood” by creating 
female dolls that were dressed in their historic attire. She wished to commemorate women 
from the past and inspire present-day women. Schmidt requested that Prochnik send pictures 
and biographies of ten famous Austrian women who represented “beauty, art, history, 
religion, patriotism, commerce, education, science and good-fellowship.”707 Some of the 
women that the Austrian Women’s Association chose were Maria Theresa, the writer Marie 
von Ebner-Eschenbach, the painter Tina Elau, the author Leopoldine Kulka, the peace 
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activist Bertha von Suttner, and the women’s leader Auguste Fickert.708 Thus, Schmidt of 
the University of Chicago showed American interest in Austrian history and culture.   
In September 1931 an Austrian music festival took place in Cleveland, Ohio, to 
which Senator J. J. Davis invited 150 members of the Austrian chorus.709 Also, in June 1933 
an Austrian theatrical production occurred in New York. Max Sonino who sponsored the 
International Theatrical Enterprises in New York emphasized the importance of the 
theatrical production and art and cultural exchanges in general. In a letter to Prochnik, 
Sonino stated that the production would be beneficial in strengthening cultural, diplomatic, 
social, political, and commercial relations. According to Sonino, the production would be 
the “most efficacious and direct means of propaganda” for Austria. He said that art and 
theater were very important to Americans. Sonino used the example of a previous Chinese 
Company performance which, he argued, had done more to improve Chinese-American 
relations in a few weeks than the diplomats had done in years. Similar to the Chinese 
example, Sonino maintained that Austrian participation in the theater group and other 
cultural events would be very “far reaching and attractive in its appeal” to the American 
public.710  
Furthermore, student, teacher, and professional exchanges also occurred throughout 
the 1930s, although they lessened in the latter part of the decade. The Anglo-Austrian 
Committee for the Interchange of Teachers and Students provided funds for Austrian 
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students and teachers to come to Britain and vice-versa. The British participants loved the 
Austrian mountains and historic cities. Also, they said that “Austrians are a hospitable and 
friendly nation, and English students or teachers of German can gain much from a visit to 
their country.”711 In 1932 many American students and teachers visited Austria in 
cooperation with the US Office of Education and the US Department of State.712 British 
tourists visited the Salzburg festival in 1933, and an Austrian soccer team played in a 
goodwill game in Glasgow, Scotland.713 Thus, these interactions strengthened diplomatic 
and cultural ties of Britain, the United States, and Austria.  
 
III. The Anglo-American Diplomacy, the Great Depression, and the Customs Union 
 The revival of the Austrian economy in the late 1920s proved short-lived. When the 
global depression struck in 1929-1930, Austria found itself in another critical economic 
crisis.714 In 1930 Vienna had an unemployment rate of fifteen percent, while the provinces 
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had an unemployment rate of twenty percent.715 From 1929 to 1932 foreign trade diminished 
by forty-seven percent, and overall Austria’s production fell thirty-nine percent.716 When the 
gravity of the depression forced the Americans and British, who encountered serious 
financial problems of their own, to significantly reduce their dollar and pound diplomacy in 
the 1930s, Austria again looked toward Germany for help and asked for an Austro-German 
customs union in 1931. France was against the customs union and stopped sending credits, 
initiating a banking emergency in Austria. On the other-hand, Great Britain and the United 
States had a more open view towards the customs union, which they would allow but only 
with the permission of the League of Nations. Neither supported any unilateral or bilateral 
action on the part of Germany and Austria. 
 At the Hague in January 1930, Johann Schober, who had become the Austrian 
Chancellor a second time from September 1929 to September 1930, stated that Austria, 
which had one of Europe’s weakest economies at the time, could only exist as part of a 
greater economic unit.717 As none of the Habsburg successor states had shown any 
enthusiasm for a Danube Confederation, in late February 1930 Schober visited Berlin to 
discuss a possible customs union. Negotiations between Austria and Germany continued off 
and on for over a year until they were finalized and made public.718  
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 In March 1930, Sir Arthur Henderson, the British secretary of foreign affairs, opened 
the Austrian Economic Exhibit in London in order to illustrate the state of the Austrian 
economy during the depression. Instead of showing works of art, this exhibit used maps, 
diagrams, models, and photographs to illustrate public revenues, the use of the League of 
Nations loans, the cost of living, and labor conditions in Austria. At the exhibit the Austrian 
ambassador in London Baron Georg Franckenstein stated that Austria once again needed 
help.719 Relief organizations, such as the Society of Friends, the Fight the Famine Council, 
and the Save the Children Fund, promised much aid. Also, the British Foreign Office and 
the Bank of England pledged their support for additional loans.720   
 In May 1930, Schober visited London where he was warmly received by Lloyd 
George, Stanley Baldwin, and Sir Arthur Henderson.721 Although he was a Greater German 
People’s Party member, Schober was regarded by the British as a good moderate choice to 
stem the tide of intensifying partisan politics. He was a good negotiator, and his former 
position as the chief of police suggested that he was a strong advocate for law and order.722 
At the London meeting, Lloyd George said that implementation of an Anschluss “would be a 
mistake.” Schober seemed to agree and said that “Germans and Austrians were one people, 
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but Germany and Austria were two states.” As Schober left London, Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald pledged that “the British government will help Austria as much as it can.”723  
Despite these British assurances of support for Austrian independence, on March 21, 
1931, Austria officially requested a customs union with Germany, which set off a crisis in 
Central Europe.724 While the United States and Great Britain had mixed opinions of the 
customs union and required its approval by an international body before they would 
officially recognize it, France and its Little Entente allies viewed the proposed Austro-
German customs union as the first step towards subsequent political union and adamantly 
opposed it.725 Britain, although worried that the customs union would cause a drop in its 
own trade with Austria, adopted a ”passive policy of ‘wait and see’ .”726 One British official 
claimed that the Austrian and German economies were actually more competitive than 
complementary, but the desperate economic condition of Austria coupled with the tariff 
walls of and isolation from some of its East Central European neighbors forced Austria into 
Germany’s hand. In the British official’s own words, ”Rebuffed by the succession States and 
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frightened by the depression [Austria] turned, no doubt, to Germany.” The official 
contended that Austria might still ”get cold feet” and back out, if its industrialists were not 
reassured and if the other powers discouraged Austria enough.727   
The Manchester Guardian stated that the United States partially favored the customs 
union. According to the newspaper, the United States believed that the customs union 
provided “better economic security” to Austria than loans.728 Herbert Hoover, Secretary of 
State Henry L. Stimson, and Julius Klein, the economic adviser to the president, also 
sympathized with the proposed customs union, which they believed would bring stability to 
the region729  
              Because the customs union would allow other countries in East Central Europe to 
join and was not exclusively for Germany and Austria, British diplomat Orme G. Sargent 
expressed concern that the customs union issue would once again divide Europe into rival 
blocs as prior to World War I.730 France and the Little Entente put pressure on Germany and 
Austria to drop their plans for a customs union, which they saw as a German-dominated 
Mittel-Europa scheme in disguise.731 Most important, France even withdrew its investments 
from the Austria’s Creditanstalt für Handel und Gewerbe, one of Europe’s largest banks, 
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which helped bring about its collapse on May 11, 1931.732 Britain sharply criticized France 
for taking advantage of Austria’s financial crisis in order to force it to abandon the customs 
union.733 The Hungarian newspaper Pester Lloyd raised the issue of Hungary’s membership 
in the customs union and questioned why Austria and Hungary should remain in ”economic 
impoverishment.” If France wanted to prevent other countries from making alliances, then 
France should never have formed the Little Entente, which was the real source of division in 
Central Europe.734   
Financial chaos erupted after the fall of Creditanstalt in May 1931, in not only 
Austria but all of Europe, and Austria asked Great Britain and the United States for aid.735 
One Austrian bank, the Bodencreditanstalt, had already gone bankrupt in the fall of 1929, 
but the Creditanstalt disaster was much worse, because this was Austria’s most important 
financial institution. The Creditanstalt held a controlling interest in about sixty percent of 
Austria’s industries.736 In Britain, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Snowden 
in particular feared that the crisis would spread to other countries. The Austrian National 
Bank was to absorb the debts of the Creditanstalt, and the Bank of England invested 150 
million schilling (5,500,000 pounds) in the National Bank on June 17, 1931.737 US Secretary 
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of State Stimson also expressed concern for the severity of the Austrian banking disaster.738 
The former chancellor Schober, who was Austrian foreign minister from 1930 to 1932, said 
that the United States had about $23 million invested in the Creditanstalt, but he urged 
American investors not to withdraw money because that would worsen the situation.739 
Snowden’s fears were realized when the financial crisis spread throughout East Central 
Europe. In Germany Heinrich Brüning, the ”hunger chancellor,”  had to close financial 
institutions in order to prevent a disastrous bank run, as people rushed to remove their 
money from the banks in widespread panic.740 
Great Britain and the United States believed that the international court had the final 
say regarding the customs union. On September 6, 1931, the League of Nations Court of 
International Justice at the Hague ruled against the customs union by a majority of eight to 
seven.741 According to the Times [London], fifteen international judges, who came from 
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Japan, the United States,742 France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Cuba, Belgium, Holland, 
Poland, Spain, Columbia, El Salvador, China, and Romania, decided the case. In a narrow 
majority of one vote, the court ruled that the customs union would compromise Austrian 
independence. Judges from the United States, Japan, Germany, China, Great Britain, 
Belgium, and Holland joined the dissenting opinion. The dissenting judges argued that the 
customs union did not lead to the “loss of independence, but [was rather] an alienation from 
it” that did not threaten independence. Again, judges from some of the countries least 
threatened by the customs union, such as Great Britain and the United States, contended that 
it was legal.743  
Meanwhile, judges from France and its allies in Central Europe (the Little Entente) 
and South America opposed the customs union.744 Although Columbia and El Salvador were 
not directly threatened by the union, these countries were under French influence. The 
majority opinion of the court asserted that the customs union was a clear violation of the 
Geneva Protocol that Austria had signed on October 4, 1922. Whereas Article 88 of the 
Treaty of Saint Germain forbade a political union with Germany, the Geneva Protocol went 
one step further and also forbade any economic or financial union that would compromise 
Austrian independence. However, unlike Austria, Germany had never signed the Geneva 
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protocol.745 Both Austria and Germany criticized the court’s ruling. The Times said that 
because the court decision was so close, it was apparent that political objectives had affected 
the court.746 Ironically, the Geneva Protocol was not mentioned in regards to the Danube 
Confederation. Because the Danube Confederation was meant to uphold Austrian 
independence, the International Court construed it as legal, and because the Austro-German 
customs union was perceived as a potential threat to Austrian independence, it was illegal.  
Even though American and British leaders sympathized with the customs union, the 
United States and Britain agreed that any such treaty revision would have to be conducted 
peacefully and necessitated approval of the League of Nations or some international body. 
When the International Court nullified the customs union, the Americans and British 
considered the issue of the customs union dead and buried.747 Neither Britain nor the United 
States officially protested the ruling. 
 
IV. Hoover’s Moratorium 1931 
Austria no longer had to pay reparations after 1930, but Austria still owed other 
debts—made worse by the Creditanstalt failure —until the moratorium offered temporary 
relief in 1931. An international conference took place in the Hague in January 1930 to 
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discuss financial conditions of creditor countries, including Austria. There had been 
discussions of postponing or canceling Austrian reparation payments since 1919. At the 
Hague conference the European major powers officially ended Austrian reparations 
stemming from the peace treaty. Article I of the agreement stated that “The financial 
obligations of Austria arising under any provision of the Armistice of the 3rd November, 
1918, and the Treaty of St. Germain and any Treaties or Agreements supplementary thereto 
shall be finally discharged.” Article II says that “All relations between the Reparation 
Commission and Austria shall be terminated as from the date of the coming into force of the 
present Agreement.” Chancellor Schober represented a relieved and grateful Austria.748 
Even though reparations were cancelled, Austria was still deeply indebted to the US and 
Britain, which hampered Austrian economic recovery.749    
According to the Chicago Daily Tribune, on June 19, 1931, while the fate of the 
Austro-German customs union was still pending, US Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon 
went to London to discuss war debts. Mellon met with Prime Minister MacDonald and 
Montagu Norman, the head of the Bank of England. With the withdrawal of French loans in 
response to the proposed Austro-German customs union, the Bank of England had to step in 
and rescue Austria. Norman stated that: “Europe was on the verge of a smash, and that if 
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Austria had gone, other nations would have followed.” Norman told Mellon that the United 
States must be more active and send more loans to Europe to prevent chaos.750  
On June 21, 1931, the New York Times stated that the United States, which was 
“financially interested in Austria’s politico-financial crisis through millions of American 
dollars in the Creditanstalt, has an indirect political interest in the new cabinet.”751 In mid-
June 1931, Dr. Schober, who had remained the Austrian foreign minister under the new 
Austrian Chancellor Karl Buresch,752 went to the British ambassador in Vienna and received 
a $2 million cash advance from the Bank of England.753  
In order to help the world economy and relieve the debt problem, in late June 1931 
President Herbert Hoover754 called for a moratorium that would suspend repayment of war 
debts and reparations for one year. He did not cancel these loans.755 The debt “holiday” was 
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not only for Germany, but for most countries who owed money to the United States, 
including Austria and Great Britain. The press said that Germany, Great Britain, Austria, 
and Italy welcomed the Hoover moratorium, while France was hesitant.756  
A global conference was called in London to work out the details of the 
moratorium.757 According to the British newspapers, at the opening of the conference, the 
British Prime Minister MacDonald said: 
The present moment may be one of the turning-points in the history of the world, for 
good or ill. If we cannot find a solution of the present crisis no one can foretell the 
political and financial dangers which will ensue. If we can find such a solution, it 
will be a striking proof of the growing effectiveness of international cooperation.758  
 
Ultimately, despite tough negotiations, the conference demonstrated a serious global effort 
in tackling the depression, even if only temporarily, since the moratorium was to last for just 
one year. 
The press said that news of Hoover’s moratorium was well received in the United 
States and around the world. American stocks went up in New York upon hearing about the 
proposal.759 US Secretary of State Stimson said the plan would “aid in the economic 
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recovery of the world.”760 In the United States, Hoover’s approval ratings went up in 
particular among German-Americans.761 Stocks in Germany, Austria, and Britain rose as 
well.762 The value of the German mark went up thirty percent. German Chancellor Heinrich 
Brüning called the moratorium an “event of greatest significance.”763 Brüning also said the 
American plan would revive “confidence in business and minimize political tensions.”764 
President Paul von Hindenburg sent a letter of appreciation to Hoover.765 The mayor of 
Berlin Heinrich Sahm766 said that Hoover should be recommended for the Noble Peace 
Price.767 Great Britain768 and Austria were extremely “enthusiastic about the plan,” and 
alongside Germany gave the strongest support. 769 The British foreign secretary said that the 
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Hoover plan would heal both the economic burdens and the psychological problems that the 
depression had unleashed.770  
In Austria President Hoover had already been warmly received since he first came to 
office because of his work with feeding Austrians after World War I.771 In 1931 the New 
York Times stated that Austrian Chancellor Buresch spoke before the Nationalrat and said 
“Hoover had sent a ray of light to all our hearts.” Buresch thanked Hoover in the name of 
Austria.772 The Chicago Daily Tribune wrote that Austrian Foreign Minister Schober called 
the moratorium “a noble and important action that will bring peace to Europe.” He was 
excited about the moratorium, because “these enormous war debts [were] the despair and 
ruin of the nations.”773 The Austrian ambassador to the United States Prochnik sent a letter 
of gratitude to Hoover and the US State Department. Prochnik wrote: 
We have always felt that this worldwide depression against which Austria, though 
not alone, is fighting on a most exposed front, could not be overcome without 
American cooperation. When news of President Hoover’s momentous decision 
reached our country it was acclaimed there as the first boding of a turn for the better 
and it filled our hearts with great joy and with deep gratitude to the American people 
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and in particular to the Great American in whose able hands lies the control of the 
Country’s destiny.774 
 
Austria quickly approved the moratorium, as did Germany.775 
However, the press asserted that France opposed the moratorium and proposed an 
alternative plan.776 At the conference to discuss the moratorium in London, France delayed 
the negotiations. France said the moratorium should only come if Germany and Austria 
officially cancelled their plans for an Austro-German customs union, which they had 
proposed in March 21, 1931.777 France also worried that Germany would use the money it 
saved from the moratorium for rearmament.778 In addition, France was against the 
moratorium because it would constitute a departure from the Young Plan779 which France 
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wanted to keep intact.780 Finally, after much delay, France approved the moratorium in early 
July.781  
At the conference in London, the United States even discussed the possibility of 
sending gold credit from the Federal Reserves to the German Reichsbank, but this idea 
fizzled due to lack of funds. The Chicago Daily Tribune supported Hoover’s policies and 
maintained that “We cannot stand apart and think that we will suffer no harm. Our 
commitments abroad are too vast for that.” Overall, the Hoover moratorium showed 
American initiative. The newspaper reported that the United States was concerned about 
Europe, in particular that both Germany and Austria were “prostrate” and “at the verge of 
bankruptcy,” and took decisive action.782  
Although the Hoover moratorium, officially agreed upon on June 30, 1931, had 
suspended Austrian debts to the United States, just over one month later, Austrian 
Chancellor Karl Buresch sent another appeal to the League of Nations for yet further 
financial assistance. His letter began, ”The international economic crisis, coupled with the 
special difficulties inherent in Austria’s economic position, had involved the country in an 
extremely difficult financial situation.” The letter maintained that Austria’s yield from 
public taxes had not been enough to pay for the increased government expenditures that 
included grappling with unemployment and buying out the collapsed Creditanstalt. The 
Austrian government thanked the League of Nations for previous loans but asked it to 
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examine Austria’s economic plight and secure the means necessary for remedying the 
situation.783 In September, the press stated that Austrian Chancellor Karl Buresch prepared 
to go to Geneva in order personally to inform the League of Nations of Austria’s progress 
and ask for future loans.784 Thus, the Hoover moratorium by itself was no long term solution 
to Austria’s ills. 
 
V. Anglo-American Diplomacy  and the 1932 Danube Confederation Proposal 
 The worsening of the global economic crisis led to a Four Power Conference of 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in early April 1932, that discussed the economic 
problems in East Central Europe and officially proposed a trade union among Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania. The United States was not present but 
welcomed the trade union plan. Both the British-sponsored Danube customs union and the 
French Tardieu Plan785 were variations of earlier Danube Confederation plans that had failed 
to materialize in 1918, 1919, and the 1920s. The situation in the 1930s was no different, and 
no agreement could be reached.  
On April 7, 1932, Prochnik asked the US Secretary of State to state the American 
position on the Danube Confederation. The Secretary of State told Prochnik “in general; that 
we [the US] regarded the move sympathetically as one which was sound, economical, and 
designed to help those [participating] countries.” Thus, the US State Department favored a 
                                                 
783Austrian Representative to Secretary-General, League of Nations.  7 August 1931. BDFA. 
3:115. 
 
784
 “Austrian Economy.” New York Times, 13 September 1931; “Economy of Austria: 
Stabilization of Floating Debt.” Times [London]. 21 September 1931; “Austrian Financial 
Difficulties.”  Times [London]. 26 September 1931. 
 
785
 The plan was named after the French Premier Andre Tardieu.  
 265 
Danube Confederation because it would improve the ruined economies in Central Europe. 
But the US State Department took no direct action in bringing about the implementation of a 
Danube Confederation786 
 An article in the New York Times on June 12, 1932, supported a Danube 
Confederation, either the British or French version, and contended that it was especially 
important to re-open trade among the Danube states. The newspaper said that in the 1930s 
trade in Central Europe had come to a virtual “standstill.” The poor economic state of 
Austria bought about $1 million losses in American trade each year. According to the New 
York Times, in 1912 Austria-Hungary imported about $70.7 million in goods from the 
United States, while it exported $13 million to the United States. Astonishingly in the 1930s, 
the United States had far less trade with the five Habsburg successor states, whose combined 
territory covered an area 28% larger than the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and whose 
combined population was ten million more. In the 1930s the five successor states imported 
only $23 million from the United States and exported $50 million. According to the New 
York Times, there was no doubt that American trade and finances could greatly “benefit if 
the Danubian states were economically reassembled.” And the preferable way to do this was 
through a Danube Confederation, which would also prevent an Anschluss.787  
At the international conference, the British proposed plan fell apart first, because as 
earlier none of the Habsburg successor states wanted or felt they needed to join Austria. The 
Little Entente, the military and economic alliance between Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
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Yugoslavia, was still in effect in the 1930s. The same bitter ethnic disputes and state 
rivalries that existed immediately after the Great War had not diminished.788   
The failure of the British plan left the French Tardieu plan. Because the Little 
Entente was under French influence, France was able to work out a trade union proposal that 
was friendly to French interests and that of the Little Entente. Nevertheless, the conference 
consideration of the Tardieu plan also broke down, mainly because the European countries 
disagreed on the exact terms of the trade union. Germany and Italy wanted a larger 
economic union and believed the Tardieu plan was a means of securing French hegemony in 
East Central Europe.789 Ironically, while France attempted to drive Austria away from the 
Anschluss, its influence in Austrian affairs helped undermine a possible alternative to the 
Anschluss. 
The German press attacked the French proposed Danube Confederation and was 
concerned that Germany would lose trade in the Danube region whereas Czechoslovakia 
would gain trade. Germany wanted to include more countries in the trade union, possibly 
even itself, and questioned why the revived Danube Confederation included 
Czechoslovakia, a state that was doing well, but excluded Bulgaria, a state that had 
difficulties. Although the French proposal received much more favorable consideration than 
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previous ones, the Little Entente expressed reservations over the new version of the Danube 
Confederation as well.790  
Voicing his concerns over the Danube Confederation, Austrian Chancellor Dr. Karl 
Buresch asserted that it was impossible to reconstruct the Austro-Hungarian Empire in an 
economic union and said ”a union of five beggars will not make a rich man.”791 Sir Eric 
Phipps conceded that few Austrians desired the Danube Confederation and that most 
yearned after an Anschluss.792 Sir Frederick Leith-Ross contended that there was no chance 
of passing the proposal because of stern opposition from Germany, Italy, and the Little 
Entente and, regarding British interests, saw no reason for Great Britain to press the issue to 
acceptance.793 Thus, the United States and Britain viewed the Danube Confederation plan of 
1932 favorably, but massive resistance from opponents brought about its failure. 
 
VI. Lausanne Conference 1932  
The impending end of the moratorium triggered the Lausanne Conference. There 
was a flurry of diplomatic activity in Switzerland--in both Geneva and Lausanne--in 1932, 
but the latter, which focused on finance, was more important for Austria since the debt 
postponement was ending. International relations centered on these conferences. Even 
though the conferences did not exclusively revolve around Austrian affairs, Austria 
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participated, and its fate was discussed and affected by what occurred at them. The 
international disarmament conference began in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 14, 1932.794 
The New York Times asserted that some people called it “Hoover’s arms reduction plan,”795 
and it dragged on inconclusively for months.796  
In contrast, the Lausanne Conference began meeting two days later on June 16 to 
discuss war debts, reparations (of Germany), the global depression, and relief to Central 
Europe, and concluded its business on July 9, 1932.797 The United States did not officially 
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attend, but Hoover sent unofficial delegates and observers like Norman Davis who also 
represented the United States in Geneva. Premier Herriot, Prime Minister MacDonald, and 
German Chancellor Franz von Papen participated in the Lausanne Conference. Also, this 
was the first international conference that Austria’s conservative, Christian Social, and anti-
Anschluss Chancellor Dollfuss attended. According to MacDonald, the conference’s main 
goal was “to get the economic machine working properly.” The Washington Post called it 
the first conference since the depression “to reestablish world confidence.”798 Central to the 
Lausanne Conference were the linked issues of war debts and reparations because Hoover’s 
one year moratorium was coming to an end on June 30, 1932. Most nations either wanted 
the moratorium extended or replaced.799 According to the Times, the “word cancellation was 
on many delegates’ lips.”800 The Times on July 1, 1932 described the scene at Lausanne. 
 
All day the members of the Bureau sat up last night to make a determined effort to 
solve the reparation problem. They have been at it hammer and tongs. It has been a 
very trying work, and after the morning sitting several of the principal delegates 
showed grave and weary faces when they went to the luncheon. But progress has 
unquestionably been made in several directions, although no vital decision was 
reached tonight.801     
 
On June 12, 1932, four days before the Lausanne Conference officially opened, the 
New York Times had discussed the possibility of an Anschluss if the United States did 
                                                                                                                                                      
1932.The conference had intense security due to the attendance of many world leaders from 
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nothing. It had asserted that the United States should play a more active role in Austria, 
because Central Europe was “of critical importance to the US.” As of 1932 the United States 
had invested about $600 million dollars in Central Europe. The figure included Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but excluded Germany. Most of that money had gone to 
Austria. In comparison France had lent about $200 million to Central Europe, but most of 
the French money had gone to its allies the Little Entente, not Austria. The New York Times 
argued that if the United States ever wanted to get back its more than one half billion dollar 
investment in Central Europe, it had to revitalize this area. Once Central Europe was stable, 
people could start repaying loans.802  
Also on June 12, 1932, the New York Times said that an American economist Dr. 
Max Winkler from New York had urged the United States to issue additional loans to 
Austria, or else American business in the near future would be “endangered.”803 Winkler had 
said international bankers and investors, like American Thomas Lamont, an international 
banker of J. P. Morgan & Company,804 Sir Josich Stamp, Vissering of the Netherlands, Rost 
of France, and Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, should help finance a $25 million 
loan to Austria at the Lausanne Conference.805 Winkler had called Austria the “focal point” 
because events that had taken place there had led to World War I. Winkler argued, “It is not 
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within reason to assume that a second rehabilitation of Austria” would improve the world 
economy and prevent another possible war.806  
 At the Lausanne Conference, the press stated that attending countries discussed 
reparations. Germany argued that it could not pay, and most countries, including Britain, 
agreed. MacDonald asserted that the United States should either further postpone debt 
repayment until after the depression or absorb the war debts because it could afford it.807 
France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and nine other countries additionally asked the United 
States to eliminate war debts.808 Dollfuss stated that he would postpone foreign debts 
payments.809 Hoover said the United States would consider a country’s capacity to pay, but 
it would not cancel war debts,810 which was a position that the Washington Post favored.811 
Ultimately, the nations attending the Lausanne Conference agreed to end reparations after 
Germany paid a final payment of 150 million pounds.812  
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Moreover, the US, Britain, and other European countries agreed on the necessity of 
rebuilding Austria. At Lausanne the major powers granted Austria another loan. The League 
of Nations allocated 300 million gold schilling, or about $42 million, to the Dollfuss 
regime.813 Due to the Great Depression, this amount was about one-third the size of the of 
the League of Nations’ loan in 1922. Once again, the majority of the $42 million came from 
American private bankers and investors.814 Newspapers reported that Britain was the second 
largest contributor. France, which had withdrawn loans from Austria in 1931, allocated 
money as well; however, as a condition of the loan Austria had to accept the international 
court decision of September 1931 and formally reject the Austro-German customs union.815  
Despite of the decrease in size, the Lausanne loan momentarily delayed Austria’s ill 
fate.816 The Chicago Daily Tribune reported that Dollfuss was happy that Austria could rely 
on the British and Americans and that Austria was not abandoned to its own meager 
resources.817 Once again the only thing keeping Austria afloat was the US and Britain. The 
loan, like the ones before, was not given unconditionally and was mainly intended to hinder 
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a union between Austria and Germany. Austria had to repay the loan within twenty years 
(by 1952) and reaffirm the Geneva Protocol of 1922 that stipulated its continuing economic 
independence.818 In addition, the Americans delayed Austria’s interest payments for the 
1922 loan until 1942.819 Moreover, the League of Nations resumed the financial control of 
Austria that had ended in 1926.820 The New York Times stated that thirteen delegates formed 
the League of Nations Financial Committee, including Norman H. Davis of the United 
States and economic experts from around Europe.821 The League of Nations loan of 1932 
was the last major international loan that Austria received that decade. The United States 
called this a step toward “world stability.”822 
 
VII. Additional International Loans and Investors, 1930-1934 
 Besides the League of Nations loan at Lausanne in 1932, Austria received other 
American and British loans from 1930 to 1934 in order to help rebuild its economy. After 
Hitler came to power, not only economic factors but also political factors (anti-Nazism) 
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motivated international economic aid. However, the Great Depression significantly 
decreased the number and amount of foreign loans. In addition, many foreign investors in 
Austria during the 1930s expressed fear that they would lose their money due to the Great 
Depression and a possible collapse of the economy. Moreover, investors feared that a 
possible union with Germany and the rise of Nazism could also mean financial losses.  
Although Austrian reparation payments had ceased in January 1930, an American 
diplomat in Vienna on June 26, 1930, listed Austria’s main obstacles in securing future 
loans. First, the diplomat expressed concern over red Vienna. The diplomat said that: 
“Austria desires a hundred million dollar loan. Experience has shown that foreign capitalists 
are not keen about subscribing to loans where the red flag waves too much.” Second, Austria 
still had an “unsettled relief debt” of about $115 million from the 1920s. The Austrian 
Chancellor remained optimistic, though, and said Austria had “favorable” chances of getting 
another loan.823 
Also in the 1930s, according to the Chicago Daily Tribune, foreign bankers did not 
have the means to simply erase Austria debts. On July 14, 1932, delegates from ten different 
international banks met in Vienna. These banks had given loans to the bankrupt 
Creditanstalt. The Creditanstalt had a debt of $61 million which the Austrian government 
wanted the foreign bankers and foreign governments to absorb, but the banks refused.824 
Even though foreign banks had rescued the Creditanstalt when it first collapsed, they were 
not ready to completely cancel Austria’s resulting debts. 
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Moreover, in the 1930s investors worried about Austria’s ability to pay back loans. 
After the Hoover moratorium had ended, Austria was in default of its loans in August 1932. 
Foreign bankers discussed Austria’s postponement of payments, and the incident made some 
American investors hesitant to send more loans.825  
Nonetheless, some loans were still made, though on a reduced scale. On July 10, 
1930, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden had agreed to 
send Austria an international loan of $50 million in order to improve Austrian railways and 
postal services,826 but it was to be paid out by 1932. The British government had agreed to 
pay $10 million of the $50 million. Once again the United States, predominantly through 
private American bankers, was the biggest lender, paying $25 million of the $50 million 
dollar loan.827 J. P. Morgan & Company financed most of the $25 million loan of 1930.828     
Also, the United States allocated a $40,000 loan to Austrian landowners in 
November 1930.829 In addition, on July 9, 1932, American investor Mr. Byron J. Quinn, 
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Assistant Vice President of the Irving Trust Company of New York, sent another $3 million 
dollar loan to the Austrian Federal Railways. The Austrian state owned the Austrian Federal 
Railways, which were badly in need of cash. Quinn had negotiated with the Austrian 
Finance Minister, the Austrian National Bank director Dr. Viktor Kienböck, and the 
Austrian Federal Railways in order to work out the specifics of a short-term loan.830 Then in 
1934 the US Vacuum Oil Company received permission from the US State Department to 
invest money into Austria and build an oil refinery in Kagran, Austria.831 The international 
loan in 1930, the Austrian landowners loan, the Quinn loan, and the US Vacuum Oil 
Company were all examples of American investors lending to Austria in the period 1930 to 
1934.832 
In addition, on June 17, 1932, the Washington Post said that the United States 
Congress issued the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, RFC, another $250 million in 
loans for global economic recovery. Although Austria only received a small portion of this 
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fund, this policy reflected the continued American financial involvement in not only Austria 
but also the entire world.833  
Nevertheless, the Great Depression had affected the United States’ and Great 
Britain’s ability to send loans. The amounts of the foreign loans sent in the 1930s were 
significantly lower than the 1920s. A State Department budget report discussed Austria’s 
difficulties in procuring new loans in 1930 and thereafter due to the “unfavorable state of the 
credit market in those countries where a loan of this kind might have been raised, in 
particular the United States.”834 The report confirmed a decrease in American money in 
Austria and the rest of Europe since the stock market crash and onset of the Great 
Depression. The report also said that the Austria government, which desperately needed 
foreign funds, would resume loan negotiations whenever possible.835  
 Furthermore, the emergence of Nazi Germany altered economic aid to Austria 
because now the major powers had to help rebuild Austria and combat Nazism. Dollfuss 
represented Austria at the World Monetary and Economic Conference in London from June 
12 to July 17, 1933,836 and he asked the British, Americans, and other major powers for help 
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against growing Nazi terrorism.837 On August 8, 1933, both France and Great Britain called 
on Germany to stop its terrorist campaign in Austria. Nazi Germany contemptuously said it 
would “make an effort” to halt the terrorism.838 Despite its failure to resolve tariff and 
currency issues, the conference was important because it showed Anglo-American 
diplomatic cooperation, as well as the necessity of helping Austria.  
According to the New York Times, while in London, Dollfuss asserted that “We are 
fighting today for the preservation of Austria as an independent political and economic body 
in Central Europe.”839 In response to his call for help, many countries promised economic 
and diplomatic aid to Austria.840 In mid-June 1933 Austria received an international loan of 
$12 million to help against the Nazi threat rather than purely for economic purposes.841 This 
marks a turning point in how both Britain and the US understood their aid to Austria. They 
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not only wanted to raise Austrian prosperity and thus decrease internal support for 
Anschluss, but also they wanted to ward off the external threat of a German-supported Nazi 
Anschluss. The realization of the Anschluss in 1938 confirmed investors’ worst fears when 
Nazi Germany seized American and British investments without any compensation.842 
 
VIII. Anglo-American Diplomacy and Dollfuss 
 The rightwing turn in Austrian politics threatened to complicate Austrian-American 
relations even before Dollfuss came to power. For example, on June 26, 1931, American 
students in Vienna wrote a letter to the Austrian government condemning it for its lack of 
response to attacks on foreign students. The students were outraged when mobs of fifty to 
hundred people, shouting “out with the foreigners!” and “Austria belongs to the Germanic 
people,” harassed and beat Jewish, Polish, and other foreign students, including women. 
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Furthermore, they were outraged that the police, university, and Austrian government had 
done nothing to protect the minority students. According to the letter: 
We protest against the cultural atrocity wherein a Rector (director) and leader of a 
university fails to defend the victims, his own students, and actually forbids the 
police to enter to help the injured. We protest against the maintenance of such a man 
in office. 
  
We protest against the police who have advance notice of these attacks. Quite 
curiously they always arrive late and fail to handle the situation with adequate  
energy and interest. Those apprehended are released without punishment.843 
 
 The students sent copies of the letter to the President of the United States, the Director of 
the University of Vienna, the American ambassador to Austria, the Associated and United 
Press, the American Legion, and the Rotary Club. The American students also wanted to 
notify American philanthropic organizations who had given aid to Austria, in particular to 
the University of Vienna. They wanted American investors in Austria to force the Austrian 
government to take action against these attacks or else stop sending money.844 In response to 
the students’ letter, on July 2, 1931, the US State Department wrote the Austrian 
government demanding that no American citizens should be harmed.845 
 The decline of Austrian democracy continued when Dollfuss became the new 
Austrian Chancellor in May 1932. He both considered socialism and the emergence of 
Nazism by the early 1930s as threats to Austria, and his response was to create an 
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undemocratic, Austro-fascist state. In 1933 he refused to allow the Nationalrat to meet, and 
in 1934 he eliminated oppositional parties in Austria.      .      
 The potential strain that the Dollfuss regime might have imposed on Austrian 
relations with the United States and Great Britain was neutralized by even more threatening 
events in Germany. Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 only intensified the anti-Anschluss 
position of the Americans and British. Regardless of previous openness to the Anschluss 
question, Britain and the United States now strongly opposed an Anschluss because they saw 
Nazism as a menace to the peace and security of Europe and certainly did not want Nazi 
Germany enlarged. The Americans and British did not like Dollfuss’ authoritarian state, but 
they believed it was less objectionable and dangerous than Hitler’s Third Reich.846  
 Hitler’s rise to power also placed the Dollfuss regime increasingly under the 
influence of Italy.847 In fact the Austrian government did not do much domestically or 
diplomatically without first consulting Italy.848 In April of that year Dollfuss met with 
Benito Mussolini in Rome, whereupon the Duce pledged his support to Dollfuss and 
Austrian independence. With its Mediterranean ports, Italy became a lifeline to Austria. 
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There had even been talks of a customs union and monetary union between Italy and 
Austria, but neither ever developed.849 In March 1934, Austria, Italy, and Hungary had 
signed the Rome Protocols, but it was merely a consultative pact and economic agreement. 
 Especially after Hitler came to power, the Americans and British likewise considered 
an Austrian rapprochement with Italy preferable to closer ties with Nazi Germany. But 
nonetheless they at first struggled with the dilemma posed by Austria’s political turn to 
dictatorship. When Dollfuss had suspended parliament in 1933, Great Britain told Dollfuss 
that their support would lessen if he created a dictatorship. However, Dollfuss argued that he 
had no choice in his fight against Nazism and socialism. The Times stated that Dollfuss was 
in “no hurry to return to parliamentary forms.” Reporting on the suspension of parliament, 
British journalist G.E.R. Gedye “found the Ringstrasse blocked with barbed wire 
entanglements and rifle-rests. The grounds of the Hofburg were crowded with mounted 
police with slung carbines, storm companies with rifles, hand grenades and steel helmets, 
and he reported that deputies were being prevented from entering the chamber by the 
police.”850 Robert Henry Hadow, a British diplomat in Austria in the 1930s, said that 
Dollfuss was unpopular and that the “present government . . . no longer enjoys the support 
of confidence of this country [Austria].”851 On January 17, 1934, Austrian Ambassador 
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Franckenstein wrote British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon about the necessity of 
Austrian economic betterment and warned that if something was not done, the opponents of 
an independent Austria would triumph.852 Agreeing with Franckenstein’s letter, Sir John 
Simon argued that Britain must do everything to prevent Austria from collapsing.853 
Therefore, Britain ultimately did assist the Dollfuss regime, despite considerable misgivings. 
 American citizens made several complaints against the Dollfuss government. Despite 
earlier protests by American students in 1931, on October 26, 1932, another anti-Semitic 
disturbance occurred at the University of Vienna, in which fifteen students including three 
Americans were hurt, although not seriously. At the American Embassy in Vienna American 
students contended that the United States had sent the army into Nicaragua to safeguard 
Americans, but the United States did nothing about the situation in Austria. Ultimately, the 
Director of the University of Vienna, Professor Dr. Abel, promised to take steps to protect 
American citizens.854 The director gave no assurances to safeguard other foreigners. 
 On October 27th, the Austrian ambassador in Washington D. C. Prochnik sent 
Dollfuss a shocking and anti-Semitic letter, in which he dismissed the incident. According to 
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the letter, the attack on the students was not important—nothing really happened. Prochnik 
argued that students get injured all the time, especially in sports, and it never gets reported. 
Only because the incident involved Jewish students, was there special attention. Prochnik 
complained about the influence of “international Jewry” (internationalen Judenschaft) and 
the “Israelite alliance” (Alliance Israelite). He stated that Jews were too strong in Vienna 
and that they were exaggerating the incident and trying to start trouble between the US and 
Austria. Prochnik told Dollfuss not to take the matter seriously.855 
 Furthermore, on February 19, 1934, in the wake of the Dollfuss repression of the 
Austrian socialists, an organization of American workers, who called themselves the United 
Committee for the Support of the Austrian Workers, sent a letter to Prochnik protesting the 
persecution of workers in Austria. In particular, they condemned the murder of socialist and 
communist workers by the Dollfuss government and Nazis. In addition, they protested the 
banning of the socialist party and labor unions and the persecution of Jews. The United 
Committee for the Support of the Austrian Workers represented many groups, both white 
and black, from the Washington, D. C. According to the letter, American workers 
“recognize that the fight of the Austrian workers against the bloody terror of Austrian 
Fascism is part of the struggle of all workers.” The United Committee for the Support of the 
Austrian Workers demanded the legalization of the socialist party, the release of political 
prisoners, and the end of worker executions. The organization stressed global working class 
support.856   
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 Nonetheless, Britain and the United States supported Dollfuss and his government 
over the Nazi German alternative. In March 1934, four months before the attempted Nazi 
coup, Britain again expressed its desire to maintain an independent Austria. The former 
British Colonial Secretary Leopold S. Amery857 visited Vienna and told Dollfuss that 
Austria was “vital to the peace of Europe.” If Germany were allowed to swallow up Austria, 
then it would not be long before Germany would takeover other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe as well.858 On September 19, 1934, the American ambassador to Austria 
George S. Messersmith859 expressed agreement with the British ambassador to Austria, who 
had said that the Dollfuss regime was “the only one and the best one that Austria can have 
for the time being, and therefore it was deserving of support.”860 President Roosevelt had 
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appointed Ambassador Messersmith in 1934.861 Therefore, like Britain, the United States 
considered Dollfuss the lesser of the two evils when compared to Hitler. The same 
calculation had induced both the US and Britain to grant the Lausanne loan to Dollfuss 
earlier. Without a doubt, the US and Britain could have placed more pressure on Dollfuss, 
stating that if he wanted financial and diplomatic backing, he had to protect foreigners and 
reaffirm democracy in Austria. However, any harsh tactics, like canceling all international 
loans and placing economic sanctions on Austria, would not have pressured Dollfuss to 
reestablish democracy in Austria but most likely have toppled his regime and opened the 
door for either a socialist or Nazi one, as Franckenstein had warned.  
  
IX. The Attempted Nazi Coup in 1934 
  In response to the Dollfuss dictatorship that had oppressed Austrian Nazis (as well 
as Austrian socialists), the Nazis instigated terrorist attacks throughout Austria in order to 
create political and economic instability and topple Dollfuss.862 On July 25, 1934, a coup 
d’etat against the Austrian government took place.863 During the attempted Nazi seizure of 
power, a group of Austrian Nazi insurgents stormed the Chancellery and shot Dollfuss.864 
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But plans to hold the Cabinet members hostage, gain support from the army and Austrian 
masses, and take over the government failed. Consequently, with international support, 
especially from Italy, the Austrian army and Heimwehr were able to restore order.865    
 Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg the leader of the fascist, paramilitary Heimwehr 
played a significant role in the civil war against the Nazis. Immediately after the death of 
Dollfuss, Starhemberg temporarily became the “acting Austrian Chancellor” and “strong 
man.” In late July and early August the Heimwehr fought small groups of Nazis in Austria, 
in particular Styria, and quickly helped restore order within a week. About one hundred 
Austrian government supporters died in the fighting, and the government arrested several 
hundred Austrian Nazis.866 According to the Washington Post, in a tribute to Dollfuss, 
Starhemberg promised to keep Austria independent and asserted that Austria “shall never 
make any concessions that in any way limit the freedom, honor, and dignity of the Austrian 
Nation.” Starhemberg also said that Austria would continue on its anti-Nazi and anti-
socialist path, and he told Austrians to “believe in their future.”867 Starhemberg’s time as 
acting chancellor was quite brief, however. On July 30, 1934, Kurt von Schuschnigg868 
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officially became the new Austrian chancellor. Starhemberg then became Vice 
Chancellor.869 
 Although the exact extent of Germany’s complicity in the assassination was 
unknown, there was no doubt that Germany encouraged Nazi activities in Austria and 
supplied Austrian Nazis with money and arms. Germany had even maintained an Austrian 
Legion comprised of Austrian Nazis who had crossed the border after Dollfuss had banned 
the Nazi Party. By 1934 the Austrian Legion numbered around 10,000, and many of them 
later changed their citizenship to German.870 The Austrian government claimed that the 
Putsch orders came from Germany.871 The Washington Post argued that it was “difficult if 
not impossible to deny that Germany played a role.”872 The Times and many world 
newspapers blamed Nazi Germany for the death of Dollfuss. The Times stated that Nazi 
Germany had sent leaflets to Austria calling for the removal of Dollfuss and that Nazi 
Germany had supplied the terrorists.873 
 The press asserted that Nazi Germany, however, denied any responsibility.874 In the 
wake of the failed coup attempt, during which the Austrian populace had not responded 
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favorably and foreign powers had threatened to intervene, Germany distanced itself from the 
revolt and announced that it would arrest any rebels crossing its borders. The President Paul 
von Hindenburg expressed his ”indignation” and ”sympathy” to the Austrian President.875 In 
addition, Hitler dismissed local Austrian Nazi leaders, slightly altered the regional 
administration of the Austrian Nazi Party, and halted Nazi terror and propaganda, a decree 
which lasted until June 1935.876    
 The Austrian public was shocked at the brutal murder of Dollfuss. The Chicago 
Daily Tribune maintained that about 50,000 Austrians attended the funeral procession at the 
St. Stephen Cathedral, including acting Chancellor Starhemberg, President Michael 
Miklas,877 the wife of Dollfuss, and the Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna Theodor Innitzer.878 
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The British ambassador to Austria Sir Walford Selby879 wrote that he witnessed sincere 
mourning on the part of the Austrians at the funeral, and this challenged the position of 
Dollfuss’ enemies who maintained that he had never had any support and no one would 
sympathize with his death.880 Dollfuss’ assassination, combined with the murders of Ernst 
Röhm and hundreds of other SA members that occurred less than one month earlier, painted 
a dismal picture of the National Socialists. 
 The Times reported that the incident made ”the name of Nazi to stink in the nostrils 
of the world. A system which flourishes on such methods inspires loathing and disgust 
everywhere.” The Times called the Nazis “desperadoes” who destroyed civilization, 
“recognize[d] no laws,” and “only pursue[d] barbarous and inhumane actions.” The Times 
stated that Hitler had contended that 90% of Austrians were Nazis, but the newspaper 
correspondents in Austria argued that there was no Nazi majority. On the contrary there was 
Austrian mass support for the government against the Nazis. The Times concluded that 
although most Austrians desired a union with a democratic Germany throughout the inter-
war period, they certainly did not want a union now with “a political gangster.”881 
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 Similar to the reports from Selby and the Times, the Manchester Guardian stated that 
the majority of Austrians were ”enraged by the brutal and cold-blooded” murder of 
Dollfuss.882  Lieutenant-Colonel F. N. Mason-MacFarlane reported that the Austrian 
government ”can definitely count on more support in the population than two months 
ago.”883 The historian Evan Bukey argues that this was a time when Kurt von Schuschnigg 
could have easily consolidated his power, but in a missed opportunity Schuschnigg failed to 
reconcile with his opponents, especially the socialists, and form a united anti-Nazi coalition.
 In addition to the lack of internal support among the Austrian people, foreign 
diplomacy, in particular the response of Austria’s neighbors, was a key factor in the failed 
Nazi coup. As soon as the assassination of Dollfuss occurred, Austria asked for international 
assistance, and Britain, France, Italy, and other European countries took steps to protect its 
territorial sovereignty. 884 Mussolini, who had made himself the protector of Austria, 
immediately sent 75,000 troops to the Austrian border.885 The press reported that Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia mobilized their troops.886 Britain, France, and even the Vatican887 were 
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outraged at the death of Dollfuss. However, Britain and France did not mobilize their troops. 
Britain and France wanted to protect Austrian territorial integrity, but they saw no 
immediate need to militarily intervene because the situation looked to be under control. 
They contended that military action could further de-stabilize Austria.888  
 Great Britain hoped the situation remained an Austrian domestic affair. It was not 
willing to take direct action unless Nazi Germany seized Austria.889 According to the Times, 
Sir John Simon stated that: “I may add that the attitude of this country as to the 
independence and integrity of Austria, in accordance with the relevant treaties,  . . . remains 
unchanged by these tragic events.”890 Although Sir John Simon did not explain exactly what 
measures Britain would take to sustain Austrian independence, he did say that Britain was 
closely monitoring the situation.891 The press wrote that the Austrian ambassador in London, 
Baron Georg Franckenstein,892 called Dollfuss a “hero” who had brought about the 
                                                                                                                                                      
887
 “Dollfuss Slaying Shocks Vatican.” Washington Post, 25 July 1934; “Pope to Voice 
Horror at Dollfuss Slaying.” New York Times, 29 July 1934. 
 
888
 Memorandum respecting the Nazi ”Putsch” of July 25, 1934. BDFA. 10:350; “300 Slain, 
Hundreds Shot; Civil War.” Washington Post, 27 July 1934; Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 July 
1934; “No Move By Britain Likely at Present.” New York Times, 27 July 1934. 
 
889
 Memorandum respecting the Nazi ”Putsch” of July 25, 1934. BDFA. 10:350; “Great 
Britain, France, and Italy Said Independence of Austria Must Be Assured.” New York Times, 
26 July 1934; “No Move By Britain Likely at Present.” New York Times, 27 July 1934. 
 
890
 “Herr Dollfuss Killed by Nazis.” Times [London]. 26 July 1934. 
 
891
 “Austria.” Times [London].  31 July 1934. 
 
892
 Baron Georg Franckenstein (1878-1953) was the anti-Anschluss, monarchist, pro-British, 
Austrian ambassador to Britain from 1920 to 1938. A speech given on February 2, 1934, 
exemplifies Frankenstein’s anti-Anschluss opinion. He said “we want to be united with 
Germany by the closest friendship, but we wish and intend to maintain our independence.” 
Franckenstein’s Speech. 2 February 1934. NPA. Archiv der Republik. Box 573; After the 
Anschluss, he became a British citizen, and King George VI (r. 1936-1952) knighted him in 
 293 
revitalization of Austria and a “peace activist.”893 King George V, Prime Minister 
Macdonald, and Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon sent a letter of sympathy to the Austrian 
people.894  
 Meanwhile, the United States also refused to get directly involved in Austria in the 
aftermath of the failed Nazi coup. According to US newspapers, the US Department of State 
was satisfied when the American ambassador in Vienna Messersmith stated that no 
American citizens had been injured in the coup.  The US State Department and some 
Americans were deeply concerned that the Dollfuss assassination, like the assassination of 
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Archduke Franz Ferdinand, would lead to another war.895 When Messersmith reported on 
July 27, 1934, that everything was “quiet,” the US State Department expressed happiness 
that the Austrians had things under control.896  
 Messersmith contended that European peace meant Austrian independence. On July 
28, 1934, he argued: 
The settlement of the Austrian problem is essential to European peace but it is not a 
problem that the Austrian people can solve by themselves in spite of concrete and 
determined intentions. Her problem was created after the war from the outside and 
only the united action of the powers can save her and by that heal what is now one of 
the most dangerous spots in Europe, perhaps immediately the most dangerous. 
 
 Messersmith was a tough opponent of Nazism. In July 1934 he accurately predicted that 
Nazi aggression would not cease with the annexation of Austria.897 But he was not always so 
perspicacious. In August 1934 he also claimed that Nazism was “on its last legs” and Nazi 
Germany would collapse within months.898Despite his support for an independent Austria, 
Messersmith asserted that the United States should not get involved in Austria, and his 
views reflected the policies of the US State Department and the United States in general. 
Messersmith told Secretary of State Cordell Hull:  
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I do not believe that the Austrian problem is an immediate problem for the US. I do 
not believe that we should intervene directly in this or other primarily European 
problems. But an independent Austria and a healthy Germany are necessary to our 
own peace and economic health.899 
 
The United States only gave “silent approval” to the strong anti-Anschluss and anti-Nazi 
stance of the other major powers. Although the United States was aware of the dangers of 
Nazism and strongly sympathized with an Austria independent, the US State Department 
said it would not intervene in European affairs. Instead, President Roosevelt, Messersmith, 
and Hull hoped that other countries (Britain, France, and Italy) would protect Austria.900 
This incident showed that while the US was active in financial diplomacy, it continued to be 
very reticent to become involved in Europe in other ways. 
 The United States, like Britain, did pay its respects. Roosevelt sent a letter of 
condolence to the Austrian people, Mrs. Dollfuss, and Austrian President Michael Miklas.901 
Secretary of State Hull said the incident “shocks and grieves me beyond expression.”902 In 
addition, the Washington Post asserted that many Americans demonstrated in front of the 
German Embassy in Washington D. C. against Nazism.903  
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 Also, the Austrian ambassador in Washington D. C., Edgar Prochnik904 said “the 
death of Dollfuss is a grave blow to Austria.” He had been on vacation in Delaware when he 
heard of Dollfuss’ death and immediately returned to Washington D. C. Prochnik expressed 
sympathy for the loss of Dollfuss and had nothing but good things to say about him. 
According to the Washington Post, Prochnik stated that Dollfuss was a leader who stood for 
world peace and was what Austria most needed then.905    
 In September 1934, Great Britain, France, and Italy once again reaffirmed their 
commitment to Austria’s independence. The German press then agreed to temporarily cease 
its anti-Austrian attitude, and in a diplomatic meeting in Vienna in November the German 
government pledged its support to Austria and stated that it had ”no territorial designs” and 
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wished only to uphold cultural relations with ethnic Germans living in other countries.906 
Despite the major setback of the coup attempt, Hitler firmly believed that the Austrian Nazi 
Party as an opposition group would still come to power in Austria through legal means as 
the Nazi Party had in Germany.  
 The 1934 Nazi coup attempt failed because of the combination of military 
mobilization by Italy, the British, Italian, and French declarations to protect Austria, and the 
lack of support for Nazism within Austria. Besides Vienna, Austrian Nazis also had planned 
coups in the Austrian provincial capitals, but they too failed everywhere. Gottfried-Karl 
Kindermann called the foiled coup Hitler’s “worst foreign policy defeat until Stalingrad in 
1943.”907  In 1934 the Austrian army, the Heimwehr, the legitimists, and the Austrian 
populace in general had remained on the side of the ruling regime. With Dollfuss gone, it 
was up to Schuschnigg to reaffirm Austrian sovereignty. Despite the fact that Austria was in 
a state of martial law, Schuschnigg, received full support from Britain and some support 
from the United States, because they considered a possible Nazi regime much worse. In the 
aftermath of the Nazi coup, Britain and the United States feared the spread of Nazism and 
another world war.908 The Dollfuss murder strengthened Schuschnigg’s international 
position in the immediate aftermath of 1934.909  
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X. Austrian Viability with American and British Help 
Despite the pessimism concerning Austria in the time period 1930 to 1934, some 
Austrians continued to believe that Austria could prosper. In 1931 an Austrian aristocrat 
Baron Leopold von Popper told the New York Evening Post that the idea that: 
[Austria] was stripped of everything by the Treaty of St. Germain, is false – nothing 
but lying propaganda. Under proper management Austria might be one of the richest 
small countries in the world, such as Holland, Denmark, Sweden, [and] Switzerland. 
Give me the city of Vienna, give me Austria as she is today, without the addition of a 
single square foot of land, and I would . . . make the state operate profitably . . ..”910 
 
Thus, von Popper claimed that the First Republic Austria born out of the defeat of the Great 
War was not a weak state. Austria could become a prosperous state, and he rejected a 
political and economic union with Germany. He listed Austria’s assets as forests, salt mines, 
water power, and tourism. He said people would naturally “flock” to Austria from Central 
and Eastern Europe.911   
Even two months after the failed coup Baron Franckenstein remained optimistic 
about Austria’s future if several conditions were met. In October 1934 he expressed the 
conviction that “Austria would be able to live an independent life in friendly and useful co-
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operation with other countries and make her contribution to the general good, provided there 
were peace, no interference from outside, and work for the Austrian people. If these 
conditions could be secured Austria . . . would be able to lead her children to a happier 
future.”912 The Popper and Franckenstein quotes show that informed people, commenting 
without the hindsight of 1938, still believed in Austrian viability in the wake of the failed 
Nazi coup.   
 
XI. Conclusion 
In the time period 1930 to 1934 Great Britain and the United States continued to take 
an active role in Austrian affairs, and fostered close cultural, economic, financial, and 
diplomatic ties. Because of the global depression, loans from the United States and Great 
Britain decreased. For example, the Lausanne loan was substantially less than the 
international loan given to Austria in 1922. However, the American and British economic 
aid nonetheless continued. The US and Britain, unlike France, supported the Austro-German 
customs union as long as the International Court approved. The temporary withdrawal of 
French loans in 1931, as punishment for Austria's attempted end-run around the Anschluss 
prohibition in the treaty settlement, had brought about the collapse of the Creditanstalt and 
only worsened the world-wide depression.  
The simultaneous rise of Hitler in Germany and the Dollfuss termination of 
parliamentary government in Austria marked a turning point in British and American 
diplomacy. The emergence of Hitler in 1933 strengthened the opposition of the major 
powers to an Anschluss, and even the United States and Britain now more decisively voiced 
                                                 
912
 “Austria Today. Baron Franckenstein in Glasgow.” Glasgow Herald. 11 October 1934. 
This newspaper was part of a collection in the NPA. Archiv der Republik. Box 565. 
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their rejection of an Anschluss that would disturb European tranquility and maybe even lead 
to another war. Despite their misgivings about the Dollfuss dictatorship, the US and Britain 
supported and financed Dollfuss because they saw the Nazi alternative as worse. 
The major powers reacted differently to the 1934 coup attempt. The United States 
was willing to engage in financial diplomacy but not to risk any political commitment. On 
the other hand, Britain followed a “middle way,” and Italy was the major military backer of 
Austrian independence in the face of the overt Nazi German threat. Thus, Austria survived 
the depression and the Nazi coup, but now faced the dilemma that it cannot survive if there 
is a subsequent withdrawal of Italian support for Austrian independence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
THE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PARTY, 1930-1934 
  
I. Introduction 
“. . .  Austria is not alone—this little country can count on world sympathy in its 
struggle for economic and political independence.” 913 (Engelbert Dollfuss, June 
1933). 
 
 
Similar to the 1920s, from 1930 to 1934, the Christian Social Party was a 
conservative, anti-Anschluss, anti-socialist, Catholic, Austrian nationalist, and anti-Semitic 
party. The Christian Social Party led Austria and provided all but one chancellor in the 
succession of coalition governments from 1930 to 1932.914 Wilhelm Miklas of the Christian 
Social Party was the Austrian federal president from December 1928 to March 1938. As 
earlier, the Christian Social Party and the socialists each received about one-third the vote in 
the last parliamentary election in 1930, and the Christian Social Party aligned with the 
Greater German People’s Party because of their common hatred of socialism.  
However, there were also significant changes in the 1930s. In response to continued 
conflict with the socialist paramilitary Schutzbund, in December 1930 the Christian Social 
Party established a military wing called the Ostmärkische Sturmscharen in order to secure 
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 Johann Schober (1874-1932) of the Greater German People’s Party was the Austrian 
Chancellor from June 1921 to May 1922 and from September 1929 to September 1930. He 
was also the Austrian foreign minister and vice chancellor under Otto Ender from 1930-
1932.  
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Christian Social rule in Austria. The Ostmärkische Sturmscharen had differences with the 
Heimwehr as well, because the former demanded that Austria become a Catholic clerical 
state.915 In addition, when Engelbert Dollfuss came to power in 1932, he dissolved the 
“Great Coalition” of the Christian Social Party and Greater German People’s Party. Dollfuss 
formed a new alliance with the Heimwehr. The anti-socialist Greater Coalition had 
succeeded in keeping Austrian independent in the 1920s and early 1930s. However, with the 
rise of Nazism, Dollfuss’ failure to form an anti-Nazi coalition between the Christian Social 
Party and socialists destroyed Austrian democracy and severely limited his remaining 
options. Dollfuss ended the parliamentary government in Austria in 1933, beginning 
authoritarian rule.  
Crushing opposition, Dollfuss postponed elections and outlawed the Nazi, socialist, 
and communist parties. The Christian Social Party also officially dissolved in 1934. Yet, de 
facto Christian Social dominance, albeit under a different party name, continued under the 
autocratic state. Dollfuss created the Fatherland Party that dominated the one-party fascist 
state, which his successor Kurt von Schuschnigg maintained until Hitler’s invasion in March 
1938. 
As in the 1920s, most Christian Social Party members officially continued to oppose 
an Anschluss and wanted to preserve an independent Austria. In the early 1930s about one-
fourth of the Christian Socials still belonged to the pro-Anschluss splinter group. The party 
was likewise split on the 1931 customs union with Germany. By 1933, however, the pro-
Anschluss faction of the Christian Social Party turned away from the Anschluss because of 
Nazism. Other parties, especially the socialists, likewise ended their support of a union with 
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Germany, and from 1933 to 1938 the Austrian Anschluss supporters were a minority. The 
Nazi Party, having absorbed many former supporters of the Greater German People’s Party, 
was now the only major pro-Anschluss party in Austria. 
By far the most important leader of the Christian Social Party in the period from 
1930 to 1934 was Dollfuss. He and his successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, had monarchist 
leanings. Monarchists were also attracted to his new Fatherland Party, which was an anti-
democratic, anti-Nazi, Catholic, Austrian nationalist organization often categorized as 
"Austro-Fascist."  Furthermore, the Catholic Church supported Dollfuss, just as it had 
supported Christian Social leaders like Seipel in the 1920s. 
 
II. The Christian Socials, the Great Depression, and the Customs Union 
In the November 9, 1930, parliamentary elections, which would be the last such 
elections of the First Republic, the socialists won seventy-two seats (about forty-two 
percent) and the Christian Socials sixty-six seats (thirty-nine percent). The Heimatblock, 
which was the political wing of the Heimwehr, received eight seats, while the National 
Economic Bloc (Nationalen Wirtschaftsblock), a new organization that included the Greater 
German People’s Party and Agrarian League and was under the former Austrian Chancellor 
Johannes Schober’s leadership, got nineteen seats. Unlike in Germany, where the Nazis had 
achieved an electoral breakthrough just two months earlier in September 1930, the Austrian 
Nazis did not receive any seats in this election. In this election campaign the socialists, 
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members of the Greater German People’s Party, and some conservatives continued to 
advocate a union with a democratic Germany.916   
The Christian Socials and the Schober faction once again formed the coalition 
government. In December 1930 the Christian Social Dr. Otto Ender917 became Austrian 
Chancellor, while Schober became the foreign minister and vice chancellor. As foreign 
minister Schober was best known for attempting to bring about an Austro-German customs 
union. His counterpart, German Foreign Minister Julius Curtius, was also willing to be a bit 
more aggressive than Gustav Stresemann in strengthening Austro-German relations.918      
The Ender government faced the global depression which marked a time period of 
extremely high unemployment and bank failures. In 1930 Austrian agriculture 
(Landwirtschaft) had a debt of three-hundred million dollars, and industry fell 26% below 
the production level of the late 1920s. Speaking at the Christian Social Party meeting on 
April 25-26, 1931, Chancellor Ender said Austria was in dire need, and its future was on a 
stony path.919 The economic crisis led to government austerity measures and the dismissal of 
many civil servants, who turned initially to the Greater German People’s Party and later the 
National Socialist Party.  
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Ultimately, due to the gravity of the economic crisis and the overall popular 
sentiment favoring an Anschluss or union with Germany, whether political or just economic, 
the Austrian Foreign Minister Schober began negotiations with the German Foreign Minister 
Curtius.  Schober requested an Austro-German Zollunion or customs union in March 1931, 
which was not supposed to compromise Austrian independence or violate the peace treaty. 
When France retaliated, the resulting Creditanstalt főr Handel und Gewerbe bank failure of 
May 1931 tremendously intensified the global depression, as well as the loss of confidence 
among Austrians regarding the economic viability of their state. 
Most of the Austrian parties wanted the customs union, and many Austrians saw 
Germany as a viable market for its wood and potential hydro-electric production. In Austria 
the socialists came out in strong support of the customs union, which was a ”pro-Anschluss 
expression.”920 The Greater German People’s Party, partnered with the Christian Social 
Party until 1932, and the extreme Austrian nationalist Heimwehr bloc likewise gave their 
support. 
However, the Christian Social Party, which led the government, was divided on the 
customs union issue. 921 Christian Socials heavily debated the customs union and its likely 
consequences, which were economic betterment at the price of losing autonomy. Seipel and 
Schober were long time, bitter political rivals. They not only had differences over the 
Anschluss, but Schober favored secular policies while Seipel favored clerical policies.922 
After serving as chancellor for much of the 1920s, Seipel had preceded Schober as foreign 
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minister in 1930. Even when he was out of office, the ex-Chancellor and ex-Foreign 
Minister Seipel could not stop intervening in Austrian affairs. When Seipel heard about his 
enemy Schober’s customs union plan, he immediately campaigned against it. Seipel’s 
Christian Social followers also opposed the customs union. In addition, the Christian Social 
Reichspost was sceptical about the customs union. Seipel did not get along with German 
Foreign Minister Curtius either.923 
Despite the opposition of many Christian Socials, according to an American 
counselor in Germany, Prentiss Gilbert, overall the Austro-German customs union received 
”virtually unanimous support” in Austria.924 The popularity of the customs union reflected 
the desperate economic situation in Austria, the people’s unhappiness with present 
conditions and hope for something better, as well as the close ties between Austria and 
Germany. Moreover, the customs union was heavily favored in Austria because it 
represented a more moderate proposal. It was acceptable to those who had wanted a political 
union with Germany but realized that, particularly due to international pressure, an 
Anschluss was not feasible at the moment. They considered an economic union a favorable 
alternative and even hoped an economic union would one day become a political one. For 
them the customs union was a way to circumvent the treaties forbidding an Anschluss. At 
the same time the customs union was acceptable to others who opposed political union but 
realized that an economic union with Germany was vital for Austrian survival, and 
contended that Austria would maintain its political sovereignty.     
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When the Austro-German customs union ultimately collapsed in September 1931 
due to French-led opposition, Schober resigned as head of the Greater German People’s 
Party. Regarding the failure of the customs union, the opposition socialists blamed France 
and its allies and the Christian Socials. The socialist leader Karl Renner said the Christian 
Socials had never really believed that the customs union would work. Also, they condemned 
Seipel for having signed the Geneva Protocols in 1922, which made an economic union with 
Germany illegal.925 Therefore, France dealt the biggest blow to the customs union, but the 
Christian Social Party, in particularly Seipel, was responsible for rallying domestic 
opposition to the Austro-German customs union. In 1931 the Greater Germans and Schober 
really challenged their coalition partner and tried to take a concrete step toward Anschluss. 
Ultimately they failed while the Christian Social Party succeeded. 
   
III. The Christian Socials under Dollfuss  
Following the fall of Schober and the brief chancellorship of Karl Buresch, Christian 
Social Party member Engelbert Dollfuss926 became Austrian Chancellor on May 20, 1932. 
Like Seipel, he helped prolong Austrian independence. Unlike Seipel, however, he fatefully 
comprised parliamentary democracy and succumbed to the authoritarian temptation in the 
process. Despite the fact that he was only about five feet in height, he was the key Austrian 
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leader in the early 1930s. The Times stated “this little man happened to be fighting to keep 
[Austria] a part of Christendom.”927 Christian Socials regarded him as an Austrian hero. But 
victims of his autocracy, especially the Austrian socialists, despised him.928 Like his 
Christian Social predecessors, in his first year in power Dollfuss received a series of 
international loans to bolster both the economy and Austrian independence. Thereafter, in 
response to the rising Nazi threat and Hitler's desire to destroy Austria, Dollfuss both created 
an autocratic state and increasingly aligned with Benito Mussolini’s Fascist Italy. At this 
time Mussolini, not yet Hitler’s ally, also wanted to maintain an independent Austria.  
The Anschluss remained a key issue in Austrian politics in the early 1930s, but the 
Christian Social Party’s position did not alter under Dollfuss. Similar to Seipel, Dollfuss still 
kept up the public appearance of close ties with Germany. Dollfuss stated, “The world must 
know that we are an independent state, because of the blood, history, and geography of our 
homeland, we are aware of the closest of ties and friendship with the German Reich, a 
friendship that is just and mandatory.”929 Dollfuss never denied that Austria was a German 
state and said ”as [a] second German State we have our special national mission, which we 
wish to fulfill in complete freedom and independence.”930 Additionally, Dollfuss favored the 
Danube Confederation plan of 1932, just as Seipel had favored such a plan in the 1920s.  
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The Christian Social Party’s opposition to the Austro-German customs union in 1931 
that had resulted in the resignation of Schober severely damaged relations between the 
Christian Social Party and the Greater German People’s Party. In addition, by the early 
1930s the Greater German People’s Party had lost many votes to the Nazi Party. In the 
spring of 1932, the “Great Coalition” of the Christian Social Party and Greater German 
People’s Party that had lasted for over a decade dissolved due to differences over the 
Anschluss. Following Hitler’s rise to power in January 1933, the role of the Anschluss issue 
in Austrian politics suddenly changed. The socialist party931 and the pro-Anschluss wing of 
the Christian Social Party officially reversed their positions at this time because they wanted 
union with a democratic, not a Nazi-dominated, Germany.932 Indeed, because Nazi terrorism 
in Austria had already begun in 1931, some Austrians had already withdrawn their support 
for an Anschluss even earlier. Nevertheless, some other Austrians, like university professor 
Karl Gottfried Hugelmann, remained staunchly pro-Anschluss and left the Christian Social 
Party when its pro-Anschluss wing reversed itself.933  
 This abandonment of the Anschluss by many of its traditional supporters and the fact 
that the Christian Socials and socialists each made up about one-third of the population 
suggested that Austrian popular sentiment from 1933 to early 1938 was both anti-Anschluss 
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and anti-Nazi. The Austrian government controlled by the Christian Socials remained both 
as well. The negative impact of Hitler’s rise to power was apparent to outside observers as 
well. Articles in both the Times [London] and New York Times had maintained that before 
the rise of Hitler, the majority of Austrians had wanted a union with a democratic 
Germany.934  
 The Austrian Greater German People’s Party was one of few older parties that 
remained in favor of an Anschluss, though this did not redound to their benefit. With the loss 
of most non-Nazi pro-Anschluss supporters, the Anschluss movement from 1933 to 1938 
became increasingly dominated by the Nazis, though for the first time since World War I it 
was now a minority movement. Moreover, while the Anschluss movement from 1918 to 
1933 was heavily swayed by the poor economic conditions in Austria, the main motivation 
of the Anschluss for the Austrian National Socialists turned from economic to national and 
political. 
 When Dollfuss came to power in May 1932, the Parliament had seventy-two 
socialists, sixty-six Christian Socials, ten Greater Germans, nine Landbund (Agrarian 
League) members, and eight Heimwehr members. Dollfuss formed a right-wing coalition of 
the Christian Socials, Landbund, and Heimwehr, which had a total of eighty-three 
parliament seats, as compared to the socialist and Greater German People Party opposition, 
which together had eighty-two seats. By a one vote majority, Dollfuss and the Christian 
Socials headed the new government.935 
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 At this time, the Christian Social Party was also concerned with the rise of Nazism. 
The Austrian Nazi Party had made gains in the provincial and Vienna municipal elections in 
April 1932, gaining 17% of the votes. The Christian Socials’ greatest fear was a coalition of 
socialists and Nazis; therefore, they began postponing elections, first for six months, then for 
a year, and finally indefinitely. However, the Christian Social Party did not take into 
consideration the fact that by 1933 the Austrian socialists, who were aware of the socialist 
persecution in Germany, were not only anti-Nazi but also anti-Anschluss. The Christian 
Socials and socialists still made up a strong majority in Austria.936  
 The intensely conservative Christian Socialist Party could not conceive of a coalition 
with the socialists even to save democracy, since they viewed the socialists as 
“revolutionaries” and political foes rather than social democrats. Many Christian Socials 
believed that the socialists were plotting to takeover the government and attempting to 
install a Bolshevik dictatorship. The right contended that socialism and communism were 
the same,937 and that the “Reds” were trying to turn Vienna into a “Socialist Mecca” after 
Moscow.938 Dollfuss, like Seipel, the Austrian Church, and Mussolini, was fiercely anti-
socialist, and Dollfuss unequivocally refused to compromise with socialists. Dollfuss was 
also concerned about Mussolini whose support required that Austria to be anti-socialist.939 
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The Christian Social Party saw the socialists and Nazis as equally menacing. Neither was an 
eligible coalition partner, and both had to be prevented from obtaining power by any means 
necessary. Thus, Dollfuss’ greatest mistake was not forming a Christian Social Party-
Socialist coalition. The Greater German People’s Party’s hostility to the socialists had 
prevented a pro-Anschluss majority in the 1920’s. Now Christian Social Party hostility to the 
socialists prevented an anti-Nazi majority in the 1930s. 
Dollfuss’ path toward authoritarianism was rooted in experiences from his early life. 
The illegitimate son of a peasant and a miller, Dollfuss nonetheless attended university, 
where the philosopher Othmar Spann, who opposed democracy and capitalism, inspired 
him. In 1913 Dollfuss had studied theology and even considered becoming a priest.940 
Dollfuss, a devout Catholic, was also influenced by Bishop Emmanuel Kettler and the anti-
Semitic Christian Social leader Karl von Vogelsang. Together, these formative influences 
helped to shape Dollfuss’ pro-agrarian, anti-socialist, and anti-democratic policies.  
In the 1920s Dollfuss had been the Director of the Chamber of Agriculture of Lower 
Austria and Secretary of the Bauernbund (Peasants’ League) from 1922 to 1927. While 
working at the Bauernbund, he met his wife Alwine Gienke. As Director of the Chamber of 
Agriculture, Dollfuss was deeply concerned about the peasants. His main goal was to help 
the poor Austrian farmers who suffered during and after the war due to an agricultural 
slump. He supported farmers in agrarian policies, such as dairying, animal breeding, and 
allocating land.941 In 1930 he became the Christian Social Party President of the Austrian 
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Federal Railway. Under the Chancellorship of Karl Buresch in 1931,942 Dollfuss had been 
the Austrian Minister of Agriculture and Forests. When he became chancellor, Dollfuss had 
used leftover money from the 1922 League of Nations Protocol to give peasants loans943 and 
continued to advocate the interests of farmers. 
Like Seipel in the 1920s, Dollfuss received a League of Nation loan despite the 
growing authoritarianism of his Austro-fascist regime. On July 15, 1932, under Chancellor 
Dollfuss, Austria signed a treaty in Lausanne, Switzerland. In the treaty the British, 
Americans, and other powers gave Austria a loan of three-hundred million gold-schilling.944 
The Reichspost stated that two-thirds of the Austrian Nationalrat favored these loans.945 
Opponents to the loans invoked both patriotic and anti-Semitic sentiments. The July 19, 
1932, Wiener Morgan asserted that Austria was being sold into slavery due to the loan. The 
newspaper called the loan an “Auslandsdiktat” (foreign dictation) and a “Krebs” (cancer).  
According to Wiener Morgan, Austria now had to pay for Mr. Rothschild’s debts.946 
Dollfuss used the money for interest payments, housing and building projects, roads, 
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bridges, railroads, and the military, as well as aiding farmers.947 In short, Dollfuss was 
directing much of the foreign loans into public construction projects in a Keynesian-like 
effort to cut unemployment and restart the economy. 
As in the past, these loans came with conditions. Once again the grantors made 
Austria re-affirm both the Treaty of St. Germain and the Geneva Protocol at Lausanne.948 
Thus, in return for these loans, Austria again had to agree to remain independent and not 
seek a political or economic union with Germany. When Hitler became Chancellor of 
Germany on January 30, 1933, Dollfuss re-stated the Christian Social Party policy that was 
not only anti-Anschluss but also made clear that Austria must fight with all methods in order 
to maintain its independence.949 In addition, in January 1933, Christian Social civil servant 
Richard Schmitz reiterated the Christian Social Party’s stance when he said that Austria had 
to right to protect its culture and history.950  
 Dollfuss ended parliamentary government in Austria on March 4, 1933, because he 
feared that the Christian Social Party would lose its control over the government to Nazis 
and/or socialists. The immediate cause was the resignation of Karl Renner from parliament 
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which triggered a political crisis. Influenced by events in Germany where leaders had issued 
emergency degrees to circumvent the Reichstag, on March 7, Dollfuss addressed the 
Austrian people and issued his own emergency decree dissolving the Nationalrat, 
diminishing the powers of the president, suspending elections, and revoking parts of the 
constitution.951 In his appeal to fellow Austrians, Dollfuss announced that there was a 
parliamentary crisis in Austria, but since the legislature alone did not run the government, 
there was no state crisis. He declared that ”in order to preserve peace and order” the 
Austrian government had to forbid any public demonstrations and meetings and suppress 
freedom of speech until further notice.952  
Even though in 1933 Dollfuss had dissolved the parliament, cancelled future 
elections, and proceeded to rule by decree, he speciously claimed that the Austrian 
parliament had dissolved itself. In contrast to Hitler’s Nazis Party, Dollfuss established an 
Austrian version of fascism called “Austro-Faschismus,” which was monarchist, Catholic, 
anti-democratic, anti-Socialist, anti-Nazi, and nationalistically pro-Austrian. Dollfuss 
claimed that Nazism was not a true form of fascism. Yet, this disclaimer notwithstanding, 
Nazism and Austro-fascism shared an anti-socialist, anti-democratic, and anti-parliamentary 
ideology.953 
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 Having banned parliament, Dollfuss ruled through the army and paramilitary 
Heimwehr. The Dollfuss government suspended certain constitutional provisions and 
suppressed most opposition groups, like the Nazis, socialists, and communists. Dollfuss set 
out to uphold conservative and Catholic forces in Austria while at the same time reasserting 
Austria’s independence. Dollfuss stated that ”we desire neither international socialism nor 
brown socialism.”954 Although he did not get support from the working class, Dollfuss 
received strong backing from the Catholic Church, Heimwehr, army,955 farmers and peasants 
in rural areas, monarchists, and some Jews who feared Nazism.956 In particular, Dollfuss 
could rely on the solid support of the Austrian Catholic Church. The Austrian cardinal, 
bishops, and other clergy, like Bishop Dr. Johannes Gföllner of Linz, adamantly backed the 
Christian Social Party. Before Dollfuss’ Chancellorship, Cardinal Innitzer had written a 
letter in October 1930 stating that the “life and death struggle against formidable internal 
forces” and Christ’s foes had begun. Innitzer had even instructed “all good Christians” to 
vote for the Christian Social Party and held prayers during elections. The Catholic Church 
supported family and marriage and attacked socialism and basic rights, like separation of 
church and state and freedom of speech.957 Thus, the Austrian Church and the Dollfuss 
regime shared a hatred of socialism and as well as lack of sympathy for democracy.  
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In September 1933 Dollfuss created the Fatherland Party (Vaterländische Front), 
which was an umbrella political movement set up to support the Austro-fascist state. The 
Fatherland Party was sometimes also called the Fatherland Front or Patriotic Front. The 
Christian Social Party, to which Dollfuss belonged, was integrated into the Fatherland 
Party.958 The symbol of the Fatherland Party was the Kruckenkreuz, (crutched cross) as 
opposed to the Nazi Hakenkreuz (Swastika). The Fatherland Party’s slogan was ”Österreich 
erwache!” (Austria awake!)959 Moreover, Dollfuss allied himself with Ernst Rüdiger von 
Starhemberg and his fascist, paramilitary Heimwehr, which was also incorporated into the 
Fatherland Party. In speeches on May 6 and September 11, 1933, Dollfuss declared that “We 
want a Catholic and German state Austria . . .[and]  that we will preserve our homeland 
Austria . . ..”960  
Most Christian Social Party members supported the new authoritarian state, and 
party brochures stated “strengthen the VF (Vaterländische Front, Fatherland Party).” The 
democratic wing of the Christian Social Party under Leopold Kunschak and Josef Reither 
opposed the undemocratic state. On the other hand, the Christian Social Otto Günther 
asserted that although many party friends would shake their heads, the Hakenkreuz 
(Swastika) threat was so intense that a one-party state was necessary to save Austria.961  
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In 1934 Dollfuss proclaimed a Ständestaat, which was the fascist, undemocratic, one 
party, authoritarian state in Austria. The Fatherland Party became the only party.962 Dollfuss 
officially outlawed oppositional political parties, such as the socialist party in February and 
the Nazi Party in June. He had already banned the communists in 1933. When Dollfuss 
banned the socialist party, he had its offices raided. He also prohibited worker strikes and 
labor unions. Working class organizations were incorporated into the fascist state. The 
Schutzbund was terminated, and socialist control over Vienna ceased.963 After it became 
illegal, the socialist party became an underground organization that opposed the ruling 
government but nonetheless preferred it to the Nazis.964 On May 1, 1934 Dollfuss created a 
new constitution, which gave the chancellor much more power than the 1920 constitution965 
Dollfuss made a Concordat with the Vatican in 1934, which gave the Catholic Church more 
influence over Austrian schools, marriages, and other areas of life.  
 By suspending elections and establishing a one-party rule, Dollfuss had in fact made 
himself dictator, which heightened public discontent. The Dollfuss regime had suppressed 
Nazism and had maintained the state’s independence, but at the expense of parliamentary 
government. Sixty to seventy-five percent of the Austrian public, split equally between 
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socialists and Nazis, did not support the Dollfuss regime.966 Meanwhile, a German 
memorandum stated at least 80% of Austrians hated the Dollfuss government.967 These 
statistics show mass popular discontent toward Dollfuss, but do not mean majority support 
for union with Nazi Germany.   
In his autocratic ambition, Dollfuss overreached. His prohibition of the socialists was 
his biggest mistake, because he destroyed the most important potential ally against Nazism. 
Dollfuss not only banned the socialists, but also he crushed them in repressive violence 
when they did not passively submit. In response to government laws aimed at disabling the 
labor movement, a workers’ uprising broke out in February 1934. It began in Linz but 
spread to other industrial areas. About two hundred people died, including one hundred 
civilians and one hundred policemen, soldiers, and Heimwehr guards. The Dollfuss regime 
executed leaders of the uprising and dismissed thousands of insurgents from their jobs. The 
state also arrested several hundred socialists.968 The Dollfuss government forced the socialist 
leader Otto Bauer into exile in Brno, Czechoslovakia, for his role in the uprising. From 
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Czechoslovakia, he attempted to mobilize socialist resistance.969 Some smaller skirmishes 
between the government and socialists occurred after February 1934, but this incident was 
the largest sign of socialist unrest under the Dollfuss regime. Therefore, by 1934 Dollfuss’s 
popularity had dwindled considerably due to intense criticism from political opponents over 
his autocratic rule. Although Dollfuss destroyed the labor movement, ended elections and 
parliamentary government, and limited people’s rights, Martin Kitchen argues that fascism 
in Austria was never as severe as it was in Nazi Germany and Italy.970 Nonetheless, 
Dollfuss’ anti-socialist policies had cataclysmic consequences because they left Austria 
vulnerable to Nazism.  
 
IV. The Christian Socials and the Rise the Austrian Nazi Party  
 Besides the socialists, the Christian Social Party’s fiercest opponents were the 
Austrian Nazis. Unlike the Austrian Nazi Party, the Christian Social Party championed 
Austrian independence and Austrian rather than German nationalism. Moreover, the 
Christian Socials in Austria opposed the anti-clerical and anti-Catholic position that the 
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Nazis had taken in Germany. During the early 1930s the Austrian National Socialists had 
already drawn attention to themselves and gained support from the youth, anti-socialists, 
pro-German nationalists, anti-clericalists, and anti-Semites, as well as doctors, teachers, 
professors, writers, and other intellectuals, even though at this time they were still a 
relatively small minority party.971  
  Besides Georg Schönerer’s right wing movement in the nineteenth century, the 
origins of the Austrian Nazi Party can be traced to the anti-Slav, anti-Semitic, pro-
Anschluss, Deutsche Arbeiterpartie (German Workers’ Party) formed in Bohemia in 1903 in 
response to German Austrian competition with cheap Czech labor. In May 1918 the party 
had changed its name to Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartie (DNSAP, German 
National Socialist Workers’ Party). After the breakup of the Habsburg Empire, the party 
split into a Sudeten German group and an Austrian one. The growth of the German Nazi 
Party caused the Austrian Nazi Party to split briefly into pro- and anti-Hitler factions. In 
1926 the Austrian Nazis merged with their German counterparts, the NSDAP.972  
 The Austrian Nazis only had 500-600 members in 1929,973 and in 1930 Phipps 
reported that, unlike Germany, communism and National Socialism in Austria were virtually 
non-existent.974 The Nazi Party was much weaker in Austria than in Germany. In 1930 
elections in both countries the Austrian Nazi Party received 3% of the vote and no 
parliamentary seats, while its German counterpart had won 18% of the vote and 101 
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Reichstag seats.975 The Nazi Party had originated in Austria (Bohemia) but remained a 
fringe group there because Austrian politics were dominated by two main parties, the 
Christian Social and socialist. The third largest party was the Greater German People’s 
Party. As both it and the Christian Socials were very much on the right, there was little space 
on the political spectrum for yet another right-wing party. 
 By 1932, however, the Austrian Nazis were on the rise. The success of the party in 
Germany contributed to its strengthening in Austria, where it gained support from 
grossdeutsch and pro-Anschluss groups. Although November 1930 was the last national 
election in Austria, the last provincial election occurred in April 1932. In these provincial 
elections the Austrian Nazi Party received 201,000 votes, an increase of 174,000 from the 
previous elections, mainly at the expense of the Greater German People’s Party, whose votes 
had dwindled to almost nothing, and to a smaller degree the Christian Social Party. While 
Nazism appealed to Austrians of various classes and occupations, in 1932 the new middle 
class, especially civil servants– many of whom had been laid off– and managers, constituted 
one of the strongest bases of support for the Nazis.976 Nevertheless, the fact that the Austrian 
Nazi Party won about 17% of the votes in the provinces in1932 and the German Nazis had 
won about 37.4 % of the votes in national elections that same year,977 showed that in 
comparison, Austrian Nazism was still not as strong as its German counterpart in the early 
1930s. 
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 Sir Eric Phipps reported that a ”noticeable change” had occurred in 1932, and  
”whether through funds obtained from its parent [organization] in Germany or through the 
spontaneous growth of a widespread discontent against existing political and economic 
conditions . . . the Nazi Party is gradually acquiring an increasing hold over a section of the 
electorate.” The Nazi Party meetings in Vienna were ”well attended,” and through numerous 
placards, speakers, and parades, the Nazi movement offered ”a promise of excitement” and 
appealed to the anti-Jewish elements of the population. Phipps went on to say that 
apparently the Nazi Party had ”come to stay,” although the fate of a similar movement led 
by Schönerer from 1873 to 1888 suggested that Austrian fascination with far right national 
parties might only last a few years.978 
 Despite the increase in Nazi votes, two-thirds of Vienna remained ”Red,”979 and in 
provincial elections the Austrian Nazis had only received one-sixth of the seats at stake, 
compared to the German Nazi Party, which had emerged as the largest party in the 
Reichstag after July 1932. The Christian Socials and socialists still numerically dominated 
Austria, together receiving 70% of the vote in 1932. Most of the German nationalists did go 
over to the Nazi side by 1933,980 but this was still not enough. Any significant gains by the 
Nazi Party had to be drawn away from one of the two main parties. It was extremely 
difficult for the Nazi Party to penetrate either the socialist party, which held sway over the 
working class and Vienna, and the Christian Social Party, whose stronghold was the 
Catholic, conservative provinces. The Austrian Catholic Church was a powerful and 
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influential institution that opposed the Nazis. Although 90.5% of Austrians were Catholic, 
before 1933 only 36-45% of them had regularly voted Christian Socialist. In 1934 the 
working class represented about 55% of Austrians, and even though not all voted socialist, 
most did.981 In short, the Austrian Nazi Party was clearly on the rise at this time, but 
significant structural factors stood in the way of its making further major gains among the 
Austrian electorate. Its success was heavily dependent on Nazi Germany, which besides 
sending support set out to undermine the Austrian government.  
 
V. Dollfuss: Combating Nazism and Terrorism  
 Germany supported violence and propaganda in Austria, which hurt the latter’s 
economy, created rampant disorder, and brought public attention to the Nazi Party which 
increased in membership.982 However, this tactic failed to bring the Nazis to power or 
achieve an Anschluss. At the same time Dollfuss’ anti-Nazi policies failed to eliminate the 
Nazi threat because the party moved underground and continued its attacks on the 
government. Dollfuss’ anti-democratic and anti-Nazi policies led to much Austrian criticism 
and dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, but not to popular support for Nazism or the 
Anschluss.  
 The Dollfuss government responded to Nazi terrorism by issuing curfews in cities, 
prohibiting the sale of German newspapers, raiding Nazi quarters, and arresting hundreds of 
agitators. According to the Chicago Daily Tribune, even many German citizens were either 
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arrested or deported. Dollfuss appointed Eugen Seydel as chief of police to restore order.983 
Dollfuss also reintroduced the death penalty for convicted Nazi terrorists and dismissed pro-
Nazi professors from Austrian universities. Furthermore, he opened a concentration camp 
for the internment of political prisoners (Nazis as well as socialists and communists),984 and 
ultimately he made oppositional parties illegal.    
 In order to weaken the Dollfuss regime, Nazi Germany made it mandatory for 
Germans visiting Austria to pay one-thousand marks for a visa on May 26, 1933.985  The 
expensive visas curbed tourism and threatened to further cripple Austria’s economy, which 
was heavily dependent on tourism as a source of revenue. Hitler’s intention was to topple 
the Dollfuss government and have new elections that would most likely strengthen the Nazi 
position.  In April 1934 Nazi Germany also cut imports to Austria.986 
 On June 14, 1933, the Dollfuss government proclaimed the Nazis responsible for a 
wave of terrorism that included a series of bomb attacks in Austria that targeted utilities, 
stores, troops, and Austrian leaders, such as the Minister of Education.987 One such bomb 
attack on an Austrian regiment in Lower Austria left thirty men wounded. In Salzburg an 
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attempt was made to bomb the water and electric plant and leave the city without utilities.988 
In June 1933 the Washington Post reported that a similar attempt to knock out a power plant 
occurred in Vienna. Nazis released tear gas into Austrian political meetings and cut phone 
lines. German National Socialists also agitated and aroused Austrian citizens by using 
German planes to drop seditious pamphlets and propaganda fliers from the skies. These 
fliers contained messages like the “new fight” has begun. The German planes that flew into 
Austrian airspace created such a problem that Austria requested seventy-five planes from the 
major powers, despite the limitations placed on the Austrian air-force in the Treaty of St. 
Germain and the Geneva disarmament conference in 1932.989 In addition, the Nazis sent 
subversive radio broadcasts from Munich.990 Nazi propaganda films, like Triumph of the 
Will, were screened in Austria as well as Germany.991 In mid-June 1933, the Chicago Daily 
Tribune stated that Nazis, Christian Socials, and socialists attacked one another on the 
streets.992 The terrorist outbreaks scared away foreign tourists, compounding the decline in 
an already shattered tourist economy. 
 The Austrian government contended that Nazi involvement in these terrorist 
incidents was ”proven beyond doubt.”993 The Reichspost declared that the National 
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Socialists were ”no longer a political, but a criminal association.”994 On the other hand, the 
pro-Nazi Wiener Neuste Nachrichten placed the blame for the attacks on a few radical 
extremists within the party and said ”the Government cannot suppress the will of a great part 
of the Austrian people, which will persist and manifest itself in due course.”995  
 Moreover, in June 1933 the New York Times contended that Nazi support was 
steadily rising in Austria’s provinces.996 Tyrol, Salzburg, and Vorarlberg were especially hit 
hard by the drop in tourism. Although not necessarily pro-Nazi, the people of these 
provinces were so dependent on German tourism that they wanted some reconciliation with 
Germany. Local skirmishes and bomb explosions were numerous in these provinces, 
indicating high Nazi activity. It was Consul Ian Henderson’s opinion that loss of German 
tourism had won Nazi supporters in these regions.997 According to Henderson, in 1933 
tourism declined in Salzburg by 45%. Two-thirds of the province was sympathetic to the 
Nazis, and before the dissolution of the Austrian Nazi Party, its meetings experienced full 
attendance.998 Henderson also said that he had ”no doubt” that the people in Vorarlberg were 
overwhelmingly pro-Nazi, and if elections were held at present the Nazis would win.999 In 
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addition, Nazism was very popular in Carinthia and Styria.1000 Swastikas were burned on 
mountain sides, posters were plastered on walls in towns at night, and far-right pamphlets 
were handed out to the populace.1001    
 Henderson reported that there was extremely high anti-Italian sentiment in Tyrol 
over the loss of South Tyrol and the oppression of its German inhabitants.1002 In South 
Tyrol, the Italian government was suppressing the instruction of the German language in 
certain areas and replacing it with Italian, dismissing German workers, and conscripting 
German Tyroleans into the Italian army.1003 German historic place names were taken down, 
some family names Italianized, freedom of speech compromised, and German was banned 
from official public use, like the courts.1004 In a 1928 speech Mussolini had called the 
German minority in South Tyrol an ”‘absolutely negligible’ one.”1005  In a conversation 
among a British diplomat, Mussolini, and the Italian Ambassador in Great Britain Count 
Dino Grandi, also in 1928, the latter had stated that the issue would be of no more concern 
within ten years because by then South Tyrol would be completely Italian.1006  In the early 
and mid- 1930s about 1,650 South Tyroleans had fled to Austria and Germany.1007  
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 The situation in South Tyrol infuriated Austrian Tyroleans who were not only anti-
Italian, but also opposed to the Austrian government. Since the end of World War I they had 
believed that Berlin not Vienna would properly address their grievances. Austrian Tyroleans 
had felt especially betrayed by Dollfuss’ alliance with Mussolini.1008 As in other areas, the 
German Tyroleans were organizing themselves, and one particular group, the Andreas Hofer 
Bund,1009 had a large number of people sympathetic to Nazism.1010 Large numbers of 
business men in Tyrol also sympathized with Nazism.1011 One Tyrolean Deputy and member 
of the Greater German People’s Party, Dr. Straffner, viewed the ”Anschluss as the panacea 
for Austria’s ills.”1012  In 1933 a few months after Hitler came to power, the Austrian Nazis 
had won 41% of the votes in Innsbruck. Nevertheless, altogether Nazi gains in Tyrol were 
low compared to those in Carinthia and Styria.1013 The New York Times also maintained that 
Tyrol had ardent pro-monarchical leanings.1014  
 Besides South Tyrol, German national sentiment heightened among German-
speaking populations in other former pre-war Habsburg territories as well. Because the 
Nazis became the preeminent supporters of the German national cause, Nazism was likewise 
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rising.  From Czechoslovakia, Sir Joseph Addison reported that of the Sudeten Germans ”the 
overwhelmingly majority are in favour of a change and, in default of any other satisfaction, 
favour Nazidom,” and ”they wish to be governed, or misgoverned by persons whose mother 
tongue is German and not by the Slavs, whom they despise….”1015 Henderson maintained 
that the Sudetens were ”Nazi to a man” and ”would welcome any upheaval which would 
bring about Czech discomfiture.”1016 Austrian sympathy for the Sudeten Germans remained 
strong, and the oppression of the ethnic Germans continued to dampen friendly relations 
between the Austrians and Czechs into the late 1930s. South Tyrol, Czechoslovakia, and 
Austria were similar because each contained a large German population in close proximity 
to the German Fatherland where German national sentiment and Nazism were increasing.  
Among these three territories, the most immediate Nazi goal was still a seizure of power in 
Austria. Ironically, Hitler had abandoned the South Tyroleans to Mussolini, the one clear 
case where he abandoned ethnic Germans for political expediency. The South Tyroleans 
were in denial about this. 
 After banning the Nazi Party in June 1934 because of heightened terrorism, Dollfuss 
had the National Socialist quarters in Austria seized and any German agitators expelled.1017 
According to the Washington Post, by 1934 Dollfuss had arrested about 1,500 people in his 
campaign to eliminate Nazism, and several accused terrorists, such as Josef Gerl who had 
shot a policeman, had been executed.1018 A memorandum by the British Foreign Office 
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stated that ”Dr. Dollfuss’ object is to continue to rule until the National Socialists have 
discredited themselves in Germany (which he hopes will be soon) and to put off holding 
new elections till then.”1019 Dollfuss had helped Austria resist National Socialism, but 
Dollfuss accomplished this at the expense of democracy. Regardless of Dollfuss’ ban of the 
Nazi Party, Nazi terrorism and propaganda remained in Austria. Nazis supporters continued 
to bomb stores, sabotage work places, and assault politicians throughout Austria.1020 
 Despite the intense Nazi terrorism and the rise of Nazism in the provinces, overall, 
the Nazis remained a minority in Austria as shown by the fact that there was no mass 
support for the attempted Nazi coup—and resulting assassination of Dollfuss—in July 1934. 
From 1933 to March 1938 about one-third of Austrians embraced Nazism. After Dollfuss’s 
assassination, his successor Kurt von Schuschnigg continued the Ständestaat, which lasted 
until the Anschluss of 1938. Schuschnigg followed the same basic approach as Dollfuss, 
suspending Austrian rights, maintaining the ban on Nazis and Socialists, and preserving 
Austrian independence. 
 
VI. Conclusion   
In the period 1930 to 1934 the Christian Social Party underwent huge changes. The 
Great Coalition broke up in 1932 due to the collapse of the Austro-German customs union 
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plan of 1931 and the rise of Nazism that weakened the Greater German People’s Party. In 
addition, Dollfuss established his own dictatorship in 1933. He suppressed oppositional 
parties and terminated elections in order to stay in power. Dollfuss formed a new anti-
socialist, Austrian nationalist, Austro-fascist, rightwing coalition with the Heimwehr.  
Nonetheless, some things remained the same in this period. The Christian Social 
Party still supported Austrian independence with continued diplomatic and financial support 
from Britain and the United States. Reasons why the Christian Social Party did not want an 
Anschluss were Austrian nationalism, Catholicism, anti-socialism, fear of Prussian and 
Protestant domination, and the influence of American and British policies. The fact that 
Catholic Church prayed for Dollfuss’ success, showed the tight relationship between his 
party and the Church in the 1930s. Both were anti-Anschluss and against the extension of 
German Protestantism and initially German socialism and later German Nazism. Dollfuss, 
like Seipel, was an Austrian patriot who confident in Austria’s viability. 
Even though the Christian Social Party had been integrated into the Fatherland Party 
in September 1933, the Christian Social Party continued to exist until 1934. The Christian 
Social Party held its last meeting on May 14 and was officially dissolved on September 28, 
1934.1021 At the last Christian Social Party meeting, Leopold Kunschak honored past 
Christian Socials Lueger and Seipel and the present leader Dollfuss, for shaping not only the 
Christian Social Party, but also the history of Austria. Kunschak stated that these men had 
gotten the country out of trouble and saved Austria from both the “red” and “brown” 
menaces. Knowing that the Christian Social Party would be terminated, he concluded that 
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Dollfuss must now go his own way. Despite his initial opposition to autocratic rule, 
Kunschak wished Dollfuss well.1022  
Kunschak’s statement during the last party meeting showed the party’s inability to 
join forces with the socialists and the precariousness of this situation. Dollfuss’ crushing 
rather than allying with socialists meant that no government with majority support was 
possible. It also led to Austria’s dependence on Italian support since Britain and the United 
States were unwilling to go beyond financial to political/military commitment.1023 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
THE LEGITIMISTS, 1930-1934 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
From 1930 to 1934, the legitimists continued to be the most ardent Austrian 
nationalists who opposed an Anschluss, in comparison to the Christian Socials and 
industrialists. In January 1932 the monarchist newspaper the Staatswehr was explicit and 
blunt in stating that the Anschluss meant “death” (Tod) for Austria.1024 As in the 1920s, the 
main goal of Austrian monarchists was still a Habsburg restoration. The monarchist 
movement strengthened in the 1930s, especially in response to Nazism.  
The two most important figures of the Austrian monarchist movement in the 1930s 
were Archduke Otto von Habsburg and Prince Ernst Rődiger von Starhemberg, the leader of 
the Heimwehr (Home Guard),1025 a heavily armed, fascist, paramilitary organization that 
strongly opposed socialism and after 1931 Nazism. There was a strong monarchist element 
within the Heimwehr, which in the 1930s had about two-hundred thousand members. Gustav 
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Wolff, Ernst Karl Winter, and Willibald Plıchl were also important men in the legitimist 
movement from 1930 to 1934.  
From 1930 to 1934 the legitimists were key players in the struggle against Nazism 
and the fight to save Austria. After the Anschluss, the legitimists became victims of Nazism. 
Many monarchists fled, and among those who did not many were persecuted or even killed 
by the Nazis. In addition, despite of the legitimists’ political failures, they indirectly 
fragmented the forces of the right who otherwise would have favored an Anschluss. Thus, 
the Austrian monarchists and their sympathizers within the Christian Social Party and 
Heimwehr took on the enemies of an independent Austria, in particular the Nazis.  
This chapter will focus on the 1930s, with less attention to the time when the 
legitimists were in exile in the United States and Great Britain. First it looks at the customs 
union plans. Second, it investigates the various legitimist organizations. Third, it analyzes 
key monarchist figures from 1930 to 1934. Finally, this chapter examines how some 
monarchists interacted with the Americans and British in maintaining Austrian 
independence. 
Initially, the United States and Great Britain did not support the idea of a Habsburg 
restoration, believing that this would undo the postwar peace settlement. After the rise of 
Nazism in the 1930s, however, Great Britain and the United States viewed a Habsburg 
restoration in Austria as preferable to a Nazi takeover. After the Anschluss, many of the 
Austrian legitimist exiles ended up in Great Britain and the United States, where they 
participated in the Austrian resistance movement against Nazism, which overall was small, 
fragmented, and unsuccessful. Ironically, during World War II, the governments of the 
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United States and Great Britain belatedly aided the Austrian legitimist exiles in their efforts 
to regain Austrian independence.  
 
II. Customs Union of 1931 and Danube Confederation of 1932 
The monarchists were the only Austrian group that adamantly came out against the 
Austro-German customs union attempt in 1931. Even though the majority of Austrians had 
supported the customs union at a time when Austria was suffering from the worst of the 
Great Depression, legitimists continued to contend that the reestablishment of the monarchy 
was the only solution to Austria’s ills.1026 More than one-thousand Austrian monarchists 
handed the British, Italian, and Hungarian diplomats in Vienna a memorandum on March 
28, 1931, declaring that the Austro-German customs union would undermine both Austrian 
independence and a Habsburg restoration.1027  
Also, the legitimists supported the Danube Confederation plan of 1932. The 
Staatswehr, on January 20, 1932, had headline titles that asked the question: “Anschluss 
oder Donauföderation, Hitler oder Habsburg?“ (Anschluss or Danube Confederation? Hitler 
or Habsburg?). The newspaper supported the latter over the former. The newspaper 
supported a customs union with only Hungary and/or Italy if the Danube Confederation plan 
failed.1028 They also backed Dollfuss’ fascist and anti-Anschluss state and its close ties with 
Italy and Hungary in the 1930s. 
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III. The Membership of Legitimist Organizations  
 By 1934 the number of Austrian legitimists, according to British calculations, was 
1,219,976.1029 This figure regarding the total number of legitimists was based on 
membership in the monarchist organizations and parties, not voting. The monarchist, Der 
Eiserne Ring (the Iron Ring)1030 had a membership of about 100,000 in the 1930s. Although 
in the late 1920s only a couple hundred communities in Austria had elected Archduke Otto 
as an honorary citizen, by 1934 4,374 communities were reported to have done so.1031 The 
number of legitimists increased in the 1930s in response to the economic crisis and Nazism. 
Nevertheless, from 1930 to 1934 the monarchists still had scant success at the polls and 
remained a small minority.   
 
IV. Otto von Habsburg  
Although he was in exile and had little real political power, Otto von Habsburg, 
whose family the British had aided after World War I and who had received tremendous 
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American support during World War II, remained the most powerful symbol for the 
Austrian legitimist movement in the 1930s. Following the death of his father Kaiser Karl in 
1922, Austrian monarchists regarded Otto von Habsburg1032 as the legitimate heir to the 
throne.1033 In 1933, when Hitler came to power and set his eye of expansion on Austria, Otto 
von Habsburg initiated opposition to Nazism from exile to keep Austria independent. In the 
1930s Austria, Archduke Otto was a major figure in the struggle of “Habsburg versus 
Hitler.”1034 Archduke Otto had even considered taking over the government from Austrian 
Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg. During World War II, Archduke Otto and his family were in 
the USA working for a free Austria.  
The Habsburg places of exile included Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Madeira, and 
the USA. Their first refuge was a Habsburg hunting lodge at Eckartsau, which was in still 
Austria. Karl had not abdicated his throne, and in early January 1919 the socialist and first 
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Austrian Chancellor Karl Renner arrived at Eckartsau and instructed the Habsburgs to leave 
the country. According to Gordon Brook-Shepherd, the security situation in Eckartsau was 
poor, and the royal family was threatened by a mob of rebels and looters. On February 16, 
1919, several British officers who belonged to the British military authorities in Vienna 
rescued the Habsburg family and escorted them from Eckartsau, Austria, to safety in 
Switzerland. The British monarchy had felt guilt over not having done anything during the 
Russia Revolution when the Bolsheviks murdered George V’s cousin Czar Nicholas II and 
his entire family in cold blood at Ekaterinburg. Gordon Brook-Shepherd asserted that 
George V did not want Eckartsau to become another Ekaterinburg. By helping the 
Habsburgs, the British monarchy was extending its hand to fellow royals in trouble. The 
commanding British officer Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Lisle Strutt befriended the 
Habsburgs. The British flag flew from the Habsburg motor cars as they left Austria. 
Ironically, the British officers gave the Habsburgs their only official salute.1035   
On April 3, 1919, the Austrian government, headed by the socialists, enacted the 
Habsburg laws (Habsburgergesetz) that officially banned the Habsburgs from Austria and 
confiscated their properties, including Schloss Schönbrunn. Yet, most members of the 
Christian Social Party and even the Greater German Party member Chancellor Johannes 
Schober, attended a mass to mourn the death of Karl in April 1922.1036 After the mass, many 
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monarchists shouted “Long Live the Habsburgs!”1037 In 1926 the Staatswehr headline stated 
“Otto, our future.”1038 
In 1930 fifteen hundred Austrian villages had declared Archduke Otto an honorary 
citizen and each year that number rose. The villages wanted to revoke the Habsburg Laws. 
Archduke Otto had connections to the Iron Ring, which had one of the late Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand’s sons, Maximilian Hohenberg, as its President. In 1933 and 1934 monarchist 
supporters had hoped that Dollfuss would restore Otto as Emperor1039 and that the 
“Kaiserless” time would come to an end.1040 Legitimists argued that the Kaiser would bring 
law, stability, and an end to violence.1041  
Archduke Otto opposed the Nazi conquest of Austria, and in 1939 he asked Great 
Britain and France permission to form an Austrian legion out of Austrian exiles, mostly 
legitimists, to fight Nazi Germany. In return for an Austrian legion fighting on the side of 
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the Allies, Archduke Otto wanted the restoration of an independent Austria.1042 From his 
exile in Belgium, Archduke Otto helped found an Austrian newspaper, the İsterreichische 
Post, which was to encourage opposition to National Socialism.1043 
Fleeing Nazi controlled Europe on March 4, 1940, Archduke Otto arrived in the 
United States and received a very warm welcome in the White House. Archduke Otto and 
President Franklin Roosevelt did not officially discuss a Habsburg restoration. Instead the 
primary focus was Austrian independence, which Roosevelt affirmed would be the 
American foreign policy goal, although the United States had not yet entered the war at this 
time. Archduke Otto spoke before the United States Senate, where he received a standing 
ovation, and in addition Archduke Otto gave many interviews with American newspapers 
and radio stations championing the Austrian cause. He made contact with Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, Senator Robert Taft, and Vice President John Garner.1044  
During World War II, Archduke Otto’s mother Zita even lived in the White House 
with Roosevelt.1045 On June 12, 1943, Franklin Roosevelt wrote a telegram to Archduke 
Otto stating:  “My dear Otto . . . the American people would be happy to see the people of 
Austria regain their place as an independent nation.”  In addition, when he saw a free 
Czechoslovakia stamp, Archduke Otto encouraged the Post Office of the United States to 
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introduce a free Austria stamp on November 28, 1943.  Ironically, the stamp pictured 
Emperor Karl and not the Austrian Republic.1046    
In July 1940 Roosevelt had urged Archduke Otto to assemble an Austrian volunteer 
battalion within the framework of the United States army, hoping to recruit thousands of 
Austrian exiles to fight for a free Austria. In 1942 the War Department under Henry Stimson 
established the 101st US Infantry Battalion at Camp Attenbury in Indiana.1047 Archduke 
Otto’s brothers Louis and Felix joined. Ultimately, the War Department called off plans for 
the Austrian volunteer battalion on April 12, 1943, which at that time had about five-
hundred men. The volunteer battalion and the attempt to create an official Austrian 
government in exile failed because the various political factions, the socialists, 
conservatives, and monarchists, could not come to an agreement. The socialists, suspecting 
that Archduke Otto’s schemes had more to do with monarchical restoration than Austrian 
independence, had called the volunteer battalion a “Habsburg battalion.”1048 Ultimately, 
even with American sympathy and support, Archduke Otto had many Austrian 
detractors.1049 
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V. Ernst Rődiger von Starhemberg 
 Ernst Rődiger von Starhemberg1050 was the leader of the paramilitary and Austro-
fascist Heimwehr in the 1930s. He was also a legitimist supporter and Austrian nationalist 
who played a pivotal role in preserving Austrian independence. He belonged to the 
Heimwehr’s political party the Heimatblock. After witnessing a wave of Nazi terrorism in 
Austria that began in 1931, Starhemberg contended that the Nazis could not be reasoned 
with and advocated the use of force against them. Therefore, he sought to turn his Heimwehr 
into a fighting apparatus strong enough to counter both the socialist Schutzbund and the 
Nazis. In the early 1930s Starhemberg’s Heimwehr was receiving most of its arms and 
money from Mussolini, in direct violation of the peace treaty. Throughout the First 
Republic, including the 1931 Putsch attempted by a dissident Heimwehr minority and the 
1934 Nazi assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss, Starhemberg and his Heimwehr remained 
loyal to the Austrian government and Austrian independence.1051   
 Starhemberg’s family had received both their land and wealth in return for their 
centuries-long service and loyalty to the Habsburgs. One of his ancestors had liberated 
Vienna from the Turks in 1683. Starhemberg had inherited the title “Prince” when he was 
born. Thus it is no surprise that when the Habsburg Monarchy collapsed, Starhemberg was 
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shocked, upset, and embittered. A far more disturbing an experience was Starhemberg’s 
return to Austria after fighting on the Italian Front. A mob taunted and humiliated 
Starhemberg and other returning Austrian officers. The mob ripped off the soldiers’ imperial 
insignias and Starhemberg’s medal of honor and threw them onto the ground. In line with 
his family’s close ties with the Habsburgs and his bitterness at the destruction of the 
monarchy, during the inter-war period Starhemberg remained a monarchist and became a 
member of the legitimist Vereinigung katholischer Edelleute in Österreich (Union of 
Catholic Nobility in Austria).1052 
Starhemberg’s enemies branded him a “murderer of workers,” “Swastika supporter,” 
and a “high traitor.” But his supporters considered him a true champion for Austrian 
independence. Like many on the right, Starhemberg was initially attracted by fascism, and 
he even played a minor role in the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch in Munich but was not arrested. 
Then, despite his initial fascination with Hitler and unlike so many others on the right, 
Starhemberg quickly became disillusioned with Nazism and became one of its fiercest 
opponents.  
In addition, Starhemberg distanced himself from Walter Pfrimer, the leader of the 
Styrian Heimwehr, who on September 13, 1931, attempted a Putsch that he had been 
preparing for months. With the intention of seizing control of the government, Pfrimer and 
forty uniformed Heimwehr members assembled in Styria. Pfrimer had declared himself 
dictator of Austria, but he lacked popular backing.1053 At the first sight of the local police, 
most of the Heimwehr members fled without much violence occurring with the exception of 
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 Ernst Rődiger von Starhemberg, Memoirs (Vienna: Amalthea-Verlag, 1971), 35-38. 
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 “Austria Puts Down a One Day Revolt.” New York Times, 14 September 1931. 
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a few fatalities.1054 Two people died and twelve were wounded.1055 Because the Austrian 
government had put down the Putsch quickly, Great Britain, France, Italy, and other 
countries saw no reason to intervene.1056 Starhemberg had adamantly stated that he had 
played no role in the Pfrimer coup and that he had remained loyal to the government. 
However, the Austrian government had arrested Starhemberg for several days until the 
charges were dropped.1057  
In the 1930s Prince Starhemberg increasingly spoke out against democracy and 
parliamentarianism. In order to unite Austrian right wing groups under one single banner, 
Starhemberg disbanded his Heimatblock in 1933, and had its members join the Fatherland 
Party. In May 1934, while remaining the leader of the Heimwehr, Starhemberg also became 
Vice Chancellor under Dollfuss and Minister of State Security, which made him one of the 
most important figures in Austrian politics. Moreover, in the wake of the1934 coup, he made 
no attempt to seize power for himself but mobilized his Heimwehr troops to prevent a Nazi 
takeover and assisted the Austrian government.1058 After Dollfuss died in July 1934, 
Starhemberg became the leader of Fatherland Party. He was thirty-five years old then, and 
newspapers described as an attractive and “youthful aristocrat.”1059 In 1934 Austrian 
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monarchists wanted him to become “Regent of a Kingdom of Austria” and to prepare the 
way for a future Habsburg restoration.1060 
Although Starhemberg had befriended Dollfuss, Schuschnigg mistrusted him. 
Schuschnigg dissolved the Heimwehr on October 10, 1936, because he thought it was a rival 
power group that was possibly dangerous to the government. The dissolution of the 
Heimwehr was a prime example of Austrian internal factionalism prior to the German 
invasion. After the termination of the Heimwehr, its members either joined the Nazi Party or 
favored the Austrian legitimist faction. Many ex-Heimwehr members collaborated with the 
Nazis, like Walter Pfrimer. Nonetheless, many of the pro-monarchist and Austrian 
nationalist (as opposed to German nationalist) members of the former Heimwehr supported 
the government against Nazism. Starhemberg and Richard Steidle1061 exemplified the latter. 
After the Anschluss, Starhemberg left Austria and Steidle ended up in a concentration camp. 
In 1939, during his exile in France and Britain, Starhemberg attempted to create an Austrian 
                                                                                                                                                      
July 1934; “Starhemberg is Firm on Austrian Independence.” New York Times, 27 July 
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Foreign Legion that would fight Nazi Germany, but this proposal failed. However, 
Starhemberg did fight for the Free French air force.1062 
 
VI. The Legitimists and the United States and Great Britain  
Although in the period 1930 to 1934 Great Britain and the United States had 
officially opposed a Habsburg restoration, nonetheless in light of changing circumstances 
they gradually began to value the legitimists for their steadfast opposition to the Anschluss. 
According to the New York Times on June 16, 1933, France and the Little Entente stated that 
they preferred the return of Otto von Habsburg over an Anschluss.1063 
In particular after the 1934 assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss, the monarchist 
movement in Austria greatly increased.1064 Given a choice between a Habsburg restoration 
and Nazism, many countries, like France, Britain, the US, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
and Yugoslavia, considered the monarchist alternative as the “lesser of the two evils.”1065 
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The New York Times on July 31, 1934, stated that the major powers had no immediate plans 
for a restoration, but the Dollfuss assassination “has certainly brought a monarchy nearer.” 
The major powers favored Archduke Otto over Hitler.1066 Therefore, in 1933 and 1934, the 
Americans and the British reversed their earlier position and began to appreciate the 
usefulness of the monarchist opposition to Anschluss, even though they opposed the 
monarchists’ revision of the post-war peace settlement.   
Furthermore, tens of thousands of Austrians fled to the United States and Great 
Britain after the Anschluss, and during the course of World War II, both the United States 
and Britain welcomed and worked with the Austrian legitimists in their fight for an 
independent Austria. Although not all the Austrian émigrés were politically active and not 
all were legitimists, most of these émigrés were committed to the cause of overthrowing 
Nazism and re-establishing an independent Austria. Besides Otto von Habsburg, three 
prominent Austrian legitimist leaders who entered the United States of America and fought 
for an independent Austria were Willibald Plıchl,1067 Karl Winter,1068 and Hans Rott.1069 
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written him on February 17, 1941, stressing the need for Austrian exiles in the United States 
to present a united front. On September 1941 they established the Free Austrian National 
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Besides Ernst Rődiger von Starhemberg, who went into exile in Britain from 1940 to 1942 
and fought for the Free France air force, another Austrian in Great Britain with strong 
monarchist leanings was Baron Georg Franckenstein.1070 
 Overall, the Austrian exiles in the United States and Great Britain failed to establish 
common objectives or a united front. There were fragmented into several camps, such as the 
legitimists, socialists, and Christian Socials.1071 The various groups had minor success.1072 
However, when it came to the larger and more significant issues, such as establishing an 
Austrian volunteer battalion and an Austrian government in exile, the Austrian émigrés 
                                                                                                                                                      
themselves would decide what type of government they wanted. However, Archduke Otto 
played such a significant role in the Free Austria Movement that many Austrian anti-
monarchist emigrants strongly opposed and even challenged Rott’s Free Austria Movement. 
Archduke Otto was both a strong asset and liability to the Free Austria Movement. Julius 
Deutsch who led the socialist exiles in the United States, in particular, was a fierce 
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failed.1073 This showed the strong factionalism within Austria that did not end with Dollfuss 
but continued into World War II.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
By the 1938 Anschluss most legitimist organizations had disappeared from the 
political spectrum. One achievement of the Reichsbund, Iron Ring, and other legitimist 
organizations was their role in re-establishing ties between the Austrian government and the 
House of Habsburg. In 1935 Schuschnigg repealed the Habsburg laws that had confiscated 
the family’s property and banned them from Austria.  
Similar to the 1920s, from 1930 to 1934 the legitimists were true Austrian 
nationalists who opposed the Anschluss in Austria because a union with Germany would 
hinder a Habsburg restoration. In 1932, the Staatswehr had called the Anschluss “suicide” 
(Selbsmord).1074 Moreover, although the Christian Social Party and Austrian industries had 
large pro-Anschluss factions within them, the legitimist position on the Anschluss question 
was clear and precise. In contrast to the Christian Socials and industrialists, the monarchists 
were the only group that adamantly opposed the 1931 customs union between Austrian and 
Germany. The legitimists had also fully supported both the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg 
regimes. 
As in the 1920s, from 1930 to 1934 the legitimists were not only anti-Anschluss,  
but also anti-republican, anti-socialist, and anti-Prussian. According to the Staatswehr in 
September 1933, “We traditional Austrian monarchists remain opposed to the Anschluss . . .. 
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We Fatherland loyal Austrians would rather eat Austrian bread with no butter than a 
Prussian roast that would only cause stomach problems.”1075 As will be noted below, after 
Hitler came to power in Germany, the monarchists opposed an Anschluss even more.1076 
 The rise of National Socialism in the 1930s marked a new threat for Austrian 
legitimists.1077 Although both the monarchists and Nazis were anti-democratic, the 
monarchists opposed the Nazis because they radically and aggressively sought to annex 
Austria. In addition, the Austro-fascism that Austrian monarchists favored was not only 
fascist, but also Catholic, monarchist, and pro-Austrian. Thus, the legitimists were strongly 
anti-Nazi.1078 
The Staatswehr, in mid-February 1933, called for a united front against Nazism.1079 
According to the Staatswehr, the monarchists were “not bomb-throwers, rapists, or 
terrorists,” but objective and honest.1080 Also, in May 1933, Gustav Wolff’s Kaisertreue 
Volkspartei spoke to Dollfuss and stated that they must unite “against the red pest and brown 
threat.”1081 In 1934, the monarchists stated that they opposed the Hitlerstaat and preferred to 
                                                 
1075
 Staatswehr, mid-September 1933. 
 
1076
 Staatswehr,  mid-September 1933. 
 
1077
 Staatswehr,  10 November 1933.  The article titled, “Hakenkreuz und Kasierkrone,” 
opposed Nazism and preferred the Kaiser.  
 
1078
 An article in the Staatswehr, on 18 February 1932, titled “Österreich Erwache—Preußen 
wird Frech!” (Austria Wake Up—Prussian is becoming bad!) bitterly attacked Nazism (and 
Prussia). The Staatswehr, in mid-February 1933, also called for monarchists to stand united 
against Nazism. 
 
1079Staatswehr, mid-February 1933. The newspaper had also predicted that Nazi regime 
would collapse within half a year. 
 
1080
 Staatswehr, mid-September 1933.  
 
 353 
be under a double eagle (Doppeladler) rather than a Swastika.1082 The legitimists favored 
Otto von Habsburg over Adolf Hitler, and the Staatswehr called Archduke Otto Austria’s 
savior.1083 Because of their steadfast anti-Nazism, the legitimists were the first victims of 
Nazism, and many legitimists died in their resistance to Nazism.  
Furthermore, the legitimists played a significant indirect role by splitting the unity of 
the right that otherwise would have almost entirely advocated a union of Germany and 
Austria. The Austrian right was divided into monarchist, Greater German, and later National 
Socialist supporters. The legitimists had attracted followers from the right within the 
Christian Social Party and Heimwehr. The monarchists supported Dollfuss in his triumph 
against the socialists and at least temporarily over the Nazis in the authoritarian phase of 
1934 to 1938.1084 
Especially after the assassination of Dollfuss, the United States and Great Britain had 
embraced Austrian monarchists in their goal of maintaining Austrian independence, but 
neither the United States nor Britain embraced the monarchist goal of restoring the 
Habsburgs. Following the Anschluss, many legitimists, such as Otto von Habsburg, Karl 
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Winter, Willibald Plıchl, and Ernst Rődiger von Starhemberg, fled to the United States and 
Great Britain. After the outbreak of World War II, the United States and Great Britain 
actively aided the legitimist refugees. In their countries of exile, many legitimists continued 
the struggle for an independent Austria. Yet, political conflicts between the monarchists, 
Christian Socials, and the socialists fractured any united Austrian resistance to Nazism, and 
this meant that Austria had no official government in exile.    
After World War II, however, the monarchist movement made no political 
comeback. If they could not prevail in the chaos, instability, and economic hardship of the 
inter-war period, they certainly could make no headway against the political and economic 
success of the Second Austrian Republic. In the time period from 1930 to 1934 the 
legitimists were important because of all the different Austrian groups, the legitimists were 
the most pronounced in their opposition to an Anschluss, an Austro-German customs union, 
and Nazism.1085  
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 Even when one goes to Austria today one senses the strong Habsburg nostalgia. There 
are many Habsburg palaces, like Schönbrunn. Street names, statues, buildings, memorials, 
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wife Elizabeth (1837-1898, nicknamed “Sissy” and from the Wittelsbach dynasty) have 
been immortalized and romanticized in films such as the Sissy trilogy that appeared in the 
1950s and starred Romy Schneider and Karlheinz Böhm. A German musical Elisabeth also 
appeared in the 1990s. There is a popular Elizabeth, “Sissy,” Museum in Vienna. 
Furthermore, one can buy Elizabeth chocolate and watch the Sissy cartoon series.  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
THE ANTI-ANSCHLUSS INDUSTRIES AND INDUSTRIALISTS, 1930-
1934 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 “Germany’s industry is a death sentence for Austrian industry.”1086 
 
 
As in the 1920s, Austrian industrialists and industries were divided on the Anschluss 
question in the period 1930 to 1934.1087 The Salzburger Chamber of Trade Secretary Dr. 
Erich Gebert and the Vienna Chamber of Trade President Friedrich Tilgner continued to 
support the Anschluss. On the other hand, the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie 
(main Austrian industrial association), in particular the Vice President Robert Ehrhart and 
the President Ludwig Urban, and Heinrich Lenhart, who became the Vice President of the 
Vienna Chamber of Trade, Business and Industry in 1932, continued to oppose the 
Anschluss. In 1931 Ehrhart stated that industries should not only seek self-preservation, but 
they should also seek patriotic interests.1088 
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The First Austrian Republic faced new ordeals in the early 1930s during the global 
depression and Creditanstalt catastrophe.1089 Although in 1931 most Austrian industrialists 
and industries favored an Austro-German customs union plan, the foes of an economic 
union remained resolute.1090 As in the 1920s, many Austrian businesses, such as the 
Austrian automobile, textile, chemical, electrical, and wood industries, continued to fear 
German competition in the early 1930s. These Austrian industries along with key Austrian 
industrialists, like Ehrhart, rejected both an economic and political union with Germany, but 
they favored a Danube Confederation. During the depression, the Americans, British, and 
French once again intervened with economic aid. Ultimately, with the help of the US, 
Britain, and France, the anti-Anschluss industries and industrialists prevailed in the troubled 
early and mid-1930s. 
 
II. Historiography 
The works of Jürgen Nautz, Franz Mathis, Hermann Kuprian, and Peter Fischer on 
the economic motivations of pro-Anschluss sentiments are also relevant to this chapter on 
industries and industrialists in the 1930s.1091 In addition to these authors, Karl Haas deals 
exclusively with the 1930s. Haas examines state control of the industry during the autocratic 
period. He focuses on industrial and other economic associations during Dollfuss’ fascist 
and undemocratic rule, and he states that with few exceptions they had to adapt to the new 
state. In response to the perception of a socialist and Nazi threat, by April 1934 the Austrian 
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chambers of trade were no longer independent, and they had to make an oath of loyalty to 
the state. According to Haas, “the economic associations of the Ständestaat1092 were not 
really autonomous. Their independence was . . . immensely shrunk by the state.”1093 The 
state even sent spies, loyal civil servants, into various chambers of trade in order to ensure 
their compliance. In addition, Haas states that by 1934, the Chambers of Trade and Business 
were aligned with Dollfuss’ Fatherland Party. The state formed a Reichsgewerbebundes, and 
Julius Raab,1094 Widmann, and Kresse controlled the Austrian chambers of trade.1095 
Therefore, the relevance of Haas’ work is that after 1934 the business associations were 
controlled by the state and no longer reflected the diverse opinions of their members vis-à-
vis the Anschluss. Like other authors on Austrian economy and industry, Haas focuses only 
on internal issues. 
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economic policies were based on more protectionism and regulations for Austrian industry. 
Haas, “Zum Problemkomplex,“  334-335, 337. 
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III. Industries and the Great Depression 
During the global depression in the 1930s, Austrian businesses hit rock bottom, and 
many industries had to lay off workers. By 1933 unemployment, which was the most visible 
sign of the global depression,1096 jumped from 8.8 percent to 26 percent.1097 Ehrhart reported 
that as a result, many Austrians found themselves in dire need of food and other 
necessities.1098 Most Austrian businesses and businessmen supported the Austro-German 
customs union in 1931. Yet, some industrialists and members of the chambers of trade still 
remained loyal to the cause of an independent Austria. The ısterreichische Hauptverband 
der Industrie continued to champion independence and to seek American and British credit 
as the best means to alleviate the depression.    
The severity of the drop in national income, economic growth, and industrial 
production in the 1930s in Austria was similar to that in the United States and Germany. 
According to Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, Austria was especially vulnerable to the global 
depression because it was a “small, advanced, industrialized, and trade-dependent country, 
constrained by an international economic environment of nationalism, retrenchment, 
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protectionism, and stagnant world trade.”1099 From 1928 to 1933 the Austrian textile 
industry shrank by about one-third. Shoe industry profits decreased from five to two million 
schilling, and the coal industry profits shrank twenty percent.1100 The chemical industry 
profit fell from 53 million to 21 million schilling, and the metal industry profit sank from 
323 million to 118 million schilling. Some industries suffered outright losses, like the utility 
companies.1101  In addition, because few people were building in Austria, no one was buying 
bricks, windows, doors, and wood. The decline in building had a ripple effect, negatively 
impacting the entire economy.1102 During the 1930s depression, state officials called 
Austria’s industrial sectors “industrial cemeteries.”1103 
During the Great Depression, industrial production overall dropped by about fifty 
percent, with the exception of sugar.1104 The Great Depression crippled the Austrian car 
industry. Austro-Daimler joined with Steyr Werke AG and Puchwerke AG to form Steyr-
Daimler-Puchwerke AG in 1932. By early 1934 the Austrian automobile industry had 
improved slightly with some exceptions. The Steyr-Daimler-Puchwerke factory in Wiener 
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Neustadt ceased production and shut-down in June 1934, while the car factories in Graz and 
Steyr continued to make some cars.1105 Moreover, Austrian textiles, the iron and steel 
sectors, paper, cotton, and bottle glass makers remained well below the production levels of 
the late 1920s. By 1933, the textile industry’s production was fifty-six percent of what it had 
been in 1927.1106 Iron and steel production had dropped fifty percent.1107 Also, during the 
depression there was a drastic deflation and workers’ wages decreased.1108 The Vice 
President of the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie, Ehrhart, asserted on November 
25, 1930 that “the economy was in serious danger.” In 1932, Ludwig Urban, the President of 
the industry association, warned that “Austrian industries are clinging on their 
existence.”1109 
In the course of the depression many industries demanded reforms to combat the 
economic crisis. Austrian anti-depression policies were both restrictionist and deflationary, 
and included increasing tariffs and lowering interest rates, wages, and taxes.1110 Many 
industries called for a decrease in production costs and the strengthening of the market. In 
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1930 the industries stated that many aspects of industrial production had to be reorganized, 
in particular interest rates and state regulations. Many industries, especially Austrian heavy 
industries, wanted higher tariffs in order to protect the Austrian domestic market from 
cheaper foreign goods. In addition, some industries, such as the chemical industry, were no 
longer willing to pay for unemployment insurance during the depression, and they asked for 
longer working hours for laborers as well.1111  
Besides the anti-depression domestic reforms, Austrian industries desperately needed 
foreign credit in the 1930s, especially because of their excessively high production costs.1112 
Both Ehrhart and Urban argued that the Austria shortage of credit during the depression was 
worse than during the monarchy or that of Austria’s neighbors. According to Ehrhart and 
Urban, “the Austrian economic problem is foremost a credit problem.”1113 Therefore, if one 
were able to solve the latter, then the former would resolve itself. Austrian existence was 
tied to credit. Ehrhart said that a “productive credit” only occurred when it effectively 
helped an industry escape bankruptcy and when the industry could pay the loan back. 
Ehrhart concluded that Austrian “production needs affordable foreign loans.”1114  
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The dire Austrian credit shortage in the early 1930s was overcome by loans from the 
US, Britain, and France. In the 1930s, Ehrhart, who had made long-term plans for the 
economic recovery and lowering of unemployment in Austria,1115 firmly believed that 
American and British loans, such as the 1932 Lausanne loan, were beneficial to Austria if 
they were accompanied by some trade reform.1116 The President of the Industry Club 
(Industriellen Klub) Dr. S. Brosche and secretary Dr. Ernst Mosing were responsible for the 
organization and distribution of credit to the Austrian industries.1117 In general, most 
industries and businesses in Austria favored foreign loans, and such outside credit helped 
save many Austrian businesses from the brink of disaster in the early and mid 1930s.1118 
However, similar to the 1920s, problems developed in the 1930s because the 
American, British, and French credits were much cheaper and had lower interest rates than 
the loans that the Austrian national banks allocated.1119 In response to competition from 
                                                                                                                                                      
simply wanted to know how his money was being used and would rather give his money 
directly to an industrial concern rather than to a province or state. 
 
1115Ehrhart, “Die Sanierung İsterreichs,“ (The Revitalization of Austria), 24 August 1932, 
folder 1. Invoice number 824.9. Ehrhart Papers. 
 
1116
 Ehrhart, “Die Sanierung İsterreichs,“ (The Revitalization of Austria), 24 August 1932, 
folder 1. Invoice number 824.9 and “Die wirtschaftspolitischen Vorgänge der letzten 
Monate,“ 8 August 1931. folder 1. Invoice number 824.12. Ehrhart Papers. Ehrhart listed 
some of the goals of the industry which were less state spending (Ersparungsprogram), 
greater use of the workforce, and a union of smaller businesses. 
 
1117
 Industriellen Klub, 28 March 1930. ÖVP Parteiarchiv. Box 74, “Industry.“ 
 
1118
 Ehrhart, “Die Sanierung İsterreichs,“ (The Revitalization of Austria), 24 August 1932, 
folder 1. Invoice number 824.9. Ehrhart Papers;  
 
1119
 The International Loan Committee had said that industrialized countries, such as France, 
Britain, and the USA, sent loans at low interest rates to Central Europe. “Internationale 
Zusammenhänge in der Arbeitsgeberpolitik.” folder 7. Invoice number 824.246. Ehrhart 
Papers. 
 363 
international loans, the banks had to lower interest rates. The industries in turn wanted more 
independence from the banks. Despite such minor problems, the loans brought about 
stabilization in Austria.1120   
Many Austrian industries welcomed foreign credits, which meant a difference 
between collapse and some economic revitalization. Those Austrian industries that favored 
foreign loans argued that unlike the late 1920s, during the early 1930s Austrian industries 
could not turn to Germany alone to solve Austria’s credit problem. Germany was 
undergoing a massive economic crisis of its own. Austria needed the help of the vast 
international community. Ehrhart asserted that, overall, with the help of international loans, 
Austria could survive the Great Depression. According to Ehrhart, Austrian industry was 
viable, and Austria could be a successful and independent nation if the state took initiatives. 
“May the regime and parliament do their thing, the industry is prepared.”1121  
Regardless of the influx of foreign credits, many Austrian industries and 
industrialists wanted an Anschluss with Germany during the depression. In 1933 the 
Federation of Austrian Industrialists and a delegate from the Austrian trade chamber Otto 
Friedländer went to Nazi Germany in order to initiate a political union.1122 Although, 
Friedländer was unsuccessful, his attempt shows the continued strong Anschluss desire 
among Austrian industrialists and industries in the early and mid-1930s. Friedländer was 
even willing to give Austria to Hitler. Rather than relying on foreigners, these pro-Anschluss 
                                                 
1120Ehrhart, no title, May 1933. folder 1. Ehrhart Papers. 
 
1121
 Ehrhart, “Industrie und Sanierung,” (Industry and Revitalization), no date. folder 1. 
Ehrhart Papers. 
 
1122
 Senft, “Economic Development and Economic Policies in the Ständestaat Era,” The 
Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment, 47. 
 364 
Austrian industrialists and industries continued to favor a joint German solution to 
depression. 
On the other hand, many industries, like the Austrian automobile, electric, and 
chemical companies, remained opposed to the Anschluss even in the troubled early 
1930s.1123 The anti-Anschluss Austrian industries still feared German competition. In 
addition, they contended that during the early 1930s Germany was not able to help them 
either, and instead they should cast their lot with the Americans and British. Furthermore, 
after 1933 many Austrian industries, especially if they were Jewish owned, did not want to 
join Nazi Germany. Therefore, during the worst of the Great Depression, many Austrian 
industries, as well as Ehrhart and Urban of the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie, 
continued to believe in the viability of a separate Austria and to rely on international loans.  
 
IV. Industries and the Austro-German Customs Union 
The devastating depression brought about the customs union attempt. Overall, most 
Austrian industries supported the customs union with Germany in 1931 because of the 
failure of alternatives. Indeed, some Austrian industries favored an economic union with 
Germany precisely because they believed that Austria would nonetheless remain politically 
independent.1124 Thus pro-Anschluss advocates supported the customs union as a stepping-
stone to political union, while others did so because they thought political independence 
could be preserved alongside economic union. Therefore, the customs union attracted 
support not only from the traditional pro-Anschluss camp, but also from some previous anti-
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Anschluss people. Nonetheless, some Austrian manufacturers, industrialists, and members of 
the chambers of trade and ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie expressed deep 
concern over the Austro-German customs union plan in 1931 because an economic union 
between a small state and a large industrial giant would mean the subjugation of Austria by 
Germany. Anti-Anschluss proponents, like Ehrhart, remained true to their cause. 
Richard Riedl, Friedrich Tilgner, and Rosenberg1125 of the Viennese Chamber of 
Trade, Business, and Industry gave their support for the customs union.1126 Riedl had said 
that the Austrians had two choices, customs union with Germany or Bolshevism. Both Riedl 
and Tilgner rejected the alternatives, such as a Danube Confederation or alliance with fascist 
Italy, and argued that the Austro-German customs union was the only way to improve the 
desperate economic situation. Riedl began preparing the Chamber of Trade for a customs 
union and even proposed tariff rates for the planned customs union between Germany and 
Austria.1127 The Salzburg Chamber of Trade also supported a customs union.1128  
The advocates of a customs union used the economic plight of Austria as the main 
argument for necessitating such an economic union or even a complete Anschluss. The pro-
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customs union industrialists and businesses pointed not to Switzerland but rather to Bavaria, 
which had greatly profited from its incorporation into a larger German economy as an 
example.1129 Also, the pro-Anschluss Secretary of the Salzburger Handelskammer (Chamber 
of Trade), Erich Gebert, said that the future belonged to larger economic units.1130 Gebert 
stated that the advantages of an economic union would be far greater if Austria merged with 
Germany rather than culturally, spiritually, and economically alien partners like Hungary 
and Poland.1131 In addition, Gebert asserted that “right now Austria is making an effort, 
through expensive promotions from the United States and Great Britain, to approach 
foreigners, when right before its gate, it has tremendous resources of people.”1132 In 
particular, Austria and Germany should cooperate in Austria’s hydro-electric energy 
industries.1133 Gebert was asking why Austria turned toward Great Britain and America, 
when it could turn toward Germany. In September 1931 the Viennese Chamber of Trade 
member Hermann Kandl criticized the decision of the International Court at the Hague that 
forbade the customs union.1134 
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However, not all of the Austrian industries and members of the Austrian chambers of 
trade and the Hauptverband der Industrie favored a customs union with Germany. Urban 
and Ehrhart of the Hauptverband der Industrie in particular were against an Austro-German 
customs union.1135 Speaking at the Hauptverband der Industrie Präsidialkonferenz in 
1931,1136 Ehrhart advocated a union with Hungary instead of Germany. Urban was deeply 
concerned over the customs union, in particular because of the danger it posed that Austria 
would be flooded with German goods.1137 Also, Redner of the Chamber of Trade opposed 
the Austro-German customs union.1138 Redner and other opponents asserted that an 
economic union had many problems, such as coming to a bilateral agreement on tariffs and 
taxes. In 1931 Germany had much lower tariffs than Austria. Austria and Germany would 
have to agree which goods should be taxed, like foreign automobiles or luxury items.1139    
In addition, the Vice President of the Chamber of Trade in Vienna Heinrich Lenhart 
came out against the customs union. After the International Court ruling against the union on 
November 1, 1931, Lenhart contended that for the last ten years the chamber’s policies had 
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“gone in the wrong direction.” Lenhart went on to say that the Chamber of Trade should 
drop past policies, favoring an economic union and Anschluss, and pursue a new course.1140  
Moreover, many Austrian industries came out against the customs union. The Kaolin 
factory, which specialized in porcelain and paper, sent a letter to the Bundesministerium für 
Handel und Verkehr, Handelpolitische Abteilung (the Austrian ministry for Trade and 
Commerce, trade and political section) stating that even though Kaolin was not a member of 
the Hauptverband der Industrie, it still wanted to be heard. The Kaolin factory feared that 
German industries would buy them out of business.1141 In the event of a customs union, the 
Austrian chemical industry demanded higher tariffs to protect its business. The Austrian 
leather, paper, lead, linoleum, and wool industries also wanted higher tariffs to guard against 
German competition during an economic union.1142 The Austrian automobile industry 
opposed a customs union with Germany. The Austrian automobile industry contended that 
German automobile-makers would take them over or run them out of business.1143 Despite 
the fact that most Austrian industries desired a customs union in 1931,1144 the opponents 
remained firm and supported Austrian economic independence.  
 
V. Industries and the Danube Confederation 
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 Opponents of the Austro-German customs union offered the alternative of a Danube 
Confederation, even though it was one that had repeatedly failed to find many supporters in 
the previous decade. The ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie had about fifteen-
hundred members in 1932,1145 and under Vice President Ehrhart and President Urban the 
industrial association favored the creation of a Danube Confederation.1146 Variations of the 
Danube Confederation had been proposed several times throughout the inter-war period, 
including a French version called the Tardieu plan.   
In 1932 Ehrhart said that he was deeply committed to the Danube Confederation. It 
was economically beneficial because it would improve the standard of living among the 
Danube states. It would re-open historic trade routes that the Habsburg successor states had 
obstructed. Ehrhart stated that he wanted this plan carried forward despite the obstacles it 
faced. According to Ehrhart, Austria as an industrial exporter should join in a customs union 
with mostly agrarian countries. If Czechoslovakia, which was also industrialized, joined the 
Danube Confederation as well, then the agrarian regions should be enlarged so as to provide 
sufficient markets for both and avoid ruinous competition. Ehrhart said that the Danube 
Confederation would greatly improve the livelihood of the Habsburg successor states that 
were all experiencing severe economic depression. The Danube Confederation was the most 
advantageous and desired solution for the Austrian trade problem and a necessary key to 
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survival or “Lebensnot” for Austria.1147 The Danube Confederation was an alternative to the 
Anschluss, and Ehrhart contended that everything must be done to keep Austria independent 
from Germany.1148 Despite Ehrhart’s firm support, the Danube Confederation Plan in 1932, 
ultimately, failed due to the same reasons previous attempts failed.  
 
VI. Industries, the Christian Social Party, and the Fatherland Party 
Many Austrian industrialists had ties to the Christian Social Party. These 
industrialists shared the Christian Social Party’s commitment against socialism, 
communism, and an Anschluss with Germany.1149 Furthermore, the Christian Social Party 
member, Victor Kienbıck, who was the Austrian Finance Minister and head of the Austrian 
national bank in the 1920s, supported foreign loans and the Anschluss prohibition.1150 The 
Christian Social Party governments influenced the Chambers of Trade and set Austrian 
economic policies during the inter-war that included maintaining Austrian independence.1151 
In the 1930s, however, many Austrian industrialists who had previously made a 
commitment to the Christian Social Party increasingly transferred their support to Dollfuss 
and the Vaterland Partei even before the Christian Social Party had officially dissolved. 
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In the 1930s Austrian industry developed strong ties to Dollfuss and his patriotic 
Fatherland Party, which was authoritarian, Austro-fascist, anti-Nazi, and anti-Anschluss.  
Lenhart, the Vice President of the Viennese Chamber of Trade, Business, and Industry, sent 
Dollfuss congratulatory letters in May 1932.1152 Many industrialists were members of the 
Fatherland Party, especially the Bergbau (coal mining) industry.1153 In April 1934, 63 of the 
1505 members of the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie were members of the 
Fatherland Party, while 391 had applied for membership with the Fatherland Party.1154 On 
June 9, 1934, the majority of the members of the Hauptverband der Industrie voted in favor 
of directly linking themselves with the Fatherland Party.1155 They created a sub-group called 
the Industrie des Vaterländischen Front (Industry of the Fatherland Party). Dr. 
Winkelmeier, Dr. Blocher, and Dr. Schneider, Dr. Margaretha, and Dr.Wanschura headed 
the Industrie des Vaterländischen Front. Even Ehrhart1156 himself warmly welcomed the 
integration of the Fatherland Party and the Hauptverband der Industrie.1157 
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However, by 1933 some Austrian industries and industrialists supported Nazism 
rather than Dollfuss. Similar to the Fatherland Party, the Nazi Party likewise appealed to 
anti-socialist, anti-democratic, and right-wing industrialists. The main differences between 
the two parties were that Nazi Party was German nationalist, much more anti-Semitic, and 
pro-Anschluss. By 1933 some of the Austrian industries and members of the Chambers of 
Trade and ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie were under Nazi influence. For 
example, in September 1933, industrialists and businessmen met in the province of Styria 
and sharply criticized the regime, waving Nazi flags.1158 Nonetheless, by 1934 only a 
minority of Austrian industries and industrialists embraced the Nazi Party, which Dollfuss 
had banned. 
During the Ständestaat, the political parties were superseded (“verdrängt”) by the 
Fatherland Party.1159 The workers’ industrial union, the Christian Social Party, and the 
Christian Gewerkschaften (unions) met in February 1934, before their dissolution, in order 
to come to an agreement on loan politics, schilling reform, and workers’ passes.1160 The 
Dollfuss regime had first crushed the socialists and their unions. Afterwards the state 
dissolved the Christian Social Party, whose origins went back to the nineteenth century, and 
Christian, non-socialist unions. This marked the elimination of the last remnant of workers’ 
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unions and organizations. By late 1934 most Austrian industries and industrialists belonged 
to the one official state party, Dollfuss’ Fatherland Party. Most Austrian industrialists were 
fiercely anti-socialist, and they supported Dollfuss in terms of his violent suppression of the 
socialists and labor unions. Therefore, Dollfuss and the business community had similar 
views regarding the “red threat.” However, the creation of an autocratic and one party 
government did little to improve industries. The economic downturn continued during the 
Ständestaat; for example, the Marchegger Maschinenfabrik closed in 1935, and in 1936 the 
large insurance company Phönix collapsed.1161   
 
VII. Conclusion 
The Austrian industries and industrialists had different views on the Anschluss issue 
in the period 1930 to 1934. Furthermore, by 1933 these differences were complicated by the 
rise of the Nazis. The Austrian business community, which had previously predominantly 
voted for the Christian Social Party, had not only defected to Dollfuss’ Fatherland Party that 
sought to maintain Austrian independence, but also to the Nazi Party that sought an 
Anschluss.   
The fact is that, despite their massive effort, the pro-Anschluss industries, 
businessmen, and chambers of trade officials failed to achieve an Anschluss in the time 
period from 1930 to 1934. There are two main reasons for their failure. First, their pro-
Anschluss ambitions were countered by the many industries and Chamber of Trade officials 
who were against a union with Germany. Both President Urban and Vice President Ehrhart 
of the ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie opposed an Anschluss, but welcomed a 
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Danube Confederation and an independent Austria.1162 Ehrhart had been a true Austrian 
patriot who believed in the economic and political viability of Austria. Also, Lenhart, Vice 
President of the Vienna Chamber of Trade, Industry, and Business, had demanded Austrian 
state loyalty and conformity from the Handelskammern.1163 Anti-Anschluss businesses 
claimed that the economic disadvantages of an Anschluss for Austria were higher taxes, 
higher interest rates, and more regulations.1164 In 1932 the Staatswehr wrote that an 
Anschluss would “ruin Austrian industry.” Similar to the Hauptverband der Industrie, the 
Staatswehr favored other alternatives to aid Austrian industries, like a Danube 
Confederation or some other plan for closer ties to the successor states of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.1165   
Second, American, British, and French policies that included an Anschluss 
prohibition and conditional loans weakened the Anschluss desire of Austrian industries. 
Ehrhart and Urban regarded the loans as necessary for the independence of not only 
Austrian industry, but also the Austrian nation.1166 Most of the Austrian Chambers of Trade 
supported the Lausanne loan, with the obvious exception of hardliners like Tilgner and the 
Austrian industrialist Dr. Geiringer, who never ceased to demand an Anschluss.1167  
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Nonetheless, at a Präsidialkonferenz the Viennese Chamber of Trade Vice President 
Lenhart demanded on March 28, 1934, that the chamber abandon its pro-Anschluss policies. 
He said that the Chamber of Trade should make a “one-hundred and eighty degree change.” 
Disillusioned that the Handelskammern were not following a pro-Anschluss direction, both 
Tilgner and Riedl1168 resigned from the Viennese Chamber of Trade in April 1934.1169  
 Ultimately, despite his undemocratic and oppressive regime, Dollfuss had strong 
support from the business sectors. In fact, it was especially because of his oppression of the 
left —socialists and unions— that many industrialists embraced him. On December 11, 
1933, the Minister of Trade Friedrich Stockinger1170 gave a speech before many 
industrialists confirming his loyalty to the Austrian state. At the same meeting, the 
Hauptverband der Industrie President Urban, praised Dollfuss for having saved a broken 
economy. Urban stated that Dollfuss’ policies would bring economic rejuvenation to the 
country, and he gave Dollfuss full support in maintaining a “free” and “happy” Austria. The 
top industrial leaders supported Dollfuss, as well.1171 Thus, the anti-Anschluss industries and 
industrialists not only welcomed international opposition to political or economic union 
between Austria and Germany but also embraced the Dollfuss regime.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
 The combination of an anti-Anschluss minority within Austria—composed of the 
majority of the Christian Social Party, the legitimists, and some industrialists—and British 
and American financial support from outside helped enable an independent Austria to 
survive through the attempted Nazi putsch of 1934. The United States and Britain based 
their foreign policy on preserving Austrian independence and preventing an Anschluss with 
Germany. However, in contrast to the other major powers, like France, the US and Britain 
were willing to compromise on the Anschluss issue if the union occurred peacefully and 
with the permission of the international community.  
In response to the rising Anschluss movement and the economic deprivation in 
Austria, the United States and Britain led the way in procuring food relief and long-term 
loans for Austrian economic reconstruction. The Americans and British were Austria’s 
biggest foreign donors, loaners, and investors from 1918 to 1934. Immediately after World 
War I, Hoover’s American Relief Administration, ARA, fed thousands of starving 
Austrians, especially children. This philanthropic aid was followed by substantial loans and 
investments from both the Britain and the United States throughout the 1920s. Most of the 
American loans came from private investors, such as J. P. Morgan & Company. 
Furthermore, the US and Britain helped secure Austrian political borders and 
independence in this time period. Following Professor A. C. Coolidge’s suggestions, Wilson 
and Lloyd George allowed Austria to gain contested regions, like the Burgenland and 
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Carinthia. In the 1920s, the series of American Republican presidents and their cabinets, as 
well as the British Conservative and Labour prime ministers, supported the First Austrian 
Republic. They refused to recognize the 1921 provincial separatist movements. 
American and British economic aid and support of Austrian independence continued 
in the 1930s. During the Great Depression, American and British funds decreased but did 
not disappear entirely. The main international loan in the 1930s was the Lausanne loan, 
which the major powers allocated during the Hoover and Macdonald governments. When 
Hitler came to power, Great Britain, the US, and other countries also came out more 
strongly against a union.  
Besides economic and financial ties, the United States, Britain, and Austria had 
strong cultural relations, as was evident in the many organizations of international 
cooperation as well as exchanges of people and art from 1918 to 1934. Americans and 
Britons viewed Austrian culture favorably, and such an attitude facilitated the pro-Austrian 
policies of democratically-elected governments toward a former enemy. Reciprocally, 
American films and books and not just American dollars influenced Austria and the rest of 
Europe.1172 
 Most Austrians opposed the policies of the major powers that included the Anschluss 
prohibition and foreign credits. The minority groups that did support an independent Austria 
and cooperated with the major powers from 1918 to 1934 were predominantly the Christian 
Socials, the legitimists, and the anti-Anschluss industries and industrialists. Despite different 
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views over the monarchy question, the legitimists, Christian Socials, and some industrialists 
shared the common goal of upholding the independence of Austria.1173 
 The Christian Socials were anti-Anschluss, anti-socialist, anti-Prussian, and anti-
Protestant. On the other hand, they supported the state of Austria and the Catholic Church. 
Christian Socials even sympathized with the monarchist cause. The Christian Socials led the 
government from 1920 to 1934, even though they were in a minority. The Greater Coalition 
between the Christian Social Party and the Greater German People’s Party made it possible 
for Christian Social political leadership to dominate the Austrian government while 
excluding the socialists. Indeed, the Greater Germans sacrificed their Anschluss position for 
anti-socialism, and the Christian Social Party and the Greater German People’s Party formed 
this coalition because of their common enemy. In 1932 Dollfuss established a new coalition 
that left both the Greater Germans and socialists in opposition. Without sufficiently broad 
support to rule democratically, Dollfuss then suspended parliament and formed a new 
Austro-fascist state in which both the socialist and Nazi parties were banned. 
              Monarchists saw the Anschluss movement as an obstacle to bringing about the 
return of the Habsburgs. Although the monarchists were ardent foes of an Anschluss from 
1918 to 1934, they were few and divided. Especially after the Dollfuss assassination, the 
US, Britain, and France partly sympathized with the legitimist cause over Nazism. After the 
Anschluss, many legitimists fled to the United States and Britain.  
            Also, many Austrian industries and industrialists were likewise anti-Anschluss 
because they did not want competition from Germany and believed that Austria was 
economically viable on its own. The Austrian chemical, automobile, and electric industries 
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were especially anti-Anschluss. The ısterreichische Hauptverband der Industrie opposed a 
union with Germany, as did many members of the Austrian chambers of trade.  
            Nevertheless, intense political factionalism had prevented a united stance of the 
Austrian nationalists under Dollfuss when Nazism first appeared in Austria and continued 
during World War II. Even as refuges in the US and Britain, the monarchists could not come 
to an agreement with other exile groups, like the socialists. The Austrian nationalists failed 
in their attempts at creating an Austrian battalion to fight Nazi Germany and establishing an 
official Austrian government. Even in exile, after Nazi Germany had occupied Austria, the 
monarchists and Christian Socials refused to cooperate with the Austrian socialists who had 
abandoned their Anschluss support by 1933. This and the fact that the most Austrians had 
supported Nazism in World War II, meant that while other countries, like France, Poland, 
and Czechoslovakia, had governments in exile, Austria did not.  
In order to keep Austria independent, the Americans, British, and Austrian 
nationalists had to combat the economic, national, and cultural motivations that were driving 
the Anschluss movement. In the period 1918 to 1934, many foreign affairs documents and 
newspaper reports attest to the poor economic conditions in Austria and the general 
acceptance of the Anschluss by Austrians. Most Austrians did not believe that their nation 
was economically viable on its own, and they sought other solutions, including a Danube 
Confederation with neighbor states. Political and ethnic tensions between Austria and its 
neighbors prevented a trade union among the Habsburg successor states and heightened the 
Austrian Anschluss movement. Because of their ethnic, cultural, and historic ties, Austrian 
Anschluss supporters argued that Austria should naturally turn toward Germany, not to the 
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United States, Britain, France, Italy, and other European countries. Thus, Austrian Anschluss 
advocates considered a Greater Germany as the best solution to the Austrian problem.  
 The economic recovery that had been accomplished by the late 1920s due primarily 
to international loans was undermined by the global depression. When the depression hit in 
1929-1930, it marked another turbulent and unstable period in Austria in which the demand 
for an Anschluss rose once again. In 1931 Austria requested an Austro-German customs 
union, which most Austrians wanted.   
Once Hitler came to power, Nazi pro-Anschluss propaganda utilized German 
nationalism, preaching ”Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer!” Nazi propaganda included the 
dropping of leaflets from the sky, the plastering of signs on walls, and the transmission of 
overt radio messages. The Nazis also undertook an enormous terrorism campaign in Austria 
that ranged from bomb attacks to assassinations. Nazi tactics turned Austrian sentiment 
against a union. Up to the emergence of Nazi Germany, most Austrians—especially the 
socialists, the Greater German People’s Party, and even a minority faction of the Christian 
Socials—wanted an Anschluss.  
Furthermore, in addition to economic problems and nationalism, the new Austrian 
state suffered from serious identity problems. The major powers had imposed nationhood on 
a group of ethnic Germans that, without any prior national identity of their own, did not 
want it. In the period 1918 to 1934, the Christian Social Party and its leaders, who sought to 
maintain Austrian independence, had to contend with both greater German nationalism as 
well as powerful regionalisms that threatened to undermine the newly created nation. A 
heightened sense of regionalism existed in the Austrian provinces, like Tyrol and Salzburg. 
Historian Stanley Suval adds the idea of “cultural unviability,” in which the Austrians saw 
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their state as being too small to “support a satisfactory culture.”1174 The Austrian Christian 
conservatives attempted to foster a separate Austrian national identity, but, ultimately, they 
failed. When the Anschluss finally did take place in March 1938, whatever tenuous and 
fragile identity with the Austrian state that had been created evaporated almost instantly and 
totally.  
The lack of Austrian identity during the inter-war period contributed to the Austrian 
response to the Nazi invasion on March 11, 1938,1175 where Austrians threw flowers at 
German troops and masses of Austrian people enthusiastically welcomed Hitler. Four years 
after an outpouring of support at Dollfuss’ funeral, Austrians tore down his statue in Graz 
and enthusiastically welcomed Hitler.1176 The Austrian Catholic Church, including Cardinal 
Theodor Innitzer, and even many socialists, like Karl Renner, suddenly came out in favor of 
union with Nazi Germany. Ultimately, the majority of Austrians either acquiesced in or 
enthusiastically greeted the Nazi takeover. At least during the years of Nazi ascendancy, and 
in the view of some historians even to the end of the war, most were in agreement with Nazi 
policies of anti-socialism, anti-communism, German nationalism, anti-Semitism, and 
economic betterment (often at the expense of expropriated Austrian Jews).1177   
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 Many factors contributed to the realization of the Anschluss in March 1938. Mussolini, 
who had previously supported, funded, and distributed arms to Austria and who had been 
willing to militarily intervene in 1934, joined the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936. Schuschnigg 
dissolved the Heimwehr in 1936, and when the Nazis invaded in 1938 he ordered Austrian 
troops not to intervene in order to prevent bloodshed. Although, the Austrian army could not 
have stopped the invading Nazi German army, Schuschnigg could have made a symbolic 
gesture against Nazism. When Nazi Germany invaded there was little resistance because 
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Despite this ignominious end, Austria had survived as a functioning parliamentary 
democracy until 1933 and as an independent country until 1938. In retrospect, this does not 
compare unfavorably with most other countries in East Central Europe that also first lost 
their democratic governments and then their independence to German aggression. A 
significant difference was that those countries enjoyed broad popular and national support 
for their independence, while minority factions in Austria had to contend with just the 
opposite, namely a strong movement against the very existence of Austria as an independent 
state. 
That an Austrian collapse and attempted Anschluss did not take place in the period 
1918 to 1934 was due in no small part to Anglo-American economic diplomacy. The US 
and Britain cooperated with Austrian nationalists, such as Ignaz Seipel, Dollfuss, Ernst 
Rődiger von Starhemberg, Baron Georg Franckenstein, Edgar Prochnik, and Robert Ehrhart, 
                                                                                                                                                      
most Austrians-- even if before the invasion they had not necessarily been Nazi per se-- 
shared some of the same views. Thus, Austrians were able to adapt to the new regime. 
Bukey contends that most Austrians willingly welcomed the Anschluss and participated in 
Hitler’s war effort until the end of the war. Radomír Luza asserts that more than two-thirds 
of the members of the Nazi Party in Austria joined after the German invasion in March. 
Before the Anschluss in February 1938, Nazi Party membership in Austria was about 
127,000. In 1942 the party membership had risen to about 688,478. Moreover, according to 
Heidemarie Uhl, although the Nazis had been a minority in Austria until 1938, by 1942 
Austria had a higher percentage of Nazis than Germany. Günter Bischof and Barbara 
Jelavich argue that opposition in Austria from 1938 to 1945 was minimal--only about 2,700 
Austrian resistors were ever executed-- yet, the population in general cooperated in the 
persecution of 220,000 Austrian Jews. Austrians ignored the Allied Moscow declaration of 
1943 that stated Austria was the first victim of Nazism and the Anschluss was “null and 
void.” Bukey also notes that some of the worst Nazis, including Hitler himself, Adolf 
Eichmann, and Ernst Kaltenbrunner came from Austria. Radomír Luza, Austro-German 
Relations in the Anschluss Era (London: Princeton Press, 1975), 118-119; Heidemarie Uhl,  
”The Politics of Memory: Austria’s Perception of the Second World War and the National 
Socialist Period.” Austrian Historical Memory, 66, 69-70; Bischof, ”Founding Myths and 
Compartmentalized Past: New Literature on the Construction, Hibernation, and 
Deconstruction of World War II Memory in Postwar Austria.” Austrian Historical Memory, 
327; Jelavich, Modern Austria, 241; See also, Bukey, Hitler’s Austria. 
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in support of Austria. The fact that during this time Italy still supported an independent 
Austria was also significant. Therefore, there was a huge contrast between July 1934 and 
March 1938. In July 1934 most Austrians and the international community were equally 
outraged at the assassination of Dollfuss and attempted Nazi coup. In March 1938, 
abandoned and alone, Austria collapsed like a house of cards. 
 After the defeat of Nazi Germany, Austria once again became a sovereign nation in 
1945.1178 A Catholic conservative government ruled Austria, which underwent a long denial 
phase after World War II in which it portrayed Austria as the first victim of German 
aggression and blamed anything pertaining to Nazi atrocities on the Germans. After a 
horrible union with Germany from 1938 to 1945, most Austrians today embrace their 
independence, and unlike the inter-war period Austria has become a prosperous country.  
 Since the end of the Cold War, Austria is trying to find its new place in Central 
Europe and has opened businesses and trading relations with the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary, and others. Today Austria is a member of both European Union 
and the United Nations. The city of Vienna continues to thrive with its rich cultural history, 
Habsburg nostalgia, and importance as a center of commerce in the heart of Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1178Allied troops withdrew in 1955. 
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